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ABSTRACT 
 
 
SARAH S KHAN. Managerial risk in information technology investments: effects of 
framing, narrow framing and time inconsistent preferences on real options exercise 
decisions. (Under the direction of DR. MOUTAZ J. KHOUJA and DR. RAM L. 
KUMAR) 
 
 
Real options theory has been advocated as a solution to risky IT investment 
decisions. IT investments decisions are risky due to uncertainty around future outcomes 
and the inability of traditional financial measures (like NPV, IRR) to account for 
inherent managerial flexibility. On the one hand, it is argued that real options analysis 
captures and formalizes managers’ intuition, hence creating a disciplined decision 
making process. On the other hand, the intuitive valuation of the options is criticized 
due to the prevalent effects of various judgmental biases. In this dissertation, we explore 
three potential biases that can affect the real option exercise decisions in terms of either 
suboptimal option exercise choice due to framing and narrow framing effects, or 
suboptimal exercise time due to time inconsistent preferences of IT managers. We test 
for framing effects in individual IT project decisions and narrow framing effects in IT 
portfolio decisions, by conducting an online experiment among top and mid-level IT 
professionals. The results show that  IT professionals are prone to framing real options 
at exercise time and simplifying complicated real option exercise decisions by isolating 
them in IT portfolios. Further, their decisions are influenced by their personal risk 
preferences. 
We analyze the effect of time-inconsistent preferences of present-biased 
managers on the exercise time of real growth and abandonment options and the realized 
values using a discrete time option valuation model. The results show that present-
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biased managers are more likely to exercise growth options early when the net payoffs 
are low, the growth option payoffs have high volatility, and the risk free discount rate is 
small. Also, present-biased managers are more likely to exercise abandonment option 
late when the net payoffs from continuing the project are high, salvage value of the 
project is low, and the rate of change in the salvage value over the period of time is low. 
In addition, present biased managers are more likely to exercise a growth option early in 
its life when the project is performing well. We provide implications for practice and IT 
governance. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
All of us appreciate having options while making decisions. This is particularly 
true in case of difficult decisions involving high stakes. Such decisions include money 
back guarantees, exchange options for our purchases, option to withdraw from a course 
in school, liquidity in our investments and variety of products to select from. These 
daily life options are usually obvious and we tend to take them into account while 
making decisions. These options provide the 
decision maker with an hedge against negative 
outcomes, also known as risk.  The case of 
Information Technology (IT) investment decisions 
is similar, where some security is appreciated for 
the risk involved in the investment, because IT 
investments are considered high risk endeavors.  
IT investments have been a focus of research due to their importance in 
organizations and as a result, the amount of resources organizations allocate to them. 
Large scale IT projects are especially categorized as high risk- high return endeavors 
(Benaroch, Jeffery, Kaufman and Shah, 2007). It is difficult to accurately estimate cash 
flows for these projects due to their intangible nature, and these projects have a long 
term impact on organizations’ strategic standing (Campbell, 2002; Kumar, 2002, 
Lederer and Prasad, 1993). Hence, inherent uncertainty and incomplete knowledge in 
There is one important caveat 
to the notion that we live in a 
new economy, and that is 
human psychology . . . which 
appears essentially immutable. 
Alan Greenspan 
Speech at the UC at Berkeley 
September 4, 1998 
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many IT investments (Sullivan et al., 1999) pose a limitation in assessing their true 
value. This makes the justification and evaluation of these irreversible investments 
difficult. (Benaroch and Kauffman, 1999).  
IT investments are typically evaluated through simple yet less structured 
financial techniques like cost benefit analysis, critical success factors, internal rate of 
return (IRR), and net present value (NPV) (Benaroch and Kauffman, 1999). On the one 
hand, such methods are easy to use, but on the other hand, these methods are criticized 
for not accurately estimating the true benefits of these investments. For example. NPV 
method is repeatedly criticized for undervaluing the IT investments (Kambil et al., 
1993; Kester, 1984), along with its inability to take into account the managerial 
flexibility in IT investments to change the course of the project. Managerial flexibility 
means changing the course of the project based on its performance as well as changing 
business needs. Also, IT investment decisions are risky because significant uncertainty 
prevails around future payoffs from the investment and information available at the time 
of decision is ill-structured. Hence it becomes challenging for the IT managers to 
evaluate the IT investments under these circumstances, where the limitations of net 
present value (NPV) approach does not make the situation easy.  
These limitations of traditional capital budgeting approaches and challenges of 
IT investment decisions led towards the exploration of valuation methods that could 
appropriately value managerial flexibility. One of such approaches included applying 
the real options theory (ROT) from finance for assessing the value of IT investments 
(Taudes, 1998; Benaroch and Kauffman, 1999; Keil and Flatto, 1999; Taudes et al., 
2000; Benaroch, 2002). It is due to the theory’s ability to handle uncertainty by 
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accounting for the embedded flexibility in IT projects where managers can exploit the 
future opportunities created by the these projects while curtailing the inherent risks 
(Benaroch, 2002; Bowman and Moskowitz, 2002). 
IT project possesses a real option when it offers the opportunity, but not the 
obligation, to take some action in the future in response to endogenous (within the firm) 
or exogenous (in the business environment) events (Benaroch & Kauffman, 1999). Real 
options valuation extends the use of financial options pricing models to value 
nonfinancial assets. Real options value goes beyond NPV to include the values of the 
options that are created when a series of repeated decisions can be made sequentially 
concerning an ongoing capital-investment stream. Thus by allowing for managerial 
flexibility in decision making, real options approach allowed more accurate valuation of 
capital investments by limiting the inherent risk (Benaroch & Kauffman, 1999; Tiwana 
et al. 2006). 
Several studies have focused on using the real options theory in IT investment 
and project management. These applications range from conceptualization of IT 
investments in the real options context (Kumar 1996; 2002), valuation of the real 
options (Taudes, 1998; Benaroch & Kauffman, 1999; Keil & Flatto, 1999; Taudes et al., 
2000; Benaroch, 2002) and intuitive recognition and valuation of real options, also 
known as real options thinking (Fitchman et al., 2005; Tiwana et al., 2006). A recent 
stream of research has started to explore if managerial intuition is in agreement with the 
ROT. Some studies show that managerial intuition typically responds in the correct 
direction to the factors that determine normative real options values, even without 
explicit real options methods or training (Bowman and Hurry, 1993; McDonald, 2000; 
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McGrath, 1997;   McGrath, 1999, Miller & Arikan, 2004). According to this school of 
thought, formal real options analysis adds logical support and quantitative precision to 
managerial intuition but does not differ qualitatively. But another school of thought 
argues that intuition is not always qualitatively consistent with real options analysis 
(Busby and Pitts, 1997; Lankton & Luft, 2008; Tiwana eta l., 2006, 2007; Millar and 
Shapira, 2004). Also, prior field and survey studies find that consistency between 
managerial intuition and real option values varies across option types and settings 
(Benaroch et al., 2006; Busby & Pitts, 1997; Lankton & Luft, 2008; Tiwana et al., 2006; 
Tiwana et al. 2007). Our motivation comes from this stream of research. 
In this dissertation, we take lead from the current IS literature on the recognition 
and valuation of real options in IT investments and projects, and managerial biases 
affecting their recognition as well as value. This stream of literature gives us insights on 
the intricacies involved while qualitatively recognizing and valuing real options in an IT 
investment before committing to them, and how susceptible this process of estimated 
value of real options is to the managerial biases. We move away from the qualitative 
recognition and valuation problem and build our case on the realized value of real 
options. Other things held constant, real options’ value depends on its optimal exercise 
(Kumar, 2002). Optimal exercise of an option includes deciding on whether to exercise 
the option, and if it needs to be exercised, then exercising it at the time when it is most 
valuable. This makes studying the real option exercise decisions as important as their 
recognition and valuation. Finding no evidence of such studies in the IS literature, we 
explore what biases can impact these cognitively challenging decisions? Hence, we try 
to understand what anomalies underlie real options exercise decisions.  
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In this dissertation, we identify three managerial biases that can affect real 
options value by impacting the respective exercise decisions. We take help from 
behavioral economics to identify these potential anomalies, which are, framing effects 
in individual IT projects, narrow faming effects in IT portfolios and effects of time 
inconsistent preferences on real option exercise decisions. We propose to use these 
theories to fulfill the objective of this dissertation while utilizing two methodological 
approaches i.e. survey experiment and analytical models with numerical analysis.  
Results from this research will change how the use of real options is perceived 
and justified in IT investments context. Theoretically, these results will highlight the 
importance of real option exercise decisions, where their mere recognition is not 
enough. Also it will add to the understanding of real options use in complex scenarios 
of IT portfolio management. In practice, results from this study will show that use of 
real options is a complicated valuation method, which is prone to judgmental anomalies. 
Use of real options in practice requires training and experience, and mere intuitions can 
lead to underutilizing the full potential of this approach. Hence, flexibility in decision 
making via real options does not always mean freedom in IT projects selection and 
management, but require training, experience and control measures to make a better use 
of real options approach.  
This research also highlights the importance of human decision making in 
complex situations concerning IT investments and project management. These decisions 
are taken in volatile environment with high uncertainty and immense pressure, 
especially when firms’ competence is at stake. Recognizing where the decision makers 
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can go wrong, is a first step towards devising better IT investment management 
techniques, especially that controls for human biases. 
The rest of the document is structured as follows. Next it presents the literature 
review on real options in the IT context. The following three chapters give details on 
individual studies; consisting of respective underlying theories, 
hypotheses/propositions, methodologies, and results. Chapter 6 concludes this 
document. 
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to document the evolution of our understanding of 
real options in IT investments i.e. the real option theory in IT. It develops a detailed 
taxonomy and tracks the direction of this research stream along with facilitating the 
overview of the real options theory in IT. The chapter is organized as follows. In the 
first section, conceptualization of real options in the context of IT investments is 
described. Section 2 discusses literature on real options quantitative valuation in IT 
investments. Section 3 focuses on the application of real option methodology for IT 
investments followed by evidence of application from literature in Section 5. Section 6 
summarizes literature on real option thinking and impact of managerial intuition. 
Section 7 concludes the chapter.  
2.1 Conceptualizing Real Options for IT Investments 
A real option is commonly defined as “any decision that creates the right, but 
not an obligation, to pursue a subsequent decision” (Janney and Dess, 2004). In the 
same vein, Real Options Analysis (ROA) is defined as a method to evaluate investment 
decisions under uncertainty, irreversibility of cost and high managerial flexibility in 
structuring the investment (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).  Real options are used as a formal 
modeling tool for specific decisions, as well as informally for framing decisions in a 
different light (Janney and Dess, 2004; Kogut, and Kulatilaka, 2001), and their 
conceptualization for IT investments is no different. On the one hand they are used as a 
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formal modeling tool for managing IT investments (e.g. Dos Santos, 1991; Benaroch 
and Kauffman 1999; 2000) and on the other hand, they are used intuitively to value 
flexibility in the IT investment (Fitchman et al., 2005; Benaroch et al., 2006). A key 
premise of real options analysis is the economic value associated with resolving 
uncertainty associated with any decision. While doing so, upside potentials of the 
decisions are left open while losses are capped. Hence real options analysis is a decision 
making tool, mostly used in the face of uncertainty. 
It is important to note the main difference between real options and financial 
options. Although both concepts are applied for valuing the risk hedging strategies, yet 
real options are different from financial options on one ground i.e. the asset underlying 
the option. In case of financial options, the asset underlying the option is an intangible 
and tradable financial asset like stocks. As for the real options are defined on real asset, 
typically not tradable.  
2.1.1 IT Investments and Traditional Financial Measures 
IT investments are characterized as essential yet hard to justify investments in 
organizations. They hold certain traits that distinguish them from standard financial 
investments (Table 2.1). Especially large scale projects are categorized as high risk- 
high return endeavors (Benaroch et al., 2007) due to their long term impact and the 
difficulty in estimating project cash flows accurately (Campbell, 2002; Kumar, 2002, 
Lederer and Prasad, 1993). Also, inherent uncertainty and incomplete knowledge in 
many IT investments (Sullivan et al., 1999) pose a limitation in assessing the true value 
of these investments. This makes the evaluation of these irreversible investments under 
uncertainty (Benaroch and Kauffman, 1999) difficult. Hence it is the IT investment 
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decision problem that leads towards exploring techniques that could facilitate these 
decisions.  
 
 
Table 2.1: Distinguishing IT Investment Characteristics 
IT Investment Characteristics References 
Difficulty in justifying leading edge automation 
projects, large scale systems architectures 
development or communications network based on 
traditional capital budgeting measures including 
return on investment (ROI) or net present value 
(NPV). The basic underlying reason is difficulty in 
quantifying the intangible benefits. 
Clemons and Weber, 1990; Campbell, 2002; 
Dos Santos, 1991; Kumar, 2002, Lederer and 
Prasad, 1993) 
Uncertainty and incomplete knowledge around 
payoffs from investment and costs over the period 
of time 
Dos Santos, 1991; Sullivan et al., 1999 
 
Flexibility in IT projects where its course can be 
changed based on its feedback with respect to its 
environment 
Dos Santos, 1991; Kumar, 1999 
 
Irreversibility of IT investment Benaroch and Kauffman, 1999; Clemons and 
Weber, 1990; Dos Santos, 1991; Kumar, 1996 
 
 
 
 
With these traits, traditional financial measures, including most commonly used 
NPV analysis, does not work very well. There are several reasons for it. First, NPV 
does not take into account the managerial flexibility of changing the course of the IT 
project during its life (Dos Santos, 1991; Kumar, 1999). Second, to calculate NPV, 
appropriate discount rate determination is a challenge (Dos Santos, 1991). Third, NPV 
approach assumes all the investment must be done upfront, irrespective of the project’s 
performance. In reality, at several points in a project life cycle, managers can change the 
course of the project based on factors like its performance, changing business needs, 
changing user needs etc. This flexibility is referred to as managerial flexibility. 
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Limitations of the traditional capital budgeting approaches led towards the exploration 
of valuation methods that could appropriately value managerial flexibility and 
incorporate flexibility. Also, the recognition of the importance of utilizing the theory of 
irreversible investment under uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) in the IS research 
(Clemons 1991; Dos Santos, 1991; Kambil et al., 1993; Kumar 1996) lead to the 
identification of the option-like characteristics of IT project investments.  
2.1.2 Real Options in IT Investments 
IT project possesses a real option when it offers managerial flexibility, to change 
the course of the project in response to endogenous (within the firm) or exogenous (in 
the business environment) events (Benaroch and Kauffman, 1999). Thus by allowing 
for managerial flexibility in decision making, real options approach allows more 
accurate valuation of capital investments while curtailing the inherent risk (Benaroch 
and Kauffman, 1999; Tiwana et al. 2006).   
Several studies (Clemons, 1991; Dos Santos, 1991; Kambil et al., 1993; Kumar, 
1996; 2002) used illustrative examples to propose the idea of using real options theory 
in IT investments, especially to manage risk by identifying and accounting for the 
inherent flexibility in decision making. Majority of the IS literature focuses on real 
options analysis for large and risky IT investments with known risks, under the 
assumption that some embedded real options already provide management with 
strategic and operational flexibility needed to respond to the risks (Benaroch et al., 
2007). Table 2.2 is adopted from Benaroch et al., (2007) and modified, to give brief 
descriptions of the types of real options identified in IT context along with the related 
risks they provide hedge against.  
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Table 2.2: Real Options Types and Related Risk (Benaroch, et al., 2007) 
Option 
 
Explanation Representative IS 
studies 
Risks present 
Defer Flexibility to defer investment 
commitment is attractive when it 
enables learning about the nature of 
uncertain payoffs (and immediate lost 
cash flows are small).  
Benaroch and 
Kauffman (1999, 
2000) 
• Customer 
usage/acceptance 
• Vendor adoption 
• Restrictive legislation 
Explore  
(pilot  
prototype)  
 
Flexibility to partially invest in a pilot 
or prototype effort enables learning 
about the extent to which technical 
and organizational risks affect the 
ability to complete (and realize the 
expected benefits of) a full-scale 
investment. 
Amram and 
Kulatilaka (1999a),  
Kambil et al. (1993) 
• IS skills and 
experience 
• Technology maturity 
• IT infrastructure 
adequacy 
• Organizational 
adoption 
Stage (stop –
resume)  
Flexibility to stage an investment and 
kill it midstream (after gateway 
reviews) is valuable when there are 
risks due to technical complexity 
risks, user involvement, architectural 
compliance, and so on. 
Benaroch (2002) • Infrastructural fit 
• Managerial support, 
organization adoption 
 
Change 
scale  
Flexibility to alter—expand or 
contract—the scope of an investment 
adds value when it allows reacting to 
observed conditions concerning 
technical risk, user involvement risk, 
and so on. 
Gaynor and 
Bradner(2001), 
Kulatilaka et al. 
(1999) 
• Project size and 
complexity 
• Technology maturity 
• Emerging standards 
Exit  
(switch–use)  
Flexibility to exit an investment and 
put its resources to alternate uses 
provides partial insurance against 
failure due to client acceptance risk, 
organizational adoption risk, etc. 
Bräutigam et al. 
(2003) 
• Customer 
usage/adoption 
• IT infrastructure 
adequacy 
 
Outsource 
development  
operations  
Flexibility to outsource development 
is valuable when development failure 
risk can be transferred to a third party. 
Outsourcing a business process is 
contingent on when business 
conditions (process transactions load) 
are sufficiently unfavorable 
(favorable); transfers benefits risk to a 
third-party service vendor. 
Lammers and Lucke 
(2004), 
Whang (1992) 
• IS skills and 
experience 
• Cost escalation 
• Customer 
demand/usage 
• Uncertain investment 
benefits 
 
Lease  
 
Flexibility to lease resources is 
valuable when investment can be 
abandoned to save residual resource 
costs, when abandonment occurs 
during development, or after 
investment is operational. 
Clemons (1991), 
Clemons and Weber 
(1990) 
• Customer adoption 
• Organizational 
adoption 
• Development failure 
Strategic 
growth  
(Expansion) 
Flexibility for favorable investment 
outcomes (due to positive risk) is 
valuable when the investment creates. 
 
Taudes et al. (2000), 
Zhu  (1999) 
• Above expected 
customer 
adoption/usage rate 
Learning  Flexibility in learning about new and 
risky technologies 
Goswami et al. 
(2008) 
• Uncertain benefits 
• Uncertain feasibility  
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IT real options are classified in two groups based on the type of flexibility they 
provide (Trigeorgis, 1993). The strategic growth (expansion) options are classified as 
growth options (Benaroch, 2002), while the rest are categorized as operational options1. 
From an options perspective, IT investment project is seen as creating a base asset with 
some expected value; for example, the baseline implementation of an enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) package (Tiwana et al., 2006). Operational options relate to 
flexible actions that managers can make to reduce the potential for losses (usually) or 
increase the potential for gains (occasionally) on that base project. Growth options, 
capture the possibility of building additional assets on top of the base asset if the initial 
project were to be completed. For example, building a data warehouse to facilitate the 
analysis of data captured in the ERP system. Operational options give managers the 
flexibility to change the features of a base project by modifying its timing, scale, or 
scope, and strategic growth options give an opportunity to create one or more additional 
but related assets beyond the asset produced by the base project (Benaroch, 2002). It is 
important to note that in the case of operating options, there is only one asset under 
evaluation (i.e., the base system), while in the case of strategic growth options, there are 
multiple assets to consider (the base system, plus one or more future investment in 
assets that build on the base system).  
This classification of real options facilitated the conceptualization of the 
phenomenon as a risk management tool for IT investments with inherent uncertainty. It 
was then carried forwarded by IS literature to solve various problems in IT investment 
management i.e. identification and recognition of real options (Benaroch, 2002), 
                                                 
1 Some studies like Tiwana et al., (2006) view option to defer as growth option and not operational 
option.  
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valuation of IT investments with embedded real options in different scenarios (e.g. Dos 
Santos, 1991; Kumar, 2002; Benaroch and Kauffman, 1999; Su et al., 2009) etc. For 
valuation purpose, growth options are considered having call option like characteristics 
(right to buy an asset in future), where operational options are considered having put 
option like characteristics (right to sell an asset in future).  
2.1.3 Discussion 
Adaptation of real options theory for IT investment decision from real options 
literature in other disciplines has made it easier to justify and consider risky IT projects, 
which was difficult before (Dos Santos, 1991). The conceptualization and classification 
of real options in IT investments facilitated the understanding of this theory as a 
justified risk management tool for IT investments. Most of the real options seen in IT 
literature are adopted from other fields like finance, strategic management, 
manufacturing, and R&D. They include real options such as abandon, defer, growth, 
scale, stage etc. Apart from these options, additional real options are also found in IT 
literature. For example, option to lease (Clemons, 1991; Clemons and Weber, 1990) and 
learning option (Goswami et al., 2008).  Learning option is quite similar to option to 
defer, where the intention is to delay the investment until uncertainty is resolved via 
learning or waiting.  
Within the real options classification as either call or put option in the IT 
literature, some confusion is seen. Option to defer investment is considered to possess 
characteristics of a put option (Benaroch, 2002) as well as of a call option (Kumar, 
2002; Tiwana et al., 2006). Similarly, option to abandon and option to switch use are 
considered as having the same characteristics (Benaroch et al., 2007), where the 
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resources are put to an alternative use. But these two real options are considered as 
separate (Tiwana et al., 2006; 2007). It seems to be a matter of context in which the real 
options have been conceptualized and discussed.  
2.2 Valuation Approaches 
Several models have been proposed to quantitatively valuate real options in IT 
investments settings. The concept behind capturing managerial flexibility in decision 
making is to take into account the value of embedded options that provide decision 
making flexibility along with NPV of expected cash flows (Trigeogris, 1995), and 
increase the value to strategic NPV.  Formally, it is seen as: 
NPVActive = NPVPassive + f (value of the bundle of real options embedded in the 
project, from active management). 
 
Where, NPVActive of project is the net strategic value of the project, which is 
equal to the traditional or NPVPassive plus the value of managerial flexibility—the latter 
being a function of the value of the bundle of options embedded in the project 
(Benaroch, 2002). In this section, we will review the various valuation methods 
proposed and used for IT investments in the IS literature. 
2.2.1 Binomial Option Pricing Model Approach (Discrete Time Model) 
Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) approach of option pricing via binomial model 
is seen in IT real options literature. Because of its simplicity, requirements for 
estimating less parameters and closed form, this discrete time model is easy to apply. 
But this formula can be applied only to single stage investments. Also this formula 
assumes that project values are in equilibrium after a period.  
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The binomial model assumes that V (uncertain underlying asset, usually present 
value of payoffs) follows a binomial multiplicative diffusion process. Starting at time t0 
= 0, by time t1 = t0 + ∆t, V may rise to uV with probability q or fall to dV with 
probability 1-q, where u =√∆ >1, and d < r < u, with r being the risk free rate. With 
∆t = T/n, a binomial tree for the underlying asset is built for n time periods. The 
approximation for q in this model is taken as p, computed as p = (r- d)/(u – d). The 
value of a call option on V is calculated via backward induction by: 
V = 
	
	
   
Where: 
= max [0, uV-I]  = max [0, dV - I] 
 
Kambil et al. (1993) used the binomial model to value IT investment in hand 
held computers, by defining a pilot option in it. Making the pilot project analogous to a 
call option, they show how incorporating decision making flexibility in project 
valuation helps in justifying IT projects. Later Benaroch et al. (2006) used the same 
model to show its appropriateness in valuing nested options in IT projects, where Black-
Scholes model (Bardhan et al., 2004) seem to overvalue them by 100%. They achieved 
it by developing a custom tailored binomial model for generic IT investment embedding 
nested options as baseline, along with a more accurate Black-Scholes model for nested 
options.  
Benaroch (2002) uses an extension of binomial model i.e. log-transformed 
binomial model (Trigeorgis, 1996) to value real option in an internet sales channel 
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investment with multiple shadow options. Log-transformed binomial model prevents p 
from becoming negative or exceeding 1, in case of small time steps or small volatility 
around payoffs V.  
2.2.2 Asset- for- Asset Exchange Approach (Continuous Time Model) 
One of the first efforts to value real options quantitatively in IT investment 
setting used a famous asset-to-asset exchange model, also known as Margrabe model. 
With an underlying question of, should the firms invests in projects involving new 
technologies, Dos Santos (1991) demonstrated how such investments can be justified by 
reframing into staged investments, where most of the value is contingent on the future 
stages of the project with investment opportunities. Investing in new technology is 
perceived as buying a call option on future investment opportunities where the firm has 
an opportunity to invest in future projects i.e. second stage projects. Therefore, the 
value of the future projects that become available as a result of an IT investment in a 
new technology is required for the economic justification of the investment. Also, such 
call options being similar to the ones on traded securities, can be valued using Margrabe 
model of real option valuation. The model is given as: 
V = B1 N(d1) – C1N (d2)   
Where: 
d1 = 

	/√       
d2 = d1 - √ 
B1 = current value of the expected benefits of the second-stage project 
C1 = Current value of the expected development costs of the second-staged project  
N (.)  = cumulative standard probability density function 
σ2 = instantaneous variance of the ratio  

 ,	computed as:  "	  # 	2	 %&  
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  = variance of the rate of change of revenues of the second stage project     = variance of the rate of change of development costs of the second-staged 
project from follow up investment 
%&  = correlation between development cost and revenues from the second stage 
project  
 
Dos Santos showed that using the Margrabe model for real option valuation 
eliminates the need to estimate a risk-based discount rate, which is a major drawback of 
NPV approach. Also not all the possible outcomes of the projects are required to be 
quantified with underlying real options, like in the case of decision trees. With good 
estimation of model parameters, this model gives a good value estimate for the 
investment. 
Building on the relationship between project risk and real option values, Kumar 
(1996) illustrated that the pattern of variation in option values (as a function of variance 
rate of change in second-stage project costs or benefits) differs from well-known results 
in financial options theory (Black-Scholes model). The study shows that the options 
values of second-stage projects could increase or decrease with an increase on variance 
of rate of change of project benefits, depending on the sign of	 #	%& . Hence 
justifying that it is not always attractive in terms of options value to select riskier 
second-stage projects. Later, Kumar (2002) proposed a real options framework for 
managing risk in IT projects in general. With the underlying concept of managerial 
flexibility and option valuing model being the same, the study differentiated the 
underlying risks in IT projects as the ones resolved by action and others that require 
hedging. Further hedging strategies were proposed by deferring the investment, 
abandoning the investment and changing the ongoing project’s scale. 
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The application of Margrabe model is not limited to valuing flexibility in IT 
projects. Kumar (1999) used this model to value flexibility resulting from DSS use by 
conceptualizing it as the change in value of a portfolio of options. This way, 
understanding the effectiveness of a DSS in terms of the value provided by its use 
became obvious.  
2.2.3 Black-Scholes Model Approach (Continuous Time Model) 
Most of the research in IT real options valuation seems to be using famous 
financial option valuation model of Black-Scholes (Black and Scholes, 1973). As 
compared to the Margrabe model, it assumes that the cost of the project is known with 
certainty (deterministic). Therefore total uncertainty in the project is due to the 
uncertainty around payoffs. Also, the discount rate is not zero but risk free rate (i.e. the 
rate on the US treasury bills). The Black-Scholes model for a European style call option 
looks like: 
V= BN(d1) – I e
-rT
 N(d2) 
 
Where: 
d1 = 
' 
	(
).+,-√-   
d2 =  d1 - √. 
B = Present value of investment returns 
I = Cost of investment 
r = risk free discount rate 
σ = variance around future payoffs 
T = Option expiration time. 
N (.) = cumulative normal distribution. 
 
Real option valuation using Black-Scholes is first seen in scenarios involving 
justifying infrastructure investment decisions. Panayi and Trigeorgis (1998) evaluated a 
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telecommunication IT infrastructure project (for Cyprus telecommunication Authority) 
with two stages i.e. an initial stage with development of infrastructure and second stage 
with expansion of network. The value of the whole project includes the value of the 
growth option for the second stage, which is computed using Black-Scholes as a 
European call options maturing at the year of network expansion. Later Miller et al. 
(2004) used Black-Scholes model to price growth and compound real options in case of 
Korean IT infrastructure. 
Benaroch and Kauffman (1999, 2000) used this model to value the project 
involving deployment of point of sale debit service system in an electronic banking 
network. The famous Yankee 24 case, the option to defer investment was modeled as a 
pseudo-American call option with dividends. The value of the underlying asset in a 
particular period was computed by subtracting the present value of the cash flows 
foregone during waiting from the present value of the project cash flows at time zero. 
Taudes et al. (2000) used Black-Scholes model in a real case study involving software 
platform decision. The problem under study was whether to use software platform SAP 
R/2 or switch to its newer release SAP R/3. Campbell (2002) used the same model to 
quantify deferral option and an optimal time to exercise it, by conceptualizing it as an 
American style call option. Su et al., (2009) used Black-Scholes to value real options 
underlying service organizations and their transformation in an uncertain business 
environment.  
Bardhan et al. (2004) extended research on real option in case of IT investments 
by providing a new method for making IT valuation and investment decisions for 
project portfolio management. By examining a large U.S. based energy utility firm 
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considering investment in a portfolio of 31 projects to provide a range of Internet-
enabled energy services to customers, they developed a nested options model by 
incorporating the impact of project interdependencies to calculate the option value of all 
projects. The general portfolio valuation model looked like: 
 Vcluster	=	PV{Phase	1	projects	"		Call	Value	[Phase	2	projects	"	Call	Value	
Phase	3	projects]}	
The underlying call option valuation, although claimed to be done using 
Margrabe model in the paper, is actually done using Black-Scholes model (with 
uncertainty around benefits and cost discounted at a risk free rate). They argue that the 
real options model provides a better understanding of project interdependencies on 
valuation and prioritization decisions, and provides insights into the business value of 
IT infrastructure projects that provide the managerial flexibility to launch future 
projects. They also presented a real options portfolio optimization algorithm for 
dynamic multi-period portfolio optimization by incorporating the project values based 
on Black-Scholes valuation in a portfolio management model with budget constraints. 
2.2.4 Expected Utility Model 
Growth options’ valuation is also conceptualized to its simplest form, looking 
like an expected utility function. Lankton and Luft (2008) used the expected utility 
function to value a simple growth option. They defined growth option as “A growth 
option has positive value if the expected utility (EU) of the initial investment, plus the 
EU of the follow-on investments later if they prove valuable, is greater than the EU of 
not making the initial investment”. 
EU(Initial investment) – EU(no Initial investment) = [p(d – e) + (1 – p)(–e)]– 0 = pd – e 
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Where: 
EU = expected utility 
p= probability the follow-on investment has positive value 
d= payoff from follow-on investment 
e = initial investment value 
They have also modeled the deferral option in a similar manner.  
2.2.5 Other Valuation Approaches 
The real option valuation in IT context is not limited to Black-Scholes model, 
Margrabe model and Binomial model. Some studies have used combinations of these 
models to conceptualize/ value real options in particular contexts. For example, Taudes 
(1998) examined the methods for evaluating sequential exchange options in order to 
obtain estimates for the value of software growth options in EDI platform. The study 
defined software growth options as IS functions that are embedded on an IT platform 
(EDI in this case) and that can be employed once the particular base system is installed 
and their use is economically justified. The paper utilized four valuation models to 
evaluate a better model for sequential software growth option (European style). The 
models include Geske’s formula (Geske, 1979) and Carr’s formula (Carr, 1988) along 
with Black-Scholes and Margrabe formula. Geske’s formula for sequential exchange 
opportunities is similar to Margrabe model, except it has an additional parameter q, 
depicting efforts for implementation of base efforts. With q = 0, Geske’s formula 
reduces to Margrabe. Valuation of software growth options with several alternative 
implementation decisions, can be done by assuming that the IS function under 
consideration can be implemented at any time within a given planning horizon T. This 
is achieved by approximating the growth options as pseudo-American exchange options 
(an option with constant dividend yield), and valuing them using Carr’s formula i.e. 
22 
 
 
 
DEF, G, H, , , , I, %JI , K=FL MN OPQRSTP∗ , V , NWXY , Z #
GXYL MN OPQRSTP∗ , V , NWXY , Z # HGXY[MN OPQR
ST
P∗ , VZ, 
 
Where 
V = value of the IS function under study, expected present value of net benefits of 
usage; 
I = cost of implementing the IS function under study,  
R = V/I 
q = fraction of I needed for implementation preparation 
t1 = decision time for implementation preparation (start of productive use) 
R* = value of R above which the (simple) exchange option should be acquired at t1 
obtained by solving 
FM (V, I, q, t2 - t1, , 	I, %JI, r) - E = 0 for  R 
where FM is given by Margrabe's exchange option formula in equation below; 
FM = (V, I, q, t2, , 	I, %JI, r) = 
VN (d1 (R exp
rt
2, t2)) - I exp
rt
2 N (d2 (R exp
rt2
, t2) 
t2= implementation decision time  = instantaneous variance of V 
I = instantaneous variance of I %JI = correlation between V and I 
N (.) = cumulative standard normal distribution function; 
B (.,.) = bivariate cumulative standard normal distribution function with correlation 
coefficient \ 
d1 (], ^ ) = (In	] + _^) / _ √^ 
d2 (], ^ ) = d1 (]	, ^) - _ √^ 
 _= " ̀ # 	2	`%JI, instantaneous variance of R 
r = risk-free interest rate. 
 
Schwartz and Zozaya-Gorostiza (2003) developed two models for the valuation 
of IT investment projects i.e. development projects and acquisition projects. The 
distinction between these two projects is done based on the time it takes to start 
benefiting from the IT asset once the decision to invest has been taken. Both the models 
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account for the uncertainty in costs as well as benefits associated with the investment 
opportunities. In case of costs uncertainties, the model accounts for technical cost 
uncertainty, input cost uncertainty and investment cost uncertainty. The benefits are 
represented as a stream of stochastic cash flows from investment, and not the value of 
underlying asset. With the stochastic cost and benefits, the value of investment 
opportunity is derived by first applying Ito’s lemma to get the differential equation and 
then applying Bellman equation of optimality to obtain the investment value, 
accounting for both cost and benefit uncertainty. The difference between development 
and acquisition projects comes in while estimating benefits, where acquisition projects 
include the value of underlying asset along with value of future cash flows from its use. 
Their model for development projects is as follows: 
 
F(V, K) =  
 
B.C. 
 
F (V, 0) = V, 
F (0, K) = 0, 
 = 0 
V = value of the asset received on successful completion of the project 
K = remaining cost to completion of the project assuming that investment could be done 
instantaneously  
I = initial cost 
 = Poisson probability of a catastrophic event causing the project to be permanently 
abandoned  
β = technical uncertainty parameter 
γ = input cost uncertainty parameter 
 = instant standard deviation of the proportional changes in V,  
µv = drift parameter reflecting changes (positive or negative) in the value as time 
proceeds 
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dy = increment to a Gauss-Wiener process that is uncorrelated with the technical 
uncertainty in expected costs, but that may be correlated with overall economic activity. 
 = risk premium associated with V 
 = risk premium associated with K 
 = change in cost experienced by IT assets over time 
rf = risk-free interest rate 
 
Dai et al., (2007) move away from financial models of real options and 
incorporated options thinking in cost-benefit analysis to permit the analysis of real 
options in the context of corporate strategy. They consider current and future costs and 
benefits as well as market factors influencing these costs and benefits relating to IT 
infrastructures. They constructed a two-stage model that considered relationships 
among the factors to guide future improvements in decision making relative to option 
value-bearing IT infrastructure investments. In Stage 1, a firm invests in an IT project to 
implement an IT infrastructure technology with an initial cost of K. With the IT 
infrastructure implemented in Stage 1, the firm is able to provide a desired product or 
service in Stage 2 by developing additional IT resources, which represents a growth 
option. Developing these new IT resources typically requires follow-up investment, 
which is analogous to what investors must pay to exercise call options on stocks to 
balance risk and returns in portfolio management. With infrastructure in place, the value 
of overall IT investment is given by: 
 
Where 
 
and d = – p with      
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2.2.6 Discussion 
Several models are proposed for the valuation of IT real options. Most of them 
are adopted form other fields, yet some efforts are seen towards developing models 
custom tailored for IT projects. At this point, it will be good to evaluate these models. 
Most of the IT literature used Black-Scholes model to value the real options. As 
seen in Table 2.3, majority of studies talking about real options valuation in IT context 
prefer to use Black-Scholes model over Margrabe, binomial or any other custom built 
model. May be it’s because of the simplicity of using the model and custom tailoring it 
for specific scenarios like sequential options or compound options, that this model is 
preferred. 
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Each model proposed, especially the ones adopted from other fields are based on 
some underlying assumptions. For example, the most commonly used Black-Scholes 
model applies to only European type options (i.e. options with fixed maturity). Whereas 
real investments are more like American options, with no fixed maturity date, where 
project manager has flexibility over when to exercise the option. This makes the 
generalizability of Black-Scholes option pricing formula doubtful. Another assumption 
underlying Black-Scholes formula is that the underlying asset is tradable. However, real 
assets, especially in case of IT projects are typically not traded e.g. cost, cash flows etc. 
Benaroch (2002) argues this point with the help of Amram and Kulatilaka (1999) to 
show that the concept can be extended to the non-traded assets as well. Black-Scholes 
model also assumes that cost of exercising an option is deterministic.  
In most IT investment scenarios, cost of investment is uncertain as well (Dos 
Santos, 1991; Kumar, 2002). This limitation of Black-Scholes is accounted by 
Margrabe model, where cost of investment is taken stochastic along with the payoffs. 
As compared to binomial model which is a discrete time model, Black-Scholes is a 
continuous time model. Benaroch et al., (2006) shows that if binomial model is 
converted into continuous time, the results produced by it should be similar to the 
results produced by Black-Scholes model. It’s all because of the underlying distribution 
assumption of payoffs for each model i.e. in binomial model the assumption is that 
payoffs are distributed binomially whereas in Black-Scholes, the assumption is that 
payoffs are distributed log normally.  
IT investments usually do not have a single underlying option but could have 
series of cascading compound options due to exposure to multiple risks. Black-Scholes 
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model tend to be limited in valuing such options (Schwartz and Gorostiza, 2003) 
because it ignores the interaction effects on option values in a series of cascading 
options. Benaroch (2002) provides a solution to it by introducing a general lattice model 
that simplifies the valuation of cascading options i.e. log-transformed binomial model.  
Such underlying assumptions make the selection of a correct option valuation 
model critical. Benaroch (2002) gives a brief on which model is appropriate based on 
two variables i.e. simple vs. compound option and cost as being stochastic or 
deterministic. Table 2.4 is adopted from Benaroch (2002) giving a brief on this area. 
 
Table 2.4: Real Option Valuation models and IT Investment Traits (Benaroch, 2002) 
 Only V is uncertain V and I are uncertain 
Investment embeds 
a simple option 
Black-Scholes and binomial 
models (Benaroch and Kauffman, 
1999) 
Margrabe model (Dos Santos, 1991) 
Investment embeds 
compound options  
 
Log-transformed binomial model 
(Trigeorgis, 1996) 
 
Expanded log-transformed binomial 
model (Gamba and Trigeorgis, 2001) 
Margrabe model adapted for sequential 
opportunities (Carr, 1988; Taudes, 1998) 
 
 
 
2.3 Applying Real Options to IT Investments- OBRiM Approach 
Real options are not inherent in any IT investments. They need planning and 
careful identification to be imbedded in order to hedge the inherent risk in that 
investment (Benaroch, 2002). This argument is aligned with the real options concept of 
“shadow options” i.e. options that are hidden until they are identified (Clemons and 
Weber, 1990). When various real options are ready to be discovered in an investment 
with multiple risks, there can be numerous ways to reconfigure the investment using 
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different series of cascading (compound) options (Benaroch, 2002). This problem took 
the IT real options literature beyond the conceptualization and valuation problem, into 
the effective application problem. 
Benaroch (2002) presents option based risk management (OBRiM) framework, 
which uses real options theory and fundamental principles from the area of financial 
risk management as a theoretical backdrop to actively configure IT investments for the 
purpose of managing the balance between their value and risk. They use real options 
analysis to decide on how to optimally configure an IT investment by creating the set of 
options that maximally contributes to that investment value. To maximize IT investment 
value, they argue that managers must size up the relevant risks and proactively build 
flexibility into an investment while continually evaluating new risk information and 
taking corrective actions within the bounds of the flexibility built into the investment. 
Figure 2.1 gives a graphic illustration of the framework. 
The major arguments of this framework, as highlighted by further studies (e.g. 
Benaroch et al., 2006, 2007) are: 
• Real options can be interpreted as high-level strategies for managing risk, with the 
associated strategic action and a managerial decision that are made possible. 
• Flexibility must be proactively embedded in an IT investment based on the specific 
risks one seeks to control (As proposed by OBRiM set of risk option mappings). 
•  The real options mapped to for the risks present permit generating alternative 
investment configurations where each configuration embeds a different combination 
of these real options. 
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• Different combinations of real options affect IT investment value differently due to 
varying associated cost and potential to handle risk (of same kind). An economically 
superior configuration can be found by quantitatively evaluating the different 
investment configurations using option pricing models. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: OBRiM Framework (As illustrated by Benaroch et al., 2007) 
 
 
 
Further support for OBRiM framework followed. Benaroch et al. (2006) 
empirically tested the presence of risk mappings on which option based risk 
management (OBRiM) is based. With the analysis of the risk management plans 
developed for a broad portfolio of 50 IT investments in a large Irish financial services 
organization, they found ample empirical support for OBRiM’s risk-option mappings 
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i.e. IT managers follow the logic of option-based risk management, although purely 
based on intuition. The study used a logistic regression to test the relationship between 
the risk factors identified and the real options present in projects exposed to these risks. 
The results suggested a strong relationship between the two. A higher level of specific 
risks for which mitigations were planned was found to be associated with an increased 
presence of specific options (forms of flexibility) that facilitated deployment of the 
mitigations. The results validated the majority of risk-option mappings posited by the 
OBRiM framework, supporting the overall logic of option-based risk management. 
With these findings, they argued that reliance on this logic based on intuition alone 
could lead to suboptimal or counterproductive risk management practices. But with the 
strong empirical evidence for OBRiM, while supporting the argument that the scope of 
real option theory can and ought to be expanded to the management of IT risk. 
Benaroch, et al. (2007) took validation of OBRiM one step further. By 
conducting a filed study among multiple managers involved in a data mart consolidation 
project (conducted by a major airline firm and a data warehousing systems vendor), 
they evaluated the viability of applying an option-based risk management (OBRiM) 
framework and its accompanying theoretical perspectives and methodology to real-
world sequential IT investment problems. They applied OBRiM to identify several 
specific classes of real options, including the implicit options of deferral and 
abandonment, and the explicit options of piloting and staging in the project. The 
approach proved to be useful and revealing for staff members at the field study sites 
who were studying how to achieve an optimal configuration for their data mart 
consolidation project so that it would embed the most value-bearing real options. The 
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results highlighted some benefits of the application of this approach i.e. the ability to 
generate meaningful option-bearing investment structures, simplification of the 
complexities of real options for the business context, accuracy in analyzing the risks of 
IT investments, and support for more proactive planning.  
Although these evaluative studies showed that OBRiM has the potential to add 
value for managers looking to structure risky IT investments, yet some aspects still 
require refinements, e.g. estimate of risk and uncertainty through incomplete contracts 
in multi-party projects. 
2.4 Application of Real Options to IT Investments 
The application of Real Options theory in the context of IT investments includes 
numerous examples to illustrate the theory’s applicability. Dos Santos (1991) used an 
example of ISDN network to illustrate the benefits from second stage projects affecting 
the value of the whole project. Kambil et al. (1993) discussed the implementation of 
handheld computer application at Healthways and valuing the project with its embedded 
piloting option. Taudes (1998) illustrated the valuation of sequential software growth 
options in IT platforms in case of EDI implementation. Kumar (1999) determined the 
DSS value via flexibility provided through its implementation in case of commodity 
training and marketing areas. Benaroch (2002) used the example of Internet Sales 
Channel investment to conceptualize and build the case for the use of real options for 
risk management in IT investments. Kumar (2002) used the example of CASE tools 
acquisition to value embedded abandon, scale and deferment options in the decision. 
Campbell (2002) used the example of Human systems Inc. and online logistics to 
illustrate the valuation of option to defer the decision. 
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Panayi and Trigeorgis (1998) used the real example of CYTA (Cyprus 
telecommunication authority and telecom infrastructure) to describe the valuation of 
multi stage real options in an IT infrastructure investment. Benaroch and Kauffman 
(1999, 2000) used the example of Yankee 24’s POS deployment problem to value the 
underlying option to defer the investment. Later, the same data was used by Schwartz 
and Zozaya-Gorostiza (2003) to test their IT investment models for IT development and 
acquisition cases. Taudes et al. (2000) discuss the practical advantages of using option 
pricing models to support IT investment decisions for the selection of a software 
platform. They used a real-life case study of a European Auto part Manufacturer, facing 
a decision of SAP system upgrade from R/2 to R/3 to value the underlying options.   
Kenneally and Lichtenstein (2002) tested the assumption that IS projects embed 
significant optional value by studying the portfolio of current and recent IS projects in a 
European manufacturer’s plant setting. By interviewing seventeen project managers 
concerning thirty-one projects they found strong support to the prediction that IS 
projects include considerable optional value. Most of the projects under review were 
found to embed forty seven options, many of them with benefits comparable to the 
value of the original projects. The study concluded on the notion that real option 
evaluation is useful for IS projects in general, and should not be confined to special 
cases. It also concluded that real option thinking may be of particular value in 
recognizing the reduction and deferral options (which were found difficult to identify 
with short time to expiration). Thus proactive management of reduction and deferral 
options should increase the flexibility and value of IS projects. Similar effort was seen 
by Bräutigam et al.(2003), where they proposed a framework aiming at facilitating the 
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process of real option valuation and to making it more time efficient. The framework 
encompasses the valuation of real options as well as the organizational, strategic, and 
controlling aspects necessary for the application of real option valuation accurately. 
Specifically it focused on uncertainties underlying any real option where these 
uncertainties were used to identify options as well as to link the interactions of 
uncertainties with the interactions of options. The applicability of the framework was 
demonstrated in the case of a German e-commerce firm.  
Bardhan et al. (2004) provided a nested options model for making IT valuation 
and investment decisions for project portfolio management. They have examined a large 
U.S. based energy utility firm considering investment in a portfolio of 31 projects to 
provide a range of Internet-enabled energy services to customers. Hilhorst et al. (2008) 
used a data from a European based firm to value embedded stage option in the 
implementation of HRM system. Recently, Su et al., (2009) applied a real options 
framework to a shared service transformation by conceptualizing it as a European call 
option at Global Multimedia Company. All these examples show the progress made 
over the last two decades in extending the real options theory to IT, by utilizing 
hypothetical as well as real examples.  
2.5 Real Options Thinking and Real Options Analysis 
Real options analysis is considered as an appropriate tool for IT investment 
valuation (as demonstrated by studies discussed before), but many IT managers find it 
complex and costly endeavor. As a result, evidence of substitutes to the approach is 
found where managers utilize insights from real options theory to arrive at similar 
conclusions by other means (Sammer, 2002). Fitchman et al., (2005) positions this 
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concept as a new way of thinking about the IT projects structure and management. 
Referring it to as “real options thinking”, they state that managers do not need to 
acquire option quantification skills to put options thinking to work. Instead by utilizing 
the real options as a heuristic framing tool, they can identify and value flexibility within 
an IT investment.  
 Empirical evidence of managerial decision making under risk for IT specific 
situations shows that IT managers follow the logic of options-based risk management, 
although purely based on intuition (Benaroch et al., 2006; Busby and Pitts, 1997; 
Fichman et al., 2005). On the one hand, the benefits of the approach can be reaped by 
using real options concepts to actively create and extract the value of embedded options 
in the IT project that can otherwise be difficult to see (Fichman et al., 2005). On the 
other hand, the intuitive decision making based on real options leads to sub optimal and 
counterproductive risk management practices (Benaroch et al., 2006). Following the 
stream of this philosophy, recent research has focused on exploring the variation in 
consistency found due to the presence of intuitive judgment along with the quantitative 
real option valuation.  
2.6 Real Options and Managerial Intuitions 
Some studies showed that managerial intuition typically responds in the correct 
direction to the factors that determine normative real options values, even without 
explicit real options methods or training (McDonald, 2000; McGrath, 1997; 1999). 
Formal or heuristic real options analysis adds logical support and quantitative precision 
to managerial intuition but does not differ qualitatively from it. But intuition is not 
always qualitatively consistent with real options analysis (Lankton and Luft, 2008). 
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Prior field and survey studies found that consistency between managerial intuition and 
real option values varies across option types and settings (Benaroch et al., 2006; Busby 
and Pitts, 1997; Lankton and Luft, 2008; Tiwana et al., 2006; 2007). Also, several 
biases come into play that causes this gap.  
Tiwana, et al. (2006), explored the effects of real options on escalation of 
commitment in IT projects. They recognized the impact of various real options on the 
decision making of IT managers and how it changed their perception about the project 
value. This lead to the continuation of the project even when traditional valuation 
methods i.e. NPV, showed it infeasible to continue. The study built its questions on the 
argument that project managers take into account the value of real options implicitly 
when it’s not a part of formal valuation procedure, along with exploring how strongly 
option value translates into an increased propensity to continue a troubled project. This 
gives an indication of how pervasive the phenomenon of warranted continuation2 is due 
to recognition of options might be in practice. The study also explored differences 
underlying perceived value of real options (i.e., to switch use, change scale, stage 
investments, abandon, or strategically grow a project) in escalation situations. Hence, 
this study provided some initial insights into possible biases in how options are valued. 
The results showed that presence of real options do contribute towards 
escalation of commitment in troubled projects. Also, among all identified real options in 
IT context, growth options are valued the most. Switch use option is found second to 
growth option and the abandonment option had the least perceived value among 
                                                 
2 Also referred to as warned escalation, refers to situations in which the decision to continue a project is 
reasonable because, even though negative events have transpired since the project was initiated, the 
expected future benefits of continuing outweigh the cost (Keil and Flatto, 1999) 
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mangers. It is argued that this option is likely to be exercised only on the least 
successful projects. Consistent with the framing argument, managers associate low 
value to abandoning the project because they are less appreciative of options that only 
serve to curtail severe losses. In practice, it is difficult to exercise this option because it 
causes morale and credibility problems among team members and other stakeholders, 
who generally become personally invested in seeing the project completed. On the 
contrary, exercising growth and switch use options may have positive impact on morale 
and evoke a sense of accomplishment among project stakeholders. The study concludes 
that neither reducing the scale of a project nor staging investments is likely to be viewed 
as negatively as exercising the option to abandon, because in both cases, the degree of 
perceived failure may be less than that associated with the abandonment option. 
Reducing the scale of the project that project may still be implemented, though on a 
smaller scale than originally anticipated, and option to stage implies that it has been 
acknowledged all along that continued funding is contingent upon achieving interim 
milestones.  
Tiwana et al., (2007) looked at the effects of bounded rationality on intuitive 
valuation of real options. They make an argument about managers not valuing options 
rationally because they are boundedly rational and they cope with decision-making 
complexity by using only a subset of the available information. The results showed that 
IT managers tend to systematically show bounded rationality bias in real option 
valuation. This affected the requirement of real options thinking, that suggests that 
managers must take into consideration the value of real options in making judgments 
about the value of new capital investments. The situation was found to be true for four 
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kinds of options i.e. growth, scaling, switching and abandonment. In case of scale 
options, it was also observed that managers value the flexibility to change scale 
irrespective of project NPV. While in case of staging and deferral option, the results 
showed that managers do not value these options even if the NPV is low. Another 
important outcome of the study was the revelation of managers’ preferences in general 
when it comes to real options. Managers weighed option to switch most heavily, 
followed by almost equal weightings on growth and scaling options, while weighing the 
abandonment option lowest.  
Lankton and Luft (2008) predicted option-type-specific differences between 
intuitive judgments and real options predictions while using regret theory and 
competitive behavior theory. According to the study, payoffs from investments in IT are 
often subject to significant uncertainties, and the newsworthiness of major technologies 
(e.g., enterprise resource planning systems, e‑commerce, open source software) often 
means that information about the successes and failures of these technologies is 
available to firms that have not (yet) invested in them. These two factors provide the 
conditions for anticipated regret to affect IT investment decision making. The results 
showed that as uncertainty increases, individuals judge deferral options as more 
valuable but growth options as less valuable thus claiming that the deferral option 
judgments are consistent and the growth option judgments are inconsistent with real 
options theory. The results also showed that competitor’s presence decreases judged 
deferral option values while increasing growth option values, even when a normative 
response to a rational potential competitor would result in no change in the option 
values. These results are consistent with behavioral economic theories as well as rules 
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of thumb i.e. increased uncertainty leading to conservative investments and aggressive 
investments due to the presence of potential competitor, even if the uncertainty is high. 
In a recent study on RFID adoption, Goswami et al. (2008) explored the role of 
embedded real options in the technology on the intention to adopt the technology. The 
real options analyzed were growth, learning, defer and stage. Further they explored the 
factors affecting the recognition of the embedded real options, including managerial 
mindfulness, institutional influences and institutional regulations. It showed that 
embedded growth and deferral options have a strong effect on RFID adoption as 
compared to learning and staging options, where they had no significant effect. Further, 
recognition of growth option was affected by only institutional influences, whereas 
recognition of deferral option was affected by only institutional regulations. Even 
though learning and staging options had no impact on RFID adoption intent, yet their 
recognition was affected by the managerial mindfulness.  
2.6.1 Discussion 
From the studies discussed above, it is evident that intuitive judgment of IT 
managers does effect real option valuation, and the outcomes are different under 
different scenarios. According to Tiwana et al., (2006), managers tend to value growth 
option more than operational options (Figure 2.2), where growth option is 
conceptualized as a call option and operational options are conceptualized as put 
options. Reasons ascribed to such outcome include: 
• Growth options capture the complete value of one or more additional assets, rather 
than modifying the value of a single asset as with operational options. 
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• Due to the framing effects, managers prefer options (growth) that decrease the 
probability of any loss over those (operational) that decrease the severity of 
potential losses, should a loss occur. Same reason is predicted for valuation of 
different operational optional (excluding deferral).  
These findings raise a need for not only testing if it is really the framing effects that are 
causing this outcome, but also extending the concept beyond escalation situations. 
 
Strategic Operational  
Growth Switch Scale Stage Abandon Defer 
Call Option Put Option 
More attractive                                                                 Less attractive 
High Value                                                                           Low Value 
Figure 2.2: How managers value real options? 
 
 
 
Valuation of real options beyond escalation situation was seen in Tiwana et al., 
(2007), by exploring when managers tend to associate real option with a project. The 
study drew the conclusion that managers are more likely to associate real options with 
project value for projects with low, but not high, NPV, thus implying that due to 
bounded rationality, options thinking comes into play as the uncertainty increases 
during the course of project (Figure 2.3).  
 
 
Option Type  
Switch Growth Scale Abandon Stage Defer 
Low NPV                                                High NPV No NPV effect 
High  Uncertainty                       Low Uncertainty No Value 
Figure 2.3: When managers value real options, in the presence of uncertainty? 
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The study gave an insight on how uncertainty plays a role in not only 
recognition and valuation of real options, but also in how the preferences of managers 
change for each type of option. Hence the real option valuation can be mapped through 
other theories relating to decision making under uncertainty. Although the study is 
sound on theory and methodology, it has some inherent limitations. Due to the cross-
sectional nature of data used in the study, results of this study do not provide insights 
into the dynamics of evolution of real options by testing how real option value changes 
across different stages of a project. Also only knowledge intensive and complex IT 
projects are examined in the study, thus making the generalizability of the results 
skeptical for other types of projects that do not share these characteristics. Over all, it 
gives a good indication that further similar concepts, relating to investors psychology 
can be applied on the real option valuation dilemma.   
Lankton and Luft (2008) took the literature one step closer to psychology of IT 
managers by predicting option-type-specific differences between intuitive judgments 
and real options predictions while using regret theory and competitive behavior theory. 
The study showed the conditions for anticipated regret to affect IT investment decision 
making, in the case of two types of real options i.e. growth and deferral, while 
controlling for potential competition (Figure 2.4). Due to the anticipatory nature of 
outcomes involved when it comes to options thinking, further impacts of regrets need 
exploration i.e. how else such an emotional state can effect options thinking among IT 
managers.  
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Figure 2.4: Role of Uncertainty and Competition on Options Valuation 
 
 
Goswami, Teo and Chan (2008) conceptualized the intuitive valuation of real 
options in a different setting i.e. new technology adoption, specifically RFID. By 
aiming at finding if institutional factors and managerial mindfulness affect the 
capability of managers to recognize the “shadow options” in the projects involving 
RFID, this study gave a new insight into further factors that can impact the real options 
thinking. Also, growth and deferral options being prominent in contributing towards 
RFID adoption intuition (Figure 2.5) strengths the pre-established result about these 
options being valued more by IT managers as compared to other real options. It will be 
interesting to see the real option valuation done by managers in the absence of growth 
or deferment or both options. There is a possibility that other real options don’t seem 
valuable due to the managerial bias towards these two options. However in their 
absence, the results might be different, especially in the case of new technology 
adoption. 
Option Types 
Defer Growth Switch  Abandon Learning Stage 
High effect on RFID  
adoption intention 
No effect on RFID  
adoption intention 
No effect of Mindfulness                                        High effect of Mindfulness 
 Institutional Influences   and 
Institutional Regulations                                   
 
Option Types 
Growth Switch Scale Staging Abandon Defer 
Uncertainty + Competition                                                          Uncertainty  
 Seek Pride                                                                          Avoid Regret  
Figure 2.5: Role of Real Options in RFID Adoption 
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2.7 Conclusion 
Our understanding of real options for IT investments is evolving. Although there 
is considerable help available from other fields that has used real options, yet the nature 
of the IT investments and risks underlying them makes these investment a special case. 
That is why we see proliferation in conceptualization of the real options in the context 
of IT, valuation methods and management and implementation issues involved. 
For the option valuation, strong arguments are provided in favor of the adoption 
of quantitative methods from financial options and real options in other fields. Yet, the 
generalizability of one method is not possible. Even if we are able to adopt all the 
methods, the dynamism in the field requires research to fine tune and improves these 
methods. Therefore, efforts like Schwartz and Gorotiza (2003); Hillhorst (2008) etc. are 
much needed. There is also a potential for integrating ROA with Decision Analysis 
(Smith and Nau, 1995) for the better approximation of managerial flexibility and 
overcoming the limitation of the traded assets underlying the real options (especially in 
case of Black Scholes model).  
Real options theory has two distinctive aspects to it:  real options thinking and 
real options analysis. Real options thinking includes literature on intuitive valuation of 
real options in IT investments/ projects and effects of biases on intuitive valuation of 
real options. Real options analysis on the other hand, includes literature on the 
conceptualization of real options in various IT investment scenarios (i.e. kinds of real 
options that can exist in an IT investment scenario), quantitative valuation of real 
options (i.e. the various models discussed in the paper) and the application of real 
options analysis in IT investment scenarios (including hypothetical examples, real 
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examples and OBRiM framework). Figure 2.6 gives a pictorial depiction of real options 
theory in IT.  
 
 
 
Keeping in view the recent developments in this area, we can conveniently say 
that real options are shown to be suitable for IT investment management. The literature 
gives a good insight into real options analysis as well as real options thinking. Real 
options analysis explains the conceptualization, quantitative valuation and application 
of real options for IT investments, whereas real options thinking explores intuitive 
valuation of option like characteristics in IT investment by IT managers and effects of 
various biases on it. 
Literature on real option thinking unanimously agrees that when real options are 
used intuitively to value flexibility in IT investments; they tend to give biased results. 
Figure 2.6: Real Options Theory in IT 
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Similar results were found in case of organizational capabilities as real options (Kogut 
and Kulatilaka, 2001). If real options’ thinking is prone to biases, then there is a 
possibility for a laundry list of synchronized biases that are not explored yet. For 
example, if growth options are valued more than option to abandonment, what effect 
this outcome can have in the case of a portfolio of projects with multiple options? Or if 
similar heuristics lead the decision maker to be risk sensitive while exercising real 
options, based on their perceived value, preferences similar to Prospect theory (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1992)?  
The real option’s value is realized when it’s either exercised or not, based on the 
project’s progress. In case if real options are used as an approximation for actual 
heuristics, it can be argued that the real option’s realized value might be biased due to 
the biased exercise decision of these options? This may be true especially, when there is 
no predetermined time to exercise a real option in the case of IT investment because 
most options are like American style options (where an option can be exercised any 
time before its expiration). While the literature has been focusing on the valuation 
problem in the real options thinking, there is a great potential for exploring the option 
exercise problem in real options thinking i.e. what biases may affect them? Hence, this 
dissertation is directed towards this objective.  
Most of the findings in the current literature about real options thinking are ex 
post and explain observations incompletely. They include either limited or many option 
types and valuation-relevant variables. Without knowing more about why such 
inconsistencies occur in a coherent manner, it is difficult to identify the conditions 
under which they are likely to occur in the future and how best to reduce them. In order 
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to do so, stronger theory base is required that not only provides a common base to 
understand the gaps between managerial intuition and real options, but also explains 
this complex phenomenon in a relatively simple manner. This marks yet another 
objective of this dissertation, where we take help from “prospect theory” to explore 
some anomalies in real option exercise decisions.
CHAPTER 3: STUDY 1 – FRAMING AND NARROW FRAMING EFFECTS ON IT 
REAL OPTIONS 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 Building on the intuitive recognition and valuation of real options by IT 
managers, recent studies have tried to explore the presence and effects of various 
systematic biases on real options (e.g., Tiwana et al., 2006; 2007; Lankton and Luft, 
2008; Goswami et al., 2008). These studies focused on the effects of various biases on 
real option valuation, showing the method’s vulnerability to human decision making. 
But these studies had a limited scope, i.e., a single project and in the presence of a 
single real option. In this study, we try to explore, the presence of systematic biases in a 
more realistic setting, i.e., a portfolio of projects with multiple embedded real options, 
along with the single project scenarios with a single embedded real option. We also aim 
at capturing the effects of these biases on actual managerial decisions at the time of 
option exercise. Furthermore, we explore the factors that can contribute towards 
minimizing the biases. Finally, we look at the relationship between risk behavior of 
individual decision makers and the risk behavior found in IT investment decisions.    
3.1.1 Motivation 
The motivation of this study is to capture the actual decision making process 
behind real option exercise decision along with the factors that impact the decision. Our 
motivation for this study comes from the existing literature on real options indicating 
the vulnerability of real options being subjectively valued by IT managers. Studies have 
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shown how real options are valued based on subjective frames in general as well as in 
IT projects. We draw on Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) idea of framing to suggest 
that managers will demonstrate systematic biases while making real option exercise 
decisions in an IT project setting. By also looking at the concept of narrow framing, we 
hypothesize that in a portfolio setting, IT managers’ tendency of framing some options 
as gains (e.g., growth) and others as loses (e.g., switch or abandon) (Millar and Shapira, 
2004; Tiwana et al., 2006) with respect to the NPV of the project as a reference point, 
will result in varying risk behaviors at option exercise time. Further, it will lead them to 
take isolated real option exercise decisions in a portfolio, hence, impacting the overall 
portfolio’s economic value.  
The focus of this study is not only on problem recognition but also on finding 
methods to mitigate these problems associated with real options exercise decisions. We 
study whether inherent characteristics in IT portfolios or restatement of the decision 
scenario can reduce the narrow framing effects. Also we investigate the role of 
individual risk behavior. Hence, with this study, we intend to answer the following 
questions: 
1. Do framing effects exist at real options’ exercise time in IT projects? 
2. Do narrow framing effects exist at real options’ exercise time in IT portfolios? 
3. What factors have the potential to impact narrow framing effects in IT portfolios? 
4. Does individual risk behavior of IT managers cause framing and narrow framing 
effects on real options’ exercise decisions in IT projects? 
 Our results indicate that framing of real growth options as gains and real 
abandonment options as losses does lead to suboptimal exercise decisions. These biases 
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are more prevalent in large projects than in small projects. Also, biased decision making 
intensifies in a portfolio of projects, where individual and firm level characteristics 
contribute significantly.  
3.1.2 Contribution 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it is one of few 
studies focusing on real options exercise decisions, instead of real options valuation 
problems. IT real options exercise decisions are challenging due to prevalent 
uncertainty about commitment to the option, and the fact that managers are expected to 
take into account all the possible outcomes and future opportunities before making a 
decision. Also, the realized value of real options depends on its optimal exercise. If 
managers are involved in framing in IT projects, their bias of showing different risk 
behavior may lead to suboptimal option exercise decisions. Also, if managers are 
involved in narrow framing in IT portfolio decisions, their bias of separating 
interconnected decisions may lead to isolation cost due to a suboptimal option exercise 
decision.  
Second, we are contributing to the literature and practice of IT project portfolio 
management. Although most organizations today are adopting the idea for managing 
their IT investments, IT project portfolio management is a relatively new research area. 
By knowing the potential pitfalls, management techniques to avoid them can be devised 
and in turn, IT managers can better equip themselves to make the best use out of real 
options.  
Third, we try to extend the literature on behavioral decision making by studying 
the effects of framing and narrow framing in a real options setting. Framing effects and 
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narrow framing have been studied extensively in the fields of psychology, consumer 
behavior, investment behavior and financial markets. Yet, the presence of these 
phenomena in a real options setting has not been investigated.  
The chapter is structured as follows: First, we review the relevant real options, 
framing, and narrow framing literature. Then, we develop hypotheses based on the 
literature, followed by the details on methodology and data. We finally present the 
results, discussion, implications and conclusions. 
3.2 Theories 
3.2.1 Information Technology Management and Real Options 
A real option has two stages: commitment stage and an option exercise stage 
(Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999). At the commitment stage, the option holder commits to 
the option by determining its value and paying an upfront price for it. At the option 
exercise stage, value of the option is realized by making an exercise decision. Most of 
the IS literature on real options has focused on their valuation at the commitment stage. 
For example, several studies (Clemons, 1991; Dos Santos, 1991;Kambil et al., 1993; 
Kumar, 1996; Kumar, 2002) used illustrative examples to propose the idea of using real 
options in IT investments, categorization of real options for IT investments (Benaroch, 
2002), study valuation methods for real options in an IT context (Benaroch 2002; 
Benaroch 2006, 2007; Su et al., 2009; Hilhorst et al., 2008) and investigate behavioral 
biases affecting the valuation of real options (Lankton and Luft, 2008; Tiwana et al., 
2007; Tiwana et al., 2006).  
IS literature has proposed to apply financial options pricing models to value the 
embedded real options in IT projects. Commonly seen models include binomial 
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(Benaroch, 2006), Black-Scholes, and Margrabe (Kumar, 1996, 2002; Bardhan et al., 
2004). In case of financial options, the values of the key parameters for these models is 
available ex ante or is easily calculated because assets underlying these options are 
traded in the market with complete information. As for the real options case, the values 
of key parameters for these models are usually not available. For example, the real 
option exercise price, option expiration time, value of asset underlying the real option, 
etc. may not be known. Table 3.1 gives a comparison between a financial option and a 
real option on an IT asset.  
 
Table 3.1: Comparison of Financial Call Options with Real Options on IT Asset 
Option 
Parameter 
Financial Call Option Real Option on IT Asset 
Option Exercise 
Time (T) 
Exercise date fixed when option is 
issued. A fixed date for European 
style options and flexibility in 
exercising before expiration for 
American style options 
Unspecified date. Estimated based on experience 
with prior projects or managerial opinion 
(Kumar, 2002) 
Strike / Exercise 
Price (K) 
Exercise price is determined before 
option is issued, which does not 
change over the life of the option 
Usually taken as the cost of IT project phase 
(Benaroch 2002, 2006; Kumar, 2002). It is 
uncertain at the time of option acquisition 
(Kumar, 2002) 
Uncertainty about 
full scale 
commitment 
(sigma) 
Calculated based on the price 
uncertainty of traded financial asset. 
It dissipates fully by the expiration 
date of option  
Based on uncertainty in project cost/ benefits 
resulting from the IT project (Kumar 2002). 
Some uncertainty persists over time leading to 
downside risk at exercise time (Tiwana et al., 
2006) 
Benefits (S) The market value of the financial 
asset 
The benefits resulting from the IT project 
(Kumar, 2002) or the value of the underlying IT 
asset (Benaroch, 2002). This may be uncertain 
and could in turn be another option to invest in 
the next phase of the project (Kumar, 2002) 
 
 
Real options provide a tool for hedging unsystematic risk inherent in IT projects 
(Kumar, 2002) by giving a flexibility of altering the course of a project as information is 
revealed. But, unlike financial options, where market information on the underlying 
asset resolves the uncertainty by the exercise time, significant uncertainty persists at the 
option exercise time about the outcome (Coff and Laverty, 2007). Two main sources of 
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uncertainty surrounding the exercise decision are technological changes and business 
environment changes (Keil et al., 2007). Technological uncertainty includes unexpected 
problems in the underlying project hardware, system software, programming languages, 
and database technologies (Nidumolu, 1995; McGrath, 1997). Business uncertainty 
arises from unpredictable changes in a project’s business priorities during its 
implementation (Nidumolu, 1995; Tiwana, Bharadwaj, and Sambamurthy, 2003).  
Therefore, at option exercise time, IT managers have to evaluate the situation with 
uncertain elements, and make a choice between exercising an option and letting it 
expire.  
Due to the difficulty in determining the value of key parameters to value real 
options, using an options heuristic is considered a more practical approach instead of 
conventional quantitative valuation approaches (Bowman and Markowitz, 2001; Kogut 
and Kulatilaka, 2001; McGrath and McMillan, 2000). But these heuristics come at a 
cost of rigor. IT investment decisions are no exception; managers rely more on intuitive 
judgments as a heuristic, rather than using formal quantitative models (Fitchman, 2005; 
Lankton and Luft, 2008). Costs of these heuristics include the likelihood for incorrect 
option exercise decisions. Especially in the face of persistent uncertainty around project 
outcomes at exercise time and with the absence of a time frame for exercising a real 
option on the underlying IT asset, it’s left to the manager’s discretion if the exercise 
decision needs to be made.  
On the one hand, it is argued in the real options literature that option analysis 
captures and formalizes the managers’ intuition, hence, creating a disciplined decision 
making process (Amram et al., 1999). On the other hand, the intuitive valuation of the 
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real options is under high scrutiny in the IS literature due to the prevalent effects of 
various judgmental biases. Also, irreversibility of these investments in terms of 
development and implementation costs makes the timing of these option decisions very 
critical. We inquire into this domain further in this study by exploring the effects of 
framing and narrow framing on real option exercise decisions. We focus on two most 
commonly found real options in IT projects, i.e., growth and abandonment options.  
An IT project can have an embedded growth option that may necessitate several 
platforms or enable implementation of other projects (Taudes et al., 2000). Examples 
include: investments by firms in C-language-based projects, client-server applications, 
and graphical user interfaces providing the knowledge to later exploit object-oriented 
programming innovations (Fichman and Kemerer, 1997); investment in web-based 
technologies by utility firms provide them the software platform to exploit various e-
services tailored to their customers (Bardhan et al., 2004); investment in new 
telecommunication infrastructure provided a telecom firm with future capability to 
adapt to changing needs and allowed it to take advantage of future development 
opportunities and follow-on projects in an uncertain environment (Panayi and 
Trigeorgis, 1998); investments in an ERP system by a firm might provide a necessary 
foundation for workflow or supply chain management systems in the future (Tiwana et 
al., 2006). 
A project can also have an embedded option to abandon, where the application 
can be halted permanently before its completion, depending on the circumstances, like 
for example good quality applications that have lost their value for the organization 
(Weil and Vitale, 1999). An abandonment option can be associated with a switch-use 
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option in the IS literature (Benaroch, 2002), where abandonment options become more 
valuable if the resources from the abandoned project can be put to another use. The 
value is generated by minimizing losses on overall investment through reducing 
resource waste. Alternatively, the abandonment option and the option to switch-use can 
be treated separately, where value from an option to abandon is generated by the 
flexibility to curtail losses, instead of minimizing them. Although, in both cases, the 
abandonment option is valuable, empirical evidence shows several reasons for this 
option to be least valued by managers, even when it is appropriate to exercise the option 
(Busby and Pitts, 1997; Miller and Shapira, 2004; Tiwana et al., 2006). These include 
political implications of cancellation of the project, personal reputation of managers, 
negative impact on staff morale, etc. (Keil et al., 2000).  
3.2.2 Information Technology Portfolio Management  
A project portfolio is a collection of individual projects. In case of IT, a 
collection of individual IT projects managed collectively comprises an IT portfolio. The 
major classifications that are found for IT portfolios in the IS literature are application 
portfolios (Ward, 1990; Weil and Vitale, 1999) and multi-stage projects portfolios 
(Panayi and Trigeorgis, 1998; Bardhan et al., 2004; Benaroch et al., 2006). Application 
portfolios constitute various IT applications that have a potential to add value to the 
firm. Each IT application in the portfolio is usually independent of the other 
applications and each can serve a specific purpose. For example, an application can be 
of strategic nature (like order management systems, links with suppliers, sales and 
demand forecasting, etc.), or can be supporting key operations (like budgetary control, 
accounting, inventory management, etc.). The common factor for which such a wide 
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variety of applications are combined in a portfolio form is that they can be supported by 
a single software platform (Taudes et al., 2000). Also, all of them are competing for 
limited organizational resources (Ward, 1990). Various methods are proposed for 
evaluating projects in these portfolios (Ward, 1990; Weil and Vitale, 1999), where each 
project investment is profiled based on its risk and value characteristics over a period of 
time (Weil and Vitale, 1999). Investment decisions are then made based on these 
profiles of individual projects within the portfolio. This portfolio approach further helps 
in determining the overall value added by IT investments to the firm’s performance 
(Ward, 1990). 
Multi-stage IT portfolios are constituted of multiple interdependent projects 
(Panayi and Trigeorgis, 1998; Bardhan et al., 2004). Usually, two kinds of 
interdependencies are found among projects in such IT project portfolios. First is an 
input/output interdependency, where completion of one project is required to carry out 
the future projects, i.e., sequencing (Bardhan et al., 2004; Benaroch et al., 2006). For 
example, in order to launch e-services, a web infrastructure has to be in place. The 
second kind of interdependency is the resource interdependency, where multiple 
projects are sharing resources like skilled people, hardware and finances (Thorp, 1999). 
These multi-staged IT project portfolios are made of large projects like IT 
infrastructure, where the base project by itself does not create much value but it has a 
potential to enable other projects that could add significant value overall. Also, such 
projects are constrained by sequencing, where completion of one project is essential to 
initiate the contingent projects. These interdependencies impact the value of not only 
the project but the whole portfolio of projects. In multi-staged IT portfolio, each stage is 
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evaluated before further investment is made. This leads to the embedded compound 
growth options in such portfolios, i.e., options whose exercise brings forth more options 
along with generating value for the firm in terms of cash flows and strategic advantage 
(Panayi and Trigeorgis, 1998; Bardhan et al., 2004).  
The overall objective of IT portfolio management is to maximize the value of 
the portfolio by balancing the combined risk and value of the projects. There can be 
several sources of risks within an IT portfolio, including, project size, experience with 
technology, project structure (McFarlan, 1981) and technical quality (Weil and Vitale, 
1999) among others. Ultimately, these factors determine how volatile the benefits are 
from the investments. As for the value of the projects, it is usually determined by the 
system’s importance to a specific business unit in the organization, perceived 
management value of the system and level of use of the system (Weil and Vitale, 1999). 
Based on that, IT projects can have one of the following risk and value profile, i.e., high 
risk-high value, high risk-low value, low risk-high value and low risk-low value.  
In this study, we focus on two types of IT portfolios, i.e., IT portfolios with no 
interdependency among projects, and IT portfolios with resource interdependency 
among projects.  In these portfolios, the key challenge is to keep the resource allocation 
at its best based on the risk-value profile of the portfolio. This in turn makes the 
investment decision dependent on the perception of real options embedded in projects 
and their exercise decision. Sub-optimal exercise decisions can impact the portfolio’s 
health in the form of sunk costs with early investments, lost opportunities, and too much 
investment for too little value. The absence of methods in place for portfolio evaluation 
makes optimal option exercise decisions challenging.  
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3.2.3 Framing Effects and Narrow Framing 
For strategic decisions involving high stakes, managers are expected to make 
decisions objectively and inclusively by considering all the alternatives and integrating 
a variety of information (Bukszar and Connolly, 1988). In reality, as the task becomes 
cognitively challenging, managers arrive at their decisions by considering a broad range 
of facts and then by conducting a detailed examination of a subset of facts (Etzioni, 
1989). While doing so, empirical studies have shown that they fall prey to the effects of 
narrow framing based on how individual subsets are framed (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981; Kahneman, 2003; Thaler, 1985; Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). This section 
reviews the literature on framing effects and narrow framing along with their 
application in various fields.  
Frames are cognitive shortcuts that people use to understand complex 
information and to simplify complicated phenomena into more easily understandable 
components (Liu et al., 2010). The first conception of frames in terms of decision 
making came from Tversky and Kahneman (1981), who described decision frames as 
the decision-maker’s conception of the alternatives and contingencies associated with 
the alternatives and outcomes. Through experimental evidence, they showed that the 
decision frames that a decision maker adopts rely on factors like formulation of the 
problem, norms, habits, and personal characteristics of the decision-maker. 
Generally, framing effect occur when the willingness to undertake a risky task 
depends on whether potential outcomes are positively or negatively framed. Also 
known “risky choice framing”, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) showed preference 
reversal among people’s risk preferences where they are willing to take more risks with 
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negatively framed outcomes than with positively framed outcomes. In their famous 
Asian disease problem, two groups were given the same situation, but framed in two 
different ways, i.e., gain (lives saved) frame vs. loss (lives lost) frame (Figure 3.1).  
 
 
Imagine that the United States is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. 
Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: 
Save Frame 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved (72%)  
 
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability 
that 600 people will be saved and a two-thirds 
probability that no people will be saved (28%) 
Loss Frame 
If Program A' is adopted, 400 people will die (22%) 
 
If Program B' is adopted, there is a one-third 
probability that nobody will die and a two-thirds 
probability that 600 people will die (78%) 
Figure 3.1: Asian Disease Problem, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 
 
 
Both the options are mathematically equal, where the expected values are the same. 
Theoretically, the same proportion of subjects should have selected option “A” as 
selected option “A`”, or should have selected option “B” as selected option “B`”. 
Instead, the majority of subjects showed preference reversal by showing risk-averse 
behavior in the gain frame and risk seeking behavior in the loss frame. In other words, 
they were risk-seeking when a "lives lost" frame was employed (B` was favored over 
A`) but under the "lives saved" frame, they were risk-averse (A was favored over B). 
The formulation of frames is dependent on the reference point to which the 
decision maker become conveniently adopted. This leads them to start relying on 
narrow frames relative to that reference point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1981; 
Kahneman, 2003). Narrow framers make their decisions through selective 
simplification and engage in suboptimal decision making under risky situations. For 
example, the reference point in the previous example was lives saved (Tversky and 
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Kahneman, 1981). Typically, the reference points vary from situation to situation. For 
example, for managerial decision making, the reference point is the organizational 
resources at stake (Hogarth, 1987). In a trade situation, reference point for the seller is 
found to be the amount received, whereas it is the amount paid for the buyers (Huber, 
Neale and North-craft, 1986), which leads to sellers being less risk taking than buyers. 
In the case of IT investment, a project’s NPV is the reference point that managers 
conveniently adapt to (Fichman et al., 2005) that guides their decision about the project. 
In other words, the decision-makers’ perceptions become narrowly anchored on a 
reference point they use to assess changes in wealth rather than the final states of wealth 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), therefore leading them to decision making in isolation 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). The situation becomes more prevalent in case of 
decisions made intuitively rather than through effortful reasoning (Kahneman, 2003). 
A similar conception of narrow framing is given by Thaler (1985), who suggests 
that framing simplifies complicated problems into simpler sub-problems, and 
decomposes investment problems into mental accounts. When doing their mental 
accounting, people engage in narrow framing, that is, they often appear to pay attention 
to narrowly defined gains and losses (Barberis and Huang, 2001), as described by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981). Again, the behavior over gains and losses follows the 
prospect theory predictions, i.e., risk-averse over gains and risk-seeking over losses. 
Also, while comparing gains and losses, people tend to be more sensitive to losses than 
gains, leading to loss-averse behavior (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The application 
of mental accounting and loss aversion, also known as myopic loss aversion is mostly 
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seen in the area of individual stock investment behavior (Barberis and Huang, 2001; 
2008) 
There is ample literature about narrow framing (Table 3.2). As mentioned 
before, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) first introduced the concept of narrow framing 
by experimentally demonstrating the tendency of people to simplify complicated 
phenomena into easily understandable outlines and engaging into decision making in 
isolation. While doing so, they showed risk-averse behavior over positively framed 
scenarios and risk seeking behavior over negatively framed scenarios, where scenarios 
were presented as a concurrent decision problem. Such tendencies lead towards the 
selection of sub-optimal choice on their part. Later Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) 
showed the existence of narrow framing for decision making under risk while showing 
that under these circumstances, people make decisions one at a time. They are prone to 
neglect the relevance of future decision opportunities as well as interdependence among 
their decisions, which leads to isolation costs. The results were generalized to individual 
decision makers as well as organizational decision making. 
Thaler (1985) extended the concept of narrow framing to marketing in the form 
of mental accounting, and developed new concepts in three distinct areas, i.e., coding of 
gains and losses by consumers, how they evaluate purchases while using transaction 
utility instead of standard utility, and budgetary rules followed by them. Later, Thaler 
(1999) further explored the relationship between narrow framing and mental accounting 
and characteristics of mental accounting, also referred to as myopic loss aversion.  
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Table 3.2: Literature on Narrow Framing 
 
 
 
Reference Area of Application Results 
Tversky and 
Kahneman 
(1981) 
Psychology of decision 
making under risk 
Formulation of frames is dependent on the reference point 
to which decision maker become conveniently adapted. It 
leads them to start relying on narrow frames relative to that 
reference point. 
Kahneman 
and Lovallo 
(1993) 
Psychology of decision 
making under risk 
Narrow framers are liable to consider problems as unique. 
They isolate current choices from future opportunities and 
neglect the connection in terms of future choice 
opportunities, which results in isolation costs. 
Thaler (1985) Consumer behavior 
and evaluation of 
purchases 
Consumers indulge in mental accounting while deciding on 
various aspects of their purchases. 
Thaler (1999) Mental accounting 
process  
Risk attitude of loss-averse investors depends on the 
frequency with which they reset their reference point. 
Barberis, 
Huang, and 
Santos (2001) 
Relation of narrow 
framing and loss 
aversion to the equity 
premium puzzle 
Loss aversion due to narrow framing over financial wealth 
fluctuations in a dynamic equilibrium model captures a 
number of aggregate market phenomena. 
Barberis, 
Huang, and 
Thaler (2006) 
Investor behavior in 
stock market 
Investors isolate their investment decisions in regards to 
their portfolio and do not take into account the degree of 
correlation between the portfolio components. 
Barberis and 
Huang (2008) 
Investors’ utility 
function for asset 
allocation under 
narrow framing and 
loss aversion 
Investors evaluate a gamble in isolation and are sensitive to 
losses. 
Frazzini 
(2006) 
Individual trading 
behavior in stock 
market 
Investors evaluate a gamble in isolation and are indifferent 
to the correlation between their outcome and their total 
wealth. 
Lim (2006) Individual trading 
behavior in stock 
market 
Individual traders exhibit mental accounting behavior in 
stock markets. They frame gains and losses separately, and 
are prone to executing trading decisions in order to sell 
more multiple losers on any given day versus selling 
winners. 
Kumar and 
Lim (2008) 
Individual trading 
behavior in stock 
market 
Narrow framing traders exhibit the disposition effect more, 
and hold more undiversified portfolios in stock markets. 
Baily et al. 
(2008) 
Individual trading 
behavior in stock 
market 
Investors who frame decision narrowly or prefer speculative 
securities poorly select mutual funds and trade excessively. 
Magi (2009) International 
portfolio choice 
Narrow framing preferences in agents lead to home bias i.e., 
foreign assets seem less attractive than the one in the home 
country.  
Liu et al. 
(2010) 
Financial Options 
market 
Traders in an options market show evidence of narrow 
framing by framing complicated investment decisions into 
simpler ones. Also, traders’ professionalism, sophistication, 
and trading experience help to reduce investors’ behavioral 
bias in the form of narrow framing. 
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Along with psychology and marketing, application of narrow framing in finance 
explained a wide variety of investor behaviors. For example, Barberis et al. (2006) 
suggest that investors engage in narrow framing by isolating their investment decisions 
in regards to their portfolio in terms of gain and losses. This way, they ignore the degree 
of correlation between the portfolio components. By demonstrating that investors 
evaluate a gamble in isolation and are sensitive to losses, Barberis and Huang (2008) 
showed that investors exhibiting narrow framing can explain equity premium puzzles. 
Frazzini (2006) reports that narrow framing can occur anytime or across different risky 
choices. In other words, agents evaluate a gamble in isolation and are indifferent to the 
correlation between their outcome and their total wealth. They also evaluate their 
outcome at given time intervals.  
Kumar and Lim (2008) justified the disposition effect among individual traders 
through narrow framing and found that investors who frame decisions narrowly or 
prefer speculative securities select mutual funds poorly and trade excessively. 
Therefore, such traders are more likely to hold more undiversified equity portfolios. 
Along with excessive trading, investors with narrow framing also select high expense 
mutual funds that detract from performance (Baily et al., 2008). Magi (2009) gave 
explanation of aggregate portfolio behavior, in a framework where economic agents 
have narrow framing preferences. In case of diversification opportunities in the form of 
international portfolio choices, an individual’s limited capabilities of processing 
information lead to home bias. This means a foreign asset is perceived as less attractive 
than it would be if the investor had the optimal information skills and, hence, would be 
able to evaluate the two risky assets jointly. 
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Traders’ behavior is also found to be in alignment with narrow framing in 
financial options markets. Liu et al. (2010) showed that traders in an options market 
show evidence of narrow framing by framing complicated investment decisions into 
simpler ones. Also, traders’ professionalism, sophistication, and trading experience help 
to reduce investors’ behavioral bias in the form of narrow framing.  
Given that the real option exercise decisions are important in order to realize 
their value (Kumar, 2002), along with the evidence provided in the literature on biases 
affecting the real options value (Busby and Pitts, 1997; Howell and Jägle, 1997; Miller 
and Shapira, 2004; Tiwana et al., 2006; 2007; Lankton and Luft, 2008), we take one 
step ahead to test if the real option exercise decisions are affected by judgmental biases? 
We make use of Prospect Theory, and specifically “framing effects”, because this 
theory has been used in real option valuation. We discuss the details in the following 
section. Also, as IT projects are commonly managed as a portfolio, we extend the use of 
the theory for collective decision making in real options scenarios, by taking into 
account the “narrow framing effects”. The details on hypotheses development is given 
in the following section.  
3.3 Hypotheses Development 
Recent real options literature has focused on the behavioral aspect of the real 
options use (Table 3.3). The motivation of these studies has been to identify the 
characteristics of managerial intuition and real options analysis along with the reasons 
for prevailing valuation gaps in various contexts. As described in Table 3.3, these 
studies concentrated on the real options value and the identification of potential biases 
that can affect their perceived value.   
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Table 3.3: Literature on Intuitive Valuation of Real Options 
Reference Theory Used Hypotheses Type of Subjects 
Busby and 
Pitts, 1997 
Real Options 
Theory 
How decision-makers in industry evaluate 
flexibility in capital investments. 
Senior Finance 
Officers 
Howell and 
Jägle, 1997 
Human 
Information 
Processing 
How managers intuitively value real growth 
options. 
Managers 
Miller and 
Shapira, 
2004 
Prospect 
Theory and 
Framing 
Effects 
How purchasers/sellers of call and put option 
price it relative to their payoffs/losses 
MBA Students 
Discount rates decrease with option duration, 
and the steepness of decline decreases with time. 
Call/Put option sellers and buyers discount 
exercise price 
Tiwana et 
al., 2006 
Escalation of 
Commitment 
Presence of real options in a project increases 
the likelihood of warned continuation of an IT 
project with negative feedback. 
Managers 
Prospect 
Theory and 
Framing 
Effects 
Managers perceive strategic growth options 
embedded in an IT project as adding more value 
to the firm than operating options 
Tiwana et 
al., 2007 
Bounded 
Rationality  
Under uncertainty, managers associate 
embedded options (growth, switch, stage, scale, 
defer, and abandon) with IT project value in case 
of a low NPV. 
Managers 
Lankton 
and Luft, 
2008 
Regret Theory Under uncertainty, deferral options are 
intuitively valued more than growth options in 
IT projects. 
MBA Students 
The presence of competition decreases the value 
of deferral options and increases the value of 
growth option 
 
 
Literature studying the fit between managerial intuitive valuation of real options 
and real options analysis confirm that managerial intuition does not always conform to 
real options analysis. For example, Howell and Jägle (1997) showed that managers do 
not value growth options as much under high uncertainty. Tiwana et al. (2007) showed 
that managers only value an option in a project when the NPV of the project is low.  
Lankton and Luft, (2008) showed that under prevailing uncertainty about outcomes, 
deferral options are valued more than growth options, which is partly in line with the 
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results of Howell and Jägle (1997). They also show that the situation reverses in the 
presence of competition.  
In this section, we develop our hypotheses in light of recent findings on real 
options and literature on “framing effects” and “narrow framing”. Hypotheses for this 
study are divided into four types. The first set hypothesizes the effects of intuitive 
frames on real options exercise decisions in individual IT projects, due to resulting risk 
behavior, and the project size effects. The second set of hypotheses is built around the 
consequences of prevailing framing effects in IT portfolios in the form of narrow 
framing. The third set of hypotheses focus on the factors that have a potential of 
reducing narrow framing effects in IT portfolios. The last hypothesis tests the 
connection between the individual risk behavior and narrow framing effects.  
3.3.1 Framing Effects 
Real options literature shows evidence of general managerial perceptions of real 
options being in alignment with the predictions of prospect theory. Millar and Shapira 
(2004) showed that real call options are framed as gains and real put options are framed 
as losses by the real options buyers and sellers, during the real options’ risk evaluation. 
Due to these framing effects, real option buyers and sellers show risk-averse behavior 
for call options and risk seeking behavior for put options at the real options’ purchase 
time. These effects are reflected in the real option price and its exercise price that each 
party is willing to pay and receive. Tiwana et al. (2006) used the same reasoning to 
show that, in the context of IT investments, IT managers value real growth options more 
than operational options because real growth options share the same structure as call 
options, whereas the rest of the operational real options are like put options. Therefore, 
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they perceive a growth option as adding more value to the project than operational 
options. These perceptions of real options in an IT investment are shown to drive 
commitment to projects embedding these options as well as contribute towards their 
continuation, even in the face of negative feedback (Tiwana et al., 2006). But this 
finding does not assure the optimal exercise of these real options at the exercise stage. 
On the one hand the IT manager is likely to commit to a project with an embedded real 
option or keep committing to the project as more real options emerge or the existing 
ones have time left to expire, because they are perceived as adding value to the project 
in terms of flexibility in changing the course of the project. On the other hand, from the 
framing theory perspective, IT managers should show either risk-averse behavior or risk 
seeking behavior at the option exercise time, depending on how they are framed, i.e., 
either as a gain or loss. For example, if growth options are framed as gains at the 
commitment stage, IT managers will show risk-averse behavior for decision scenarios 
involving exercising decision under uncertain outcomes situations. Hence, we 
hypothesize that: 
H1: When IT managers exercise a growth option in a single IT project, there will be 
framing effects.  
Several operational options exist against one real growth option, i.e., option to 
switch, stage, abandon, scale and defer. The IT literature points that an IT real option to 
abandon is least valued by the managers (Tiwana et al., 2006; Busby and Pitts, 1997) 
due to difficulty in exercising the option. Other factors identified include the “sunk cost 
effect” and ‘face saving” (Keil et al., 2000) that may lead to delaying/preventing 
exercising the option to abandon among IT managers. Contributors towards the 
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difficulty in exercising the exit option include disruption in ongoing project operations, 
negative impact on the team’s moral and credibility, and the ability of the exit option to 
give no accomplishment as compared to other real options, except curtailing losses 
(Tiwana et al., 2006).  
We extend our framing argument to the option to abandon. Similar to the growth 
option, an option to abandon is shown to drive commitment to an IT project or 
continuation of the troubled IT project, but its presence does not assure that the option 
value will be realized through its optimal exercise. Especially due to risk seeking 
behavior in situations framed as losses, IT managers will put off their exercise decision 
as much as possible, even when it’s optimal to exercise it, i.e., with small odds of 
breaking even against taking a sure loss and saving resources. Hence, we hypothesize 
that: 
H2: When IT managers exercise an abandonment option in a single IT project, there 
will be framing effects. 
While evaluating gains as well as losses, people show loss-averse tendencies in 
general. It means that they are more sensitive to losses than to gains. Their displeasure 
associated with losing a sum of money is generally greater than the pleasure associated 
with winning the same amount. Aversion to losses is used to explain several decision 
making paradoxes including people's reluctance to accept fair bets on a toss of a coin 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), the discrepancies between the amount of money people 
are willing to pay for a good and the compensation they demand to give it up (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1986; Bishop and Heberlein 1979; Knetsch and Sinden, 1984), and a 
violation of consumer theory known as endowment effect, i.e., the selling price for 
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consumption goods is much higher than the buying price, often by a factor of 2 or more. 
The reason is that the value of a good to an individual appears to be higher when the 
good is viewed as something that could be lost or given up than when the same good is 
evaluated as a potential gain (Kahneman, 2003; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). 
We make use of loss-aversion to explain the risk behavior related to real options.  
As, abandonment options are found to be least valued by the IT managers, we argue that 
it is due to their aversion to losses. We hypothesize that loss aversion3 holds in real 
abandonment option exercise decisions. Reaction to losses associated with option to 
abandon, are more severe in IT investment decisions than reaction to gains associated 
with growth options. Hence, the suboptimal decision making at option exercise time for 
abandonment options is greater than in the case of growth options.  
H3: When IT managers exercise a real option in a single project, framing effects will 
be greater in an IT project with an abandonment option than in an IT project 
with a growth option. 
3.3.2 Framing Effects and IT Project size  
Framing effects are more prevalent in situations framed as gains and losses 
involving small amounts than situations involving large amounts, given the actual 
quantities involved are similar in both situations. For example, the subjective value 
difference between a gain of $10 and a gain of $20 is perceived to be greater than the 
subjective value difference between a gain of $110 and a gain of $120. The same holds 
true for losses, unless the larger loss is intolerable. Hence, the marginal value of both 
gains and losses generally decrease with their magnitude (Kahneman and Tversky, 
                                                 
3
 Loss aversion is the tendency of people to strongly prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979) 
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1979).The reason for such variability is associated with the underlying weighing 
function that drives the subjective value of frames in the prospect theory. This S-shaped 
value function defined over gains and losses is concave for gains and convex for losses, 
where the effect of marginal change in subjective value decreases with the increase in 
distance from the reference point in either direction (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986).  
IT projects vary in terms of their scope and investment costs. For example, 
according to the Amberdeen Group Inc. (2006) survey, an average total cost of an ERP 
system ranges from $0.4 Million to $2.2 Million, depending on the vendor and the size 
of the firm in terms of the system users. In alignment with the prediction of framing 
theory and the effects of subjective valuation of gains and losses on the quantities 
involved in the situation with respect to their distance to the reference point, we predict 
that the framing effects will be relatively more substantial in smaller IT projects with 
embedded growth and abandonment options as compared to their counterparts that 
involve higher costs. Hence, we hypothesize: 
H4a: In IT projects with growth options, framing effects will be stronger in small IT 
projects than large ones. 
H4b: In IT projects with abandonment options, framing effects will be stronger in 
small IT projects than large ones. 
In the IS literature, evidence has been provided that an increase in the size of the 
project has led to more biased decisions. Especially in the case of IT projects with less 
potential of being productive, escalation of commitment is prevalent. Sunk cost effect 
(Keil et al., 2000) is successfully attributed to such a behavior, where decision makers 
tend to be more willing to continue a project when the level of sunk cost is high. 
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Although this finding is limited to software projects, it provides a counter argument for 
the effect of size of a project on real option exercise decisions. We also find evidence of 
difficulty in killing large projects. Examples include Denver’s International Airport 
baggage system (Keil and Montealegre, 2000) and London’s Taurus stock exchange 
project (Drummond, 1996). In those cases, the size of the project along with other 
factors, such as managers’ reputation, the political ramifications of abandoning, and the 
possible effect of abandonment on staff morale (Keil et al., 2000) have been shown to 
increase the difficulty in abandoning the project. In case of option to abandon decision, 
larger projects will have more at stake at the exercise time, as compared to small 
projects, which might make a decision maker biased towards escalation of commitment.  
For growth option exercise decisions, large projects require more investment 
and, hence, putting more at stake, as compared to small projects with growth options. 
Economic recession compiled with shrinking technology market has impacted the IT 
investments greatly across the world (Ante, 2008; Botello, 2009). These 
macroeconomic factors have a tendency of rendering organizations to be very careful 
and conservative about their investments including in IT. Investments in large projects 
with high uncertainty puts quite allot at stake. With organizations having less capability 
to take risk, and IT managers reputation depending on the performance of the project, 
might lead them to be conservative in their investment approach. We extend these 
arguments to both real options, i.e., growth as well as abandonment option decisions 
and propose the following competing hypotheses: 
H4c: In IT projects with growth options, framing effects will be stronger in large IT 
projects than small ones. 
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H4d: In IT projects with abandonment options, framing effects will be stronger in 
large IT projects than small ones. 
3.3.3  Narrow Framing Effects – Portfolio of Independent Projects 
Exercising real options in the absence of quantitative methods is risky due to the 
prevalent biases. In the case of IT investments, the situation is further complicated due 
to the effect of uncertainty around outcomes at option exercise time (Kumar, 2002; 
Tiwana et al., 2006), high option exercise cost which is based on the cost of current IT 
project/ project phase (Benaroch 2002, 2006; Kumar, 2002), and uncertain benefits 
from the underlying IT asset (Benaroch 2002; Kumar, 2002). The decision scenario 
becomes more complex in the presence of more than one IT projects, i.e., project 
portfolio setting with embedded options.  
In the presence of framing effects in managerial valuation of real options in 
general (Millar and Shapira, 2004) and real options embedded in IT projects (Tiwana et 
al., 2006), their impact on portfolio decisions is still unknown. Narrow framing theory 
suggests that narrow framers make decisions through selective simplification and 
engage in suboptimal decision making under risky situations (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981; Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). The simplification process is executed by 
isolating each decision, then formulating “frames” around each decision with a mutually 
exclusive reference point, and then becoming conveniently adapted to it (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981). In the investment portfolio setting, investors are found to isolate 
their decisions while ignoring the vital decision criteria like correlation among portfolio 
components (Barberis, Huang and Santos, 2001) and the connection between current 
choice and future opportunities (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). Hence, one of the 
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implications of framing of situations is narrow framing in complicated decision 
scenarios.  
To capture the implications of framing effects in IT portfolio decisions, we 
utilize the narrow framing theory. Our goal is to observe if managerial intuition of IT 
managers engage in narrow framing at option exercise time in an IT portfolio that is 
embedding different real options, due to the difference in the framing of real options. 
We keep our hypotheses limited to two types of real options for portfolio decisions:  
real growth option and real abandonment option. The underlying intuition is that the 
framing of real options incites different risk behaviors, which is observable in the option 
exercise choice. Hence, IT managers’ tendency to frame real growth options as gains 
and real operational options as losses (Millar and Shapira, 2004) may lead them to 
narrow framing in portfolio decisions.   
In an IT portfolio with multiple embedded real options, managers will frame a 
growth option associated with one project as gain and an option to abandon as loss. 
Therefore, managers are likely to show risk-averse behavior for the growth option and 
play it safe by not exercising it and risk seeking behavior for the option to abandon, 
again by not exercising it when it’s feasible to do so. Due to the framing effects on 
individual real options in the portfolio, they would isolate each real option exercise 
decision by their frame and decide individually based on underlying risk predictions, 
while ignoring the overall impact of their decision on the portfolio, hence, engaging in 
narrow framing. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H5a: When IT managers exercise real options in an IT portfolio, they will engage in 
narrow framing. 
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We extend our framing effects argument from single projects embedding real 
options to portfolio decisions.  Portfolios are a collection of individual projects. If the IT 
managers engage in framing and show respective risk behaviors based on real option 
type in single projects, their decision preferences should not change in the portfolio 
setting. Managers framing single growth options will frame them in a portfolio as well. 
Similarly managers framing single abandonment options will frame them in a portfolio 
as well. Engaging in narrow framing indicates decision making in isolation in a 
portfolio. This outcome may be due to how real options are framed individually, in a 
non-portfolio setting. Hence, we hypothesize that: 
H5b: Framing of real options in single IT projects will lead to narrow framing in IT 
portfolios. 
We hypothesized earlier that loss aversion holds in real option exercise 
decisions. Reaction to losses, associated with the option to abandon, is more severe in 
IT investment decisions than for gains situations, associated with growth options. We 
extend the same reasoning to IT portfolios and hypothesize that the presence of 
abandonment options in IT portfolios contributes more towards a suboptimal decision in 
the portfolio, than the presence of growth options, because  of the IT managers’ 
aversion to losses.   
H6: When IT managers exercise real options in an IT portfolio, framing effects will 
be greater for projects with an abandonment option than for projects with a 
growth option. 
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3.3.4 Narrow Framing Effects – Portfolio of Interdependent Projects 
In an IT portfolio, projects are likely to share resources. These resources include 
financial resources, where a portfolio needs to be maintained out of a same budget pool, 
and  human resources, where the same set of people are responsible to develop, 
implement and maintain the projects involved in the portfolio. With such resource 
interdependency among projects in the portfolio managed by IT managers, the 
challenge is to maximize the portfolio output while making efficient use of the scarce 
resources at hand. The embedded real options in the projects forming such portfolios 
give IT managers the flexibility of making decisions in order to achieve that goal. 
In IT portfolios, resource interdependencies initiate competition for scarce 
resources (Throp, 1999). Also, such interdependencies act as constraints on the 
portfolio, which is a key step in portfolio alignment (Goldman, 1999). These findings 
point towards the notion that resource interdependencies among IT projects in a 
portfolio contribute towards its improved management, where efficient management of 
these resources becomes a key to maximize the output of the portfolio.  
IS literature highlights the contribution of effective resource management in IS 
projects by promoting de-escalation of commitment in failing projects (Keil and Robey, 
1999). Awareness of alternative uses of the funds supporting a project is shown to force 
the decision makers out of decision making in isolation (Keil and Robey, 1999; 
McCain, 1986; Northcraft and Neale, 1986). Especially for long term resource 
allocation decisions for projects with setbacks like decreased revenue, increased cost, 
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and lower benefits, decision makers ignore the opportunity costs4 and frame the 
situation as a loss, i.e., choice between certain loss and the possibility of larger or no 
loss. Making the opportunity costs more explicit, by highlighting the alternative uses of 
remaining resources, have proven to alter the framing of such decisions, hence, leading 
to decisions that more closely reflect the cost/ benefit prescriptions (Northcraft and 
Neale, 1986), instead of subjective decisions based on risk behaviors.  
On the one hand, in alignment with the narrow framing theory prediction, where 
interconnection among investments is ignored by decision makers, IT managers’ 
tendency of framing real options differently has a potential to lead them towards taking 
decisions in isolation in a portfolio setting. But on the other hand, the resource 
interdependency among projects has a potential for  the IT project managers to improve 
their portfolio output by taking  into account the complete portfolio outcome before 
making option exercise decisions for each real option, hence, reducing the potential 
narrow framing effects. We extend our prediction in favor of the IT portfolio findings 
and hypothesize that: 
H7: Resource interdependency among projects in an IT portfolio will reduce the 
narrow framing effects. 
3.3.5 Narrow Framing Effects - IT Project Size  
We hypothesized earlier that framing effects are predicted to be more prominent 
in small sized IT projects with embedded real options as compared to their larger 
counterparts. Continuing on the same reasoning, it is arguable that such IT project size 
effects will be seen in IT portfolios as well. In alignment with the prospect theory we 
                                                 
4 Opportunity costs here mean costs associated with forgone opportunities to utilize resources in more 
productive endeavors/ projects.  
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predict that the IT managers will be showing more narrow framing bias in IT portfolios 
involving smaller projects in terms of investment than the ones involving large projects 
in terms of investment size. For example, the gain of $ 10,000 will be more valuable in 
a project of size $100,000 as compared to the project of size $ 1 Million. Similarly the 
loss of $10,000 will be more valued by IT managers in a project of size $ 100,000 as 
compared to the project of size $ 1 Million. Such decreasing marginal value of gains 
and losses with respect to the project size could impact the narrow framing effects in an 
IT portfolio setting, by reducing the framing bias on IT projects constituting the 
portfolio. When the subjective value on pure gains and losses is reduced, there is a 
likely chance of IT managers to think inclusively about the portfolio before making the 
real options exercise decision. Hence, we hypothesize that: 
H8a: Increasing project sizes in an IT portfolio will reduce the narrow framing 
effects. 
We hypothesized earlier that an increase in the size of the project may lead to 
more biased decisions, for growth and abandonment options.  We extend the same 
reasoning for IT portfolios consisting of growth and abandonment options. We propose 
the following competing hypothesis: 
H8b: Increasing project sizes in an IT portfolio will increase the narrow framing 
effects. 
3.3.6 Narrow Framing Effects – Simplifying the Real Options Outcomes 
Narrow framing has costs associated with it, i.e., isolation cost due to exclusive 
decision making. In the case of IT real options, the isolation cost would be the 
suboptimal portfolio outcome based on the option exercise decisions. It means that IT 
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managers’ risk-averse behavior for situations framed as gains and risk-seeking behavior 
for situations framed as losses would lead them to ignore the overall impact of their 
exercise decisions on the portfolio. But, when the presentation of the same decisions is 
changed from the binary choice for each real option in a portfolio to a single choice 
among potential portfolio outcomes, where the economic value of the combined 
decision is obvious, they would select the choice where the portfolio’s economic value 
is optimal. This prediction is in alignment with Tversky and Kahneman (1981) finding 
that, once the prospects are combined and dominance of the prospects is obvious, 
decision makers recognize the dominant prospect and select that. Therefore, we expect 
that: 
H9: Simplifying the real option exercise decisions in an IT portfolio will reduce the 
narrow framing effects.  
3.3.7 Narrow Framing Effects - Individual Risk Behavior  
Narrow framing studies have found a connection between decision makers’ 
professional characteristics (e.g., professional sophistication and experience) with their 
ability to narrow frame (Liu et al., 2010), but the framing studies as well as narrow 
framing studies results are typically presented independent of the individual risk 
behavior of the decision maker.  One reason for such a trend is the underlying 
assumption of prospect theory that all decision makers are systematically biased in the 
same way and to the same extent when it comes to framing of situations (Kahneman et 
al., 1982). This assumption implies independence between the individual risk behavior 
of the decision maker and their ability of framing situations that lead to narrow framing. 
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It means that independent of individual risk behavior, people are biased for narrow 
framing.  
The real options literature and the IT project management literature do not look 
at individual risk behavior. To get a deeper insight into the narrow framing 
phenomenon, we consider capturing individual risk behavior of IT managers that are 
important in this study. The reputation of IT managers at stake positions the IT portfolio 
management as an important decision scenario. On the one hand, the importance of the 
decision scenario should guide the IT project managers to rational decision making 
while managing the portfolio. On the other hand, real options are found to be framed by 
IT managers as gains and losses, based on the type of real option (Millar and Shapira, 
2004; Tiwana et al., 2006) (risky choice framing).  Narrow framers evaluate prospects 
subjectively leading to the underlying risk behaviors, based on how the prospects are 
framed. Hence, if there is evidence of a suboptimal option exercise decision found 
confirming the narrow framing effects in IT portfolio decision making, this should be 
irrespective of individual risk behavior of the decision maker. Our previous hypotheses 
are based on prospect theory’s assumption that IT managers hold prospect theory 
preferences that will lead to narrow framing in an IT portfolio setting. We hypothesize 
that: 
H10: Narrow framing effects in an IT portfolio are independent of the individual risk 
behavior of the IT managers. 
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3.4 Methodology and Data 
To test the effects of framing and narrow framing, we used Choice-based 
Conjoint analysis (CBC), also known as Experimental Choice Analysis (ECA). The 
following sub sections discuss the rationale for the experiment method and details.  
3.4.1 Experimental Choice Analysis 
ECA is a conjoint analysis technique, based on the Information Integration 
theory (IIT) by Norman H. Anderson (1981). IIT focuses on the behavior of numerical 
data generated to capture the complex decision making process via its decomposition 
(Louviere, 1988). IIT has been dominantly used in the field of marketing research, but 
is also been proposed and used to study risky decision making (Louviere, 1988) due to 
the similarities it shares with axiomatic utility theory in economics, management 
science and statistics (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976).  
Experimental choice analysis (ECA) is a stated choice model that relies on the 
discrete choice between alternatives by the respondents (Louviere et al., 2000), e.g., in 
our case, the decision to exercise or not to exercise a real option in a decision scenario. 
ECA integrates and applies theory and methods from conjoint analysis, probabilistic 
discrete choice theory and the design of discrete multivariate statistical experiments 
(Batsell and Louviere, 1991). We will justify our inclination towards conjoint analysis 
first, followed by our motivation for the selection of the choice analysis. 
3.4.2 Why Conjoint Analysis? 
There are three central elements in a conjoint research design: attributes, 
conjoint profiles, and utilities (part-worth and overall utilities). An attribute refers to a 
decision criterion that respondents might use to evaluate the dependent variable. The 
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overall value assigned to the dependent variable is referred to as its overall utility. The 
contribution of each attribute towards the formation of the overall utility of a project is 
called its part-worth utility. Lastly, different combinations of attribute levels are called 
treatments or conjoint profiles. The conjoint technique requires respondents to make a 
series of judgments about a dependent variable based on a set of attributes from which 
the underlying structure of their cognitive system can be statistically inferred. For 
example, in our case, a series of conjoint project profiles with different combinations of 
attribute levels, i.e., risk, payoffs and underlying real options, can be presented to each 
respondent, and their responses can provide an assessment of the dependent variable 
i.e., real option exercise decision, for each project and portfolio profile. Some of the 
benefits that this conjoint experiment approach can provide over survey or role-playing 
experiments are as follows: 
• Our hypotheses are grounded in behavioral decision theories and pursue a theory-
testing goal. Conjoint-based research designs are especially suitable for such theory-
testing endeavors (Graham and Cable, 2001). 
• The conjoint method has been developed primarily to decompose respondents’ 
utilities for multi-attribute decision making. In our case, the decision to exercise a 
real option involves a multi attribute criteria of the real option type, project’s future 
payoffs, and uncertainty around the payoffs associated with each decision, project 
size, and the decision scenario (single project vs. portfolio). The conjoint design, 
therefore, will allow decomposing the contributions of these project attributes in 
arriving at a holistic project decision related to real option exercise decision 
assessment (Louviere, 1988).  
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• Studies examining behavior relating to professional situations, especially the ones 
where managers are likely to be sensitive or can get defensive might induce risk of 
some form of social desirability bias (Tiwana et al., 2006). Using a traditional 
survey-based approach would require to have managers retrospectively recall a 
recent event to assess the outcome, which might include an unfavorable event, thus 
affecting their responses. As the conjoint project profiles are hypothetical and do not 
require the respondents to recall their previous project, the design is immune to the 
threats of social desirability bias and retrospection bias. 
3.4.3 Why Experimental Choice Analysis? 
In traditional conjoint analysis, subjects are required to respond to multiple 
combinations of attribute levels, often generated by some statistical design procedure 
(like factorial design). Similar to conjoint analysis, ECA employs combinational design 
to generate multi-attribute stimuli. Conjoint analysis relies on one at a time preference 
ratings or rankings of one set of multi-attribute stimuli to estimate individual level 
utilities. In contrast, ECA estimates utilities from aggregates of individual choices or 
resource allocations among sets of multi-attribute choice objects from samples of 
individuals or segments. Therefore, unlike rating-based conjoint analysis, choice 
experiments use experimental design to place choice objects into choice sets.  
Our intention is to capture the risk behavior of the respondents, related to real 
option exercise decisions, in a project and then in a portfolio setting based on how they 
are subjectively framed. This is only reflected in the choices they make for real options 
scenarios. Therefore, we chose choice-based conjoint instead of rating-based conjoint 
analysis. In choice-based conjoint analysis, choice probabilities can be predicted 
83 
 
 
 
directly (Moore, 2004), which will reflect the underlying risk behavior of the 
respondents under particular real options scenario.  
3.4.4 Experiment Design and Measures 
We created single project and portfolio profiles for our experiment. They are 
described as follows. 
3.4.4.1 Individual Project Profiles 
Four IT project profiles were created to test for the framing effects. In each 
profile, information about a single IT project was given in terms of the embedded 
option in it and the risk and return of the project associated with available real option 
exercise decisions. To keep things simple, all the projects had only one embedded real 
option each, i.e., either a growth option or an option to abandon. Each embedded real 
option had two outcomes, i.e., a risky outcome with uncertainty around it and a riskless 
outcome with no uncertainty around it. Further, the projects were grouped as small 
projects or large projects, based on investment costs and payoffs involved. Hence, the 
projects varied in terms of the embedded option, and the size of the project. Table 3.4 
gives a breakdown on the project profiles set up that tested the framing effects.  
 
 
Table 3.4: Individual IT Project Profiles Breakdown 
Project Embedded 
Options 
Size of 
Projects 
1 Growth Small 
2 Abandon Small 
3 Growth Large 
4 Abandon Large 
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 For the growth option, usually the risky decision is to invest in the project 
further by exercising the option, which might lead to higher returns in the form of larger 
NPV, especially when there is uncertainty around the outcome at the time of option 
exercise. We control for this uncertainty in the form of probability of outcome in the 
experiment profile. On the contrary, the riskless decision related to the growth option is 
to let the option expire, which usually leads to certain but lower gains. We assume pure 
gains either way for growth options for simplicity. This situation is close to what is seen 
in reality, where growth options seem to be lucrative and are valued higher as compared 
to the rest of the real options (Miller and Shapira, 2004; Tiwana et al., 2006) due to the 
potential of larger future benefits, yet there is uncertainty involved in the future realized 
benefits at the time of real option exercise time, i.e., follow-up investment (Coff and 
Laverty, 2007). It can be argued that the uncertainty around outcomes can be reduced 
by deferring the investment. Our intention is to capture the investment behavior in the 
absence of the flexibility to delay the investment and to know the risk behavior of the IT 
managers under such situations. In reality, the flexibility to delay the investment is 
usually not availed by firms operating in a competitive market, where growth is vital for 
their survival (Lankton and Luft, 2008).  
For the abandonment option, the risk is typically associated with continuing to 
invest in the project even when the project is not doing well with a hope that it will turn 
around. The uncertainty around the course of the project in the future as well as 
ambiguous benefits attached to it adds to its risk (Keil et al., 2007). There is always a 
possibility for the project to rebound, but the risk increases as the time passes. On the 
contrary, the relatively riskless option is to exercise the option to abandon, realize the 
85 
 
 
 
cost and save the rest of the investment amount for other projects. This is typically true 
for situations where the resources used by the project are from a common pool and can 
be utilized easily elsewhere. We mimic this situation in our decision scenarios by 
positioning the exercise decision of abandonment option as a riskless decision with 
certain partial loss along with the risky decision to continue investing in the project with 
a slight possibility for it to breakeven. Even if the project has a potential to generate 
positive returns but with less likelihood, the decision scenario would still be the same, 
i.e., deciding between smaller but sure loss vs. probable but larger loss. We consider 
breakeven as the best probable outcome for simplicity. 
Although, theoretically every investment project can have an option to abandon, 
in reality, there can be several restrictions forbidding this option to be exercised. Such 
restrictions include contractual agreements binding the project to be completed, 
regulatory ramifications associated with incomplete projects etc. We assume none of 
these restrictions are associated with the project. 
3.4.4.2 Project Portfolio Profiles 
To test the narrow framing effects and factors that can reduce them, three IT 
project portfolios were created. Each portfolio consisted of two IT projects, similar to 
the ones used to test framing effects. The portfolios varied in terms of the 
interdependency among the projects within the portfolio projects and the size of the 
projects involved in the portfolio in terms of investment costs. Table 3.5 gives a 
breakdown on the portfolio set up. The interdependency among the projects within a 
portfolio was created by explicitly stating about the resources available for the project 
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portfolio and the presence of flexibility of using the resources interchangeably among 
projects.  
 
Table 3.5: IT Project Portfolios Breakdown 
Portfolio Number of 
Projects 
Embedded 
Options 
Interdependency 
among projects 
Size of Projects 
1 
Two Growth, Abandon 
No Small 
2 Yes Small 
3 No Large 
 
After presenting the participants with the portfolio profiles, a follow up decision 
scenario was presented to test the effects of combining and simplifying portfolio 
decisions. In this scenario, each choice was an aggregate outcome of option exercise 
decisions presented in the first portfolio, i.e., the NPV values adjusted for uncertainty in 
each project underlying the portfolio. Out of the four choices, one of the choices was 
the theoretically most probable choice as predicted by prospect theory, and another 
choice was the optimal choice. The determinant of narrow framing effects in small scale 
portfolio of independent projects was presence of the preference reversal among the 
choices made in these two similar scenarios that were presented differently (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1981).  The complete survey is presented in Appendix A.  
3.4.5 Independent Variables 
3.4.5.1 Option Type 
We used two kinds of real options in our experiment profiles. In the growth 
option scenarios, the decision maker had a choice to invest further in a project that can 
add to the future IT capabilities of the firm or not to invest. In an option to abandon 
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scenarios, the decision maker had a choice to abandon the project mid-way, or keep 
investing in it by not exercising the option.  
3.4.5.2 Uncertainty and Payoffs 
All decision scenarios consisted of future payoffs and uncertainty around them. 
In each project and portfolio profile, all the real options were positioned as high risk. 
The probable gains are much higher for a growth option as compared to certain gains, 
but with less likelihood. For an abandonment option, the probability of the project to 
become valuable again for the firm was low. We chose the payoff probabilities of 25% - 
75% based on the original experiments of framing and narrow framing (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981). Also, cumulative prospect theory shows the threshold for risk 
behavior change is approximately 50%, where risk seeking behavior in gains and risk-
averse behavior in losses are observed for outcomes with probability less than 50% and 
the reverse was observed for outcomes with probability more than 50% (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992). Options are valuable under high uncertainty as well, so we chose to 
keep the same uncertainty in all scenarios. 
We created the experimental scenarios using realistic figures for payoffs, to 
make it look like an important investment decision. We used the actual costs of ERP 
systems given in the past few years. We think ERP systems are a good example of IT 
projects and project portfolios. Most enterprises utilize them and they are considered 
important investments due to the wide range of costs involved in them as well as the 
variety of applications that are enabled due to the implementation of ERP systems. The 
average costs we found for ERP systems ranged from approximately $0.4 Million to 
$2.3 Million, depending on the vendor and the size of the firm implementing the system 
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(Aberdeen Group Inc., 2006). In order to keep the scenarios simple, we kept payoffs in 
all the profiles close to these figures. The payoffs only vary for each real option 
scenario based on project size. The details on the project sizes are given below. 
3.4.5.3 Project Size 
To control the scenarios for the projects’ size, we chose $ 0.5 million for small 
projects and $ 2.0 Million for large projects. All the scenarios were positioned as 
projects completed mid-way, where they are 50% complete and 50% of the resources 
are invested. This way, the earned value, i.e., budgeted cost of project multiplied by its 
completion percentage (Anbari, 2003), for small projects comes at $0.25 Million and $ 
1.0 Million for the large projects. This earned value enabled us to create a suitable 
decision point in terms of planned value of the projects (i.e., value to be earned as a 
function of project work accomplishment up to a given point in time (Anbari, 2003). 
The IT managers had to decide about the future course of the IT projects, purely based 
on the embedded flexibility in them. Table 3.6 gives a breakdown on the payoffs used 
for large and small projects in the experiment, along with the respective uncertainty.  
In accordance with Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), the net 
payoff difference between risky and riskless options was kept the same in small and 
large projects, i.e., equal to $ 200,000, to capture the difference between framing and 
narrow framing among small and large projects.  
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Table 3.6: Uncertainty and Payoffs used in Experimental Scenarios 
  
Small 
Projects 
(0.5M) 
Growth Abandon 
Exercise Expire Exercise Expire 
25% $1,800,000 $250,000 $(250,000) 75% $(600,000) 
Expected 
Value 
$450,000 $   250,000 $(250,000) $(450,000) 
Difference $200,000 $(200,000) 
  
Large 
Projects 
(2.0M) 
Growth Abandon 
Exercise Expire Exercise Expire 
25% $4,800,000 $1,000,000 $(1,000,000) 75% $(1,600,000) 
Expected 
Value 
$1,200,000 $1,000,000 $(1,000,000) $(1,200,000) 
Difference $ 200,000 $(200,000) 
 
 
 
3.4.5.4 Interdependency among Projects 
Resource interdependency among the projects in one of the portfolios was 
created by specifying in the scenario that both the projects in this portfolio are utilizing 
the same resource pool in terms of funds and human recourses.  
3.4.5.5Individual Risk Behavior 
We used the Webber et al. (2002) risk attitude scale to measure individual risk. 
This scale was developed and tested based on the risk-taking behaviors literature to 
cover the full range of risk-taking situations encountered by young adults in Western 
cultures.  
When it comes to individual risk behavior, individuals tend to show different 
risk attitudes in various domains (Webber et al., 2002). As our goal is to measure only 
the individual risk attitudes of the respondents, we included only the items measuring 
the financial risk behavior from the “Risk-Behavior instrument” in Webber et al. (2002) 
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in our survey. We measured only the individual financial risk for the participants, using 
the 8-item scale. The financial risk taking is measured using two subscales, focusing on 
investment and gambling problems. Each sub scale consists of 4 items, measuring the 
risk taking behavior in that domain. We included both of them in our survey because 
our scenarios require investment decisions by the participants and, due to the 
uncertainty around payoffs at the decision time, which resembles a gamble. The 
individual risk behavior items are included towards the end of the survey. Participants 
are asked to identify the ‘likelihood” of them engaging in the activities described in the 
survey. The likelihood is measured on a Likert scale of 1-5 (Webber et al., 2002). The 
risk behavior items were presented in a random order following the original study, as no 
order effects were found in it.  
3.4.6 Dependent Variables 
3.4.6.1 Option Exercise Decision  
Decision making under risk has been viewed as choices between prospects or 
gambles (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The closest approximation of capturing such a 
decision in an experiment is to treat it like a gamble (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993), 
especially in organizations. In our experiment, we presented the real option exercise 
decision in each profile as a gamble. Real option exercise decisions are taken in the face 
of uncertainty where future payoffs depend on the exercise decision and unveil over the 
period of time. Given that uncertainty and dependency of payoffs on the decision are 
two major components of a gamble, we think it is the simplest yet most realistic way to 
represent a real option exercise decision. 
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Further, testing of framing effects requires the experiments to be built around a 
reference point, to which decision maker becomes conveniently adapted, leading them 
to start relying on narrow frames relative to that reference point (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1982; Kahneman, 2003). For IT managers, the common criteria that is used to 
evaluate investment decisions is considered to be the project’s NPV (Fitchman et al., 
2005; Keil et al., 2007). Hence, we have used it as a reference point in our experiment.  
The reference point also serves as a boundary that distinguishes gains from losses 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Based on the reference point, the growth options in 
both portfolio profiles are presented as a prospect with possibility of minimum zero 
NPV and the abandonment options are presented as a prospect with possibility of 
maximum zero NPV.  
3.4.7 Control Variables 
To isolate the effects of framing and narrow framing in the study, several control 
variables were included in the survey, based on the literature. We controlled the 
experiment for gender based on differences found in risk behaviors in literature (Fellner 
and Maciejovsky, 2007). We also control for age, work experience of the respondents in 
years (Liu et al., 2010), industry sector of respondents’ organization, respondents’ 
country, and size of the respondents’ organizations in terms of annual revenue. For 
industry sectors, we used simple distinction of manufacturing and services. We also 
controlled the experiment for the experience of the respondents with (i) IT investment 
decisions, (ii) IT investment decisions involving real options, and (iii) IT investment 
decisions involving IT project portfolios. 
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3.4.8  Data  
We pilot tested the survey among MBA students at UNC Charlotte. A total of 37 
usable responses were generated to test the quality of the survey and the clarity of the 
project/ portfolio scenarios. Minor modifications were made based on the feedback 
from the survey. The final survey was sent out to IT management professionals in the 
US and abroad. We used Dun and Bradstreet Executive’s list 2010 (Tiwana et al., 2006; 
2007) consisting of top and middle level management in US organizations involved in 
information and technology management, as well as Project Management Institute 
(PMI) US chapters and communities of practice. A total of 3500 surveys were sent out. 
We received 387 responses back, making our response rate 11.05%. The response rate 
declined due to lower response rate from Dun and Bradstreet Executive’s list. Once 
possible explanation is that the list we got was not up to date. Out of these responses, 
355 were complete. We had 223 responses from US respondents and 132 from 
International respondents. We used US responses to test the hypotheses in this study 
because the international sample consisted of multiple countries, leading to 
heterogeneity among the international respondents in terms of origin and culture. Also, 
our individual risk measures were primarily developed on US sample. The US sample 
size met the requirement based on our a-priori sample size estimation for the study 
given the effect size, error probability, and power for the parametric data analysis 
(Table 3.7). The data collected was based on different scales. Table 3.8 gives a 
summary of variables and their respective scales, used in the analysis. 
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Table 3.7: a- priori power Analysis to determine sample size 
Test family : z-tests, Statistical test: two independent Pearson’s r 
In
p
u
t 
P
ar
am
et
er
s 
Tails One One One One 
Effect size5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Error probability α 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Power (1-β)6 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 
O
u
tp
u
t 
P
ar
am
et
er
s 
Critical z 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.64 
Total sample size 106 122 144 180 
Actual Power 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 
 
 
Table 3.8: Variables and their Respective Scales 
Variable Scale Values 
All single and portfolio 
Projects 
Binomial 
 
1= Correct Decision 
0=Incorrect Decision 
Portfolio outcome Binomial 
1= Correct Portfolio Decision 
0=Incorrect Portfolio Decision 
Loss aversion Binomial 
1= Loss aversion in portfolio decision 
0=Absence of loss aversion in portfolio decision 
Combined Decision Binomial 
1= Correct Decision 
0=Incorrect Decision 
Individual risk measures Likert Scale 
Scale of 1-5 
Age Categorical 5=Above 50; 4=46-50; 3=41-45; 2= 36-40; 1=20 - 35 
Gender Binomial Male – 1; Female - 0 
Work Experience Categorical 
5=Above 20 years 
4=16-20 
3=11-15 
2= 6-10 
1=5 years or less 
Industry Sector Binomial 
0= Manufacturing 
1= Services 
                                                 
5 Was calculated using expected significant t-values and df. 
6 Set to minimum expectable range (Cohen, 1988) 
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Firm Size Categorical 4=More than $1 Billion  
3= $500 Million - $1Billion 
2=$ 1 Million - $ 500 Million 
1= Less than $1 Million 
Country Binomial 
US - 1 
Non US - 0 
IT Investment, Real 
Options and Portfolio 
Management  Experience 
Likert Scale Scale of 1-5 
 
 
 
Prior to run the analyses, all variables for single projects, portfolios and controls 
were examined for accuracy of data entry, outliers, and missing values using SPSS v17. 
All the values for all variables were within acceptable ranges suggesting that there were 
no data entry errors. There were some univariate outliers detected (Table 3.9). The 
descriptive statistics were computed with and without outliers and they stayed the same. 
Hence, the observations were retained in the data set. 
 
 
Table 3.9: Univariate Outliers 
Variable Outliers 
Work Experience 15 (=<2) 
Real Options Experience 19 (<= 1) 
 
 
 
The descriptive statistics of the data is given in Table 3.10. Due to the binary 
responses for project and portfolio profiles, normality of distribution, and 
multicollinearity were not checked. We checked for multicollinearity and normality of 
distribution for the control variables. Upon checking the VIF of control variables, 
control variable “age” was found to have a VIF equal to 2.82, showing 
multicollinearity. Also, bivariate correlation between “age” and “work experience” was 
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approximately 0.8 (Table 3.11), Due to multicollinearity, we dropped “age” from the 
analysis. In terms of normality of data distribution, some variables were slightly skewed 
(Table 3.10). The skewness of data was not enough to merit data transformation. None 
of the Mahalanobis distance p-values (based on chi-square distribution) were found to 
be less than 0.001. Hence, there were no multivariate outliers.  
 
 
Table 3.10: Descriptive Statistics, n=223 
 
Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std.  
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
 Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic S.E. Statistic S.E. 
Project 1(P1) 0 1 .49 .501 .045 .163 -2.016 .324 
Project 2 (P2) 0 1 .81 .395 -1.568 .163 .462 .324 
Project 3(P3) 0 1 .40 .491 .415 .163 -1.845 .324 
Project 4(P4) 0 1 .59 .493 -.377 .163 -1.875 .324 
Portfolio1-P1 0 1 .69 .465 -.807 .163 -1.360 .324 
Portfolio1-P2 0 1 .69 .465 -.807 .163 -1.360 .324 
Portfolio 1 0 1 .48 .501 .099 .163 -2.008 .324 
Portfolio2-P1 0 1 .69 .465 -.807 .163 -1.360 .324 
Portfolio2-P2 0 1 .70 .461 -.853 .163 -1.284 .324 
Portfolio 2 0 1 .49 .501 .045 .163 -2.016 .324 
Portfolio 3-P1 0 1 .48 .501 .063 .163 -2.014 .324 
Portfolio 3-P2 0 1 .55 .499 -.190 .163 -1.982 .324 
Portfolio 3 0 1 .25 .435 1.156 .163 -.671 .324 
Simplified Decision 0 1 .92 .273 -3.099 .163 7.674 .324 
Age 1 5 3.74 1.399 -.741 .163 -.835 .324 
Gender 0 1 .77 .421 -1.301 .163 -.311 .324 
Work experience 2 5 4.43 .955 -1.414 .163 .613 .324 
Industry 0 1 .42 .494 .339 .163 -1.902 .324 
Firm size 1 4 2.69 1.081 -.005 .163 -1.390 .324 
IT Investment experience 1 5 3.52 1.266 -.493 .163 -.818 .324 
Real Options Experience 1 5 3.45 1.218 -.441 .163 -.690 .324 
Portfolio Management 
Experience 
1 5 3.17 1.288 -.139 .163 -1.094 .324 
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3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Framing Effects 
We used non-parametric frequency analysis to test H1- H4d. The data was first 
coded in binary, i.e., 1 for rational response and 0 for biased response. Testing for 
framing in projects with growth and abandonment options (H1 and H2), the participants 
were divided into four categories: (a) making a rational decision for the growth option, 
(b) making a risk-averse decision for  the growth option, (c) making a rational decision 
for the abandonment option, and (d) making  a risk-seeking decision for the 
abandonment option. Frequency analysis was used to evaluate the risk tendencies of the 
respondents under each decision scenario, followed by one sample t-tests (Table 3.12). 
 
 
Table 3.12: Individual project scenario responses (n=223) 
 No. of rational 
decisions 
(Percentage) 
No. of biased 
decisions  
(Percentage) 
t-stat 
(p- value) 
Project 1  
(small project -growth option) 
109 
(48.9%) 
114 
(51.1%) 
14.569 
(<.001) 
Project 2  
(small project – 
 abandonment option) 
180 
(80.7%) 
43 
(19.3%) 
30.484 
(<.001) 
Project 3  
(large project- growth option) 
89 
(39.9%) 
134 
(60.1%) 
12.143 
(<.001) 
Project 4  
(large project- abandonment 
option) 
132 
(59.2%) 
91 
(40.8%) 
17.945 
(<.001) 
 
 
 
The test results were significant for all four projects, showing a significant 
difference between the rational and biased decisions for each project scenario. This 
illustrates that framing occurred at the real option exercise time for growth options 
(project 1 and 3) as well as for the abandonment options (project 2 and 4). Hence, the 
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framing effects at the option exercise decision time for a project can cause the decision 
maker to take biased decisions according to how it is framed in their minds. Although 
growth options are found to be valued highly by IT managers (Tiwana et al., 2006), 
according to our results, they are not exercised optimally due to framing effects. IT 
managers showed risk-averse behavior at the growth option exercise time and let it 
expire, instead of realizing the value of the growth options by going for the risky but 
economically optimal choice. Based on these results, the framing effects hold for growth 
options in small as well as large projects. Hence, hypothesis 1 is supported7. 
For abandonment options, we found most respondents making a rational 
decision for the small project with abandonment option (project 2) and terminating the 
project. But for larger projects with an abandonment option (project 4), they showed 
risk-seeking behavior and went for the riskiest and economically suboptimal decision 
by not terminating the project, instead of going for the small but certain losses as in case 
of project 2. Based on these results, hypothesis 2 is supported8, but the project size 
seemed to play a role. We tested the project size effects next, to see if escalation of 
commitment set in for large projects. 
To test project size effects (hypotheses 4a and 4d), we compared the responses 
between small and large projects with growth options (project 1 and 3) as well as 
between small and large projects with abandonment option (project 2 and 4) using the 
non-parametric Friedman’s rank test for k	χas well as Cochran’s Q test for correlated 
samples. The tests showed significant difference between project 1 and 3 (χ (1) = χ = 
                                                 
7 Hypothesis 1 states: When IT managers exercise a growth option in a single IT project, there will be 
framing effects. 
8
 Hypothesis 2 states: When IT managers exercise an abandonment option in a single IT project, there 
will be framing effects. 
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5.556, p=.018), as well as between project 2 and 4 (χ(1) = χ = 31.135, p<.001). 
Hence, the project size impacted the framing effects for growth options as well as for 
abandonment options. Combining these results with the frequency analysis of small and 
large projects in Table 3.12, we found that for growth option scenarios, the percentage 
of correct responses decreased significantly from 48.9% to 39.9% in large projects. 
Similarly for option to abandon scenarios, the percentage of correct responses decreased 
from 80.7% to 59.2% in large projects. These differences were significant as per 
Friedman’s rank test. Hence, increase in project size increased framing effects in case 
of growth as well as abandonment options. Also, the effect was relatively stronger for 
option to abandon cases (with 21.5% drop in correct responses) than growth option 
cases (with 10% drop in correct responses). These results are counter intuitive to the 
prospect theory, where project size should have reduced the narrow framing effects in 
portfolio 3. Based on these results, both hypotheses 4a and 4b are not supported but 
hypotheses 4c and 4d are supported9. 
To test for loss aversion (H3), the responses between the small project with 
growth option and small project with abandonment option (project 1 and 2) as well as 
between the large project with growth option and large project with abandonment 
option (project 3 and 4) were compared using non-parametric Friedman’s rank test for k 
                                                 
9
 Hypothesis 4a states: In IT projects with embedded growth options, framing effects will be stronger in 
large IT projects than small ones. 
Hypothesis 4b states: In IT projects with embedded abandonment options, framing effects will be 
stronger in large IT projects than small ones. 
Hypothesis 4c states: In IT projects with embedded growth options, framing effects will be stronger in 
small IT projects than large ones. 
Hypothesis 4d states: In IT projects with embedded growth options, framing effects will be stronger in 
small IT projects than large ones. 
100 
 
 
 
χand Cochran’s Q test for correlated samples (χ. The tests showed significant 
difference between project 1 and 2 responses (χ (1) = χ = 48.835, p<.001), as well as 
between project 3 and 4 responses (χ (1) = χ = 16.963, p=.001).These results show 
that the real option type impacted the intensity of framing effects in single projects. 
Combining these results with the frequency analysis (Table 3.12) showed that the 
framing effect in small projects was more prominent in the growth option scenario 
(project 1 with 51.5% suboptimal decisions) than in abandonment options (project 2 
with 19.3% suboptimal decisions). The trend was similar in large projects (project 3 
with 60.1% suboptimal decisions vs. project 4 with 40.8% suboptimal decisions). This 
trend indicates that IT managers are more prone to making suboptimal decisions for 
growth options by showing risk-averse behavior, as compared to the option to abandon 
by showing risk seeking behavior. Based on these results, IT managers did not show 
significant loss aversion over all in single projects, and hypothesis 3 is not supported10. 
This also implies that overall IT managers are conservative and showed tendencies to 
“save” rather than “optimize economic returns”. These results are contrary to the 
findings of “escalation of commitment” in IT projects (Keil and Monte, 2000). Given 
that the projects in the scenarios were halfway complete, more than expected IT 
managers took a rational decision and exercised the option to abandon, as compared to 
the growth option scenarios. One reason might be the global economic recession effects, 
which might have had an impact on IT investment decision makers by making them 
more conscious on savings than maximizing economic returns.   
                                                 
10
 Hypothesis 3 states: When IT managers exercise a real option in a single project, framing effects will 
be greater in an IT project with abandonment option than in an IT project with growth option. 
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3.5.1.1 Supplementary Analysis 
To test the effects of control variables on real option exercise decisions, we 
conducted seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) analysis (Zellner, 1965; Amemiya, 
1985), with the project decision in each project’s case as a dependent variable and 
Gender, Work Experience, Industry Sector, Firm Size, IT Investment Experience, Real 
Options Experience, and Portfolio Experience as independent variables. We use SUR, 
because the error terms might be correlated across equations, due to the similarities 
among the decision scenarios. The equations are as follows: 
Project Decisioni=b) + b	cdNK+b	efKg	hXYKidj +bkGdNlmKn	ojfK 
+bpDiKq	oir +b+	G.	Gdsmqdm	hXYKidj +btWuv	wYifdm	hXYKidj 
+bxyfKzfvif	hXYKidj; for i = 1,2,3,4 
The regression unstandardized coefficients and z values, and model fit measures 
are presented in the Table 3.13. Among all four equations, the model for project 3 (χ2= 
19.69, p<0.01) is significant. This means that there are no differences in single project 
responses in all the projects based on individual and firm level characteristics, except in 
the case of large project with growth option. For small project with growth option 
(project 1), work experience (z= -1.55, p=0.05) and experience with real options (z= -
1.77, p=0.07) were significant. IT managers with more work experience as well as 
experience with real options showed risk-averse behavior and took biased option 
exercise decisions as compared to the IT managers with lesser work experience. More 
specifically, with increased work experience, and experience with real options, IT 
manager’s biased decisions increased by 0.134 and 0.156 respectively. We suspect that 
with more experience, IT managers became more risk-averse for positive outcomes. 
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They want to make sure positive returns are ensured instead of making optimal 
decisions. There can be several reasons behind this behavior including budget cuts in 
organizations, difficulty in generating positive returns in IT support projects like 
infrastructure etc. 
 
 
Table 3.13: SUR Results 
Explanatory 
Variables 
(1) 
Project 1 
(2) 
Project 2 
(3) 
Project 3 
(4) 
Project 4 
Gender -0.065 
(-0.080) 
0.048 
(.75) 
-.206*** 
(-2.65) 
0.042 
(.53) 
Work 
Experience 
-0.070* 
(-1.95) 
.035 
(1.22) 
-.064* 
(-1.86) 
0.021 
(.59) 
Services 
Sector 
0.018 
(.27) 
-.031 
(-.59) 
0.054 
(0.83) 
-0.039 
(-.59) 
Firm Size -0.031 
(-1.01) 
0.013 
(.52) 
-0.022 
(-.75) 
0.020 
(.66) 
IT 
Investments 
Experience 
.043 
(1.03) 
0.010 
(.031) 
-0.063 
(-1.57) 
0.015 
(0.37) 
Real 
Options 
Experience 
-0.064* 
(-1.77) 
0.008 
(.03) 
-0.027 
(-.78) 
-0.045 
(-1.28) 
Portfolio 
Experience 
0.029 
(.73) 
0.005 
(.18) 
0.079** 
(2.03) 
0.052 
(1.31) 
Constant 0.902*** 
(4.84) 
0.507*** 
(3.43) 
0.948*** 
(5.32) 
0.361** 
(1.97) 
     
Model Fit     
R2 0.043 0.024 0.081 0.030 
χ statistics 9.94 5.37 19.69*** 6.87 
No. of obs. 223 223 223 223 
*** Significant at 1% significance level 
** Significant at 5% significance level 
*  Significant at 10% significance level 
 
 
 
 For the large project with growth option (project 3), gender (z= -2.65, p<0.01), 
work experience (z= -1.86, p= 0.06), portfolio experience (z= 2.03, p= 0.04) were 
significant. Like in the case of the small project with growth option, IT managers with 
more work experience showed risk-averse behavior and took biased option exercise 
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decisions, for the large project with growth option as compared to the IT managers with 
lesser work experience. More specifically, with increased work experience, IT 
managers are 0.123 times more likely to take biased decisions. We believe this behavior 
is due to the same reasons as described before. 
  The results also indicate that gender becomes significant in the large project 
with growth option, where male respondents showed greater risk-averse behavior and 
made more biased decisions, than female respondents. More specifically, females on 
average, after controlling for all other variables are 0.174 times more likely to make 
rational decisions. This shows when stakes are higher in a project with growth potential, 
male IT managers are more conservative and take biased decisions. Previously, we did 
find that increasing project size increased the framing effects for growth option 
significantly. This project size effect on growth option might be due to the gender 
difference.  
 We also found that experience with portfolios facilitated rational decisions (z= 
2.03, p= 0.04). With increased experience with portfolio management, IT managers are 
0.204 times less likely to take biased decisions. This result is intuitive where experience 
with portfolios improves decision making in the large project with growth option. 
 For the small project with option to abandon (project 2), and large project with 
option to abandon (project 4), none of the control variables explained the variation in 
option exercise decisions. This shows that rational decision in the small project with 
abandonment option and biased decisions in the large project with abandonment option 
are irrespective of the individual and firm level characteristics we controlled this 
experiment for.  
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3.5.2 Narrow Framing Effects 
Hypothesis 5a was tested using non parametric frequency based analysis in 
SPSS v17, to determine the presence of narrow framing was determined in portfolio 
scenarios. Hypothesis 5b was tested in two stages. In the first stage, repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted in SPSS v17 to examine the effects of changing scenarios from 
single projects to portfolio, on real option exercise decisions. In the second stage, 3 
stage least square (3SLS) was performed in STATA/SE 11.2, to examine the unique 
contribution of framing of real options in single projects, on the narrow framing in 
portfolio decision. Our reason for using 3SLS is the endogenous nature of project and 
portfolio decisions in the experiment, and unknown causality between project and 
portfolio decisions. Before running the data analyses for hypothesis 5a and 5b, the 
individual projects’ data in each portfolio was coded. We had two responses for each 
portfolio as a portfolio consists of two projects. First, portfolio data was coded as a 
combination of correct and incorrect decisions within the portfolio to differentiate the 
correct portfolio choices from incorrect ones. The portfolio results were then used to run 
the analyses. The coding key used to code the portfolio choices is given in Table 3.14. 
 
 
Table 3.14: Coding key to calculate portfolio choices 
Growth option response in the 
portfolio 
Abandonment option response 
in the portfolio 
Portfolio outcome 
1 (correct choice) 1(correct choice) 1(correct choice) 
1(correct choice) 0(incorrect choice) 0(incorrect choice) 
0 (incorrect choice) 1(correct choice) 0(incorrect choice) 
0(incorrect choice) 0(incorrect choice) 0(incorrect choice) 
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After the coding of portfolio choices, frequency analysis was conducted on 
portfolios 1, 2 and 3. The results are shown in Table 3.15. These results were significant 
for the portfolio 1 choices with 106 (47.5%) correct portfolio decisions and 117 (52.5%) 
incorrect decisions (t-value (222,223) = 14.182, p<.001). They were also significant for 
portfolio 2 choices with 109 (48.9%) correct portfolio decisions and 114 (51.1%) 
incorrect decisions (t-value (222,223) = 14.569, p<.001), and portfolio 3 choices with 
56 (25.1%) correct portfolio decisions and 167 (74.9%) incorrect decisions (t-value 
(222,223) = 8.628, p<.001). This showed the presence of narrow framing of decisions 
at the real option exercise time for all the project portfolios, and hypothesis 5a11 is 
supported.  
 
 
Table 3.15:  Project Portfolio Responses: Portfolios consisting of growth and 
abandonment options 
 No. of rational 
decisions 
(percentage)  
No. of biased 
decisions  
(percentage) 
t-statistic  
(p value) 
Portfolio 1  
(small scale independent projects) 
106 
(47.5%) 
117 
(52.5%) 
14.182 
(<.001) 
Portfolio 2 
(small scale interdependent projects) 
109 
(48.9%) 
114 
(51.1%) 
14.569 
(<.001) 
Portfolio 3  
(large scale independent projects) 
56 
(25.1%) 
167 
(74.9%) 
8.628 
(<.001) 
 
 
 
3.5.2.1 Repeated Measures ANOVA 
Small scale growth option and abandonment option scenarios were presented to 
the respondents three times. They were first presented as single project scenarios, then 
as a portfolio of independent projects and finally as a portfolio of interdependent 
                                                 
11
 Hypothesis 5a states: When IT managers exercise real options in an IT portfolio, they will engage in 
narrow framing. 
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projects. Large scale growth option and abandonment option scenarios were presented 
to the respondents two times, first presented as single project scenarios, then as a 
portfolio of interdependent projects.  
For the small growth option scenario, a repeated measures ANOVA with a 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction determined that mean option exercise decisions were 
statistically different among the three scenarios (F (1.871, 415.45) = 26.287, p <0.000). 
Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed that changing the decision 
scenario for small growth options from single project to a portfolio of independent 
projects elicited a decrease in biased growth option exercise decisions, which was 
statistically significant (p<0.000 ). 69% people took rational decision for growth option 
in portfolio as compared to 49% people in single project scenario. A similar result held 
for changing the decision scenario from single project to a portfolio of interdependent 
projects (p<0.000), where again, 69% people took rational decision for growth option in 
portfolio as compared to 49% people in single project scenario.  However, changing the 
decision scenario to a portfolio of interdependent projects from a portfolio of 
independent projects was not statistically significantly different (p=0.999). We can, 
therefore, conclude that a portfolio scenario elicits a statistically significant decrease in 
biased decisions for growth options, as compared to single projects, irrespective of 
interdependency among portfolio resources. However, interdependency among 
portfolio scenarios does not solely impact biased decisions.  
For the small scale abandonment option scenario, a repeated measures ANOVA 
with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction determined that mean exercise decisions again 
were significantly different  among three scenarios (F (1.964, 436.09) = 7.957, p < 
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0.001). Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed that changing the 
decision scenario from single project to a portfolio of independent projects as well as to 
a portfolio of interdependent projects elicited an increase in biased abandonment option 
exercise decisions, which was statistically significant (p=0.001 ; p=0.006). 69% people 
took rational decision for abandonment option in portfolio as compared to 81% people 
in single project scenario. However, changing the decision scenario to a portfolio of 
interdependent projects was not statistically significantly different from a portfolio of 
independent projects (p = 0.999). 70% people took rational decision for abandonment 
option in portfolio as compared to 81% people in single project scenario. We can, 
therefore, conclude that a portfolio scenario elicits a statistically significant increase in 
biased decisions for abandonment options, as compared to single projects, irrespective 
of interdependency among portfolio resources. However, interdependency among 
portfolio scenarios does not solely impact biased decisions.  
For the large scale growth option scenario, a repeated measures ANOVA with a 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction determined that mean exercise decisions were 
significantly different among two scenarios (F (1, 222) = 6.489, p= 0.012). Post hoc 
tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed that changing the decision scenario from 
single project to a portfolio of independent projects elicited an decrease in biased 
growth option exercise decisions, which was statistically significant (p=0.012). 48% 
people took rational decision for growth option in portfolio as compared to 40% people 
in single project scenario. We can, therefore, conclude that a portfolio scenario elicits a 
statistically significant decrease in biased decisions for large growth options, as 
compared to single projects. 
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For the large scale abandonment option scenario, a repeated measures ANOVA 
with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction determined that mean exercise decisions did not 
differ significantly among two scenarios (F (1, 222) = 1.566, p= 0.212). Post hoc tests 
using the Bonferroni correction revealed that changing the decision scenario from single 
project to a portfolio of independent projects did not impact abandonment option 
exercise decisions. 55% people took rational decision for abandonment option in 
portfolio as compared to 59% people in single project scenario. We can, therefore, 
conclude that for the large project with abandonment option, changing scenarios from 
single project to a portfolio did not affect the exercise decisions. Framing effects were 
strong in large project with abandonment option, and the effect stayed in the large 
portfolio.  
3.5.2.2 3SLS Analysis: 
For 3SLS the sequential equations used in the analysis are as follows: 
Project 1 
(growth) 
 
= Gender + Work Exp + Firm Size + Industry + IT Exp + RO Exp       (3.1) 
 
Project 2 
(abandon) 
 
= Gender + Work Exp + Firm Size + Industry + IT Exp + RO Exp      (3.2) 
 
Project 3 
(growth) 
 
= Gender + Work Exp + Firm Size + Industry + IT Exp + RO Exp       (3.3) 
Project 4 
(abandon) 
 
= Gender + Work Exp + Firm Size + Industry + IT Exp + RO Exp       (3.4) 
Portfolio 1 = Project 1 + Project 2 + Portfolio Exp  (3.5) 
Portfolio 2 = Project 1 + Project 2 + Portfolio Exp  (3.6) 
Portfolio 3 = Project 3 + Project 4 + Portfolio Exp  (3.7) 
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 For 3SLS, project portfolio decisions for all the project portfolios were further 
coded on a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 being incorrect portfolio choice due to incorrect 
decisions taken in both the projects in the portfolio, 2 being incorrect portfolio choice 
due to suboptimal decision for project with growth option, 3 being incorrect portfolio 
choice due to suboptimal decision for project with option to abandon12,and 4 being 
correct portfolio choice due to correct decisions taken in both projects in the portfolio.  
The coding key used to calculate the portfolio choices is given in Table 3.16. This scale 
allowed us to capture the variation in portfolio responses explained by individual 
project responses. With a scaled dependent variable, Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
(MLE) is recommended (Maddala, 1983). This makes the use of 3SLS appropriate for 
our case because in 3SLS, equations in 3rd stage are estimated using Generalized Linear 
Model (GLM), which uses MLE as the estimation technique. The 3SLS model results 
are given in Table 3.17, with unstandardized coefficients and respective z-values.  
 
 
Table 3.16: Coding key to calculate portfolio choices 
 Project 2 – Exercise 
Option to Abandon  
(correct choice) 
Project 2 – Do not Exercise 
Option to Abandon (incorrect 
choice) 
Project 1 – Exercise Option to 
Grow (correct choice) 4 2 
Project 1 – Do not Exercise 
Option to Grow (incorrect 
choice) 
3 1 
 
 
                                                 
12
 We chose rank 2 for incorrect portfolio choice due to suboptimal decision for project with growth 
option, and 3 for incorrect portfolio choice due to suboptimal decision for project with option to abandon, 
based on the results from hypotheses 1-4. We found that in IT projects, growth options are more sensitive 
to biased decisions than abandonment options. Therefore, we ranked portfolio suboptimal choice due to 
growth option lower than abandonment option.  
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Table 3.17: Three-stage least squares (3SLS) regression results of IT Project Portfolios 
Explanatory 
Variables 
(1) 
Project 1 
SSGO 
(2) 
Project 2 
SSAO 
(3) 
Project 3 
LSGO 
(4) 
Project 4 
LSAO 
(5) 
Portfolio 1 
SSIND 
(6) 
Portfolio 2 
SSINT 
(7) 
Portfolio 3 
LSIND 
Project 1 
- - - - 
0.429 
(.34) 
0.403 
(.27) 
- 
Project 2 
- - - - 
-0.831 
(-.32) 
-1.589 
(-.52) 
- 
Project 3 
- - - - - - 
0.498 
(.83) 
Project 4 
- - - - - - 
2.581* 
(1.72) 
Gender -0.093 
(-1.20) 
0.010 
(.22) 
-.235*** 
(-3.14) 
0.054 
(.87) 
- - - 
Work 
Experience 
-.0641* 
(-1.85) 
.0422* 
(1.83) 
-.056* 
(-1.71) 
0.030 
(1.14) 
- - - 
Services 
Sector 
-0.005 
(-.08) 
-.063* 
(-1.66) 
0.021 
(.34) 
-0.028 
(-.60) 
- - - 
Firm Size -0.026 
(-.92) 
0.007 
(.42) 
-0.009 
(-.35) 
0.016 
(.74) 
- - - 
IT 
Investments 
Experience 
.0635* 
(1.93) 
0.015 
(.60) 
-0.012 
(-.40) 
.0461* 
(1.73) 
- - - 
Real 
Options 
Experience 
-0.055 
(-1.62) 
0.014 
(.59) 
-0.004 
(-.14) 
-0.037 
(-1.23) 
- - - 
Portfolio 
Experience 
- - - - 
0.062 
(.71) 
0.093 
(.94) 
-0.010 
(-.11) 
Constant .884*** 
(4.84) 
.515*** 
(3.65) 
.911*** 
(5.17) 
.348** 
(2.09) 
3.320 
(1.38) 
3.856 
(1.35) 
0.822 
(1.08) 
        
Model Fit        
R2 0.040 0.020 0.063 0.021 -0.043 -0.370 -0.715 
χ statistics 9.98 7.26 16.96*** 5.08 1.90 2.78 8.15** 
No. of obs. 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 
*** Significant at 1% significance level 
** Significant at 5% significance level 
*  Significant at 10% significance level 
SSGO = small scale project with growth option 
SSAO = small scale project with abandonment option 
LSGO= large scale project with growth option 
LSAO= large scale project with abandonment option 
SSIND= portfolio of small scale, independent project 
SSINT= portfolio of small scale, interdependent project 
LSIND= portfolio of large scale, independent project 
 
 
 
 Among first stage equations, the model for project 3 (χ= 16.96, p<0.01) is 
significant. This means that there are no differences in single project responses in all the 
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projects based on individual and firm level characteristics, except for in the case of the 
large project with growth option. A similar result holds true for third stage equations 
where there are no differences in portfolio responses in all the portfolios based on single 
project decisions and portfolio experience,  except in case of portfolio 3 (χ= 8.15, 
p<0.05).  
 For the small project with growth option (project 1), work experience (z= -1.85, 
p=0.06) and experience with IT investments (z= 1.93, p=0.05) were significant. For the 
small project with growth option, IT managers with more work experience showed risk-
averse behavior and took biased option exercise decisions as compared to the IT 
managers with lesser work experience. More specifically, with increased work 
experience, IT managers are 0.122 times more likely to take biased decisions. We 
believe the reason for this effect is the overall economic recession, where budget cuts 
for IT investments in organizations have impacted the investment habits, thus changing 
mind set of IT managers from economic benefit maximization to minimizing losses and 
keeping IT investments low. In most organizations, IT investment decisions authority is 
not limited to IT specialists. Such decisions are also entrusted by people with versatile 
work experience, e.g., finance, general project management etc. We believe this 
heterogeneity in work experience might have caused the inverse relationship. Although 
IT managers have more work experience overall, but lack of specialized skills and 
experience might have led them to take the biased decision. On the contrary, more 
experience with IT investments lead to more rational decisions. With increased 
experience with IT investments, IT managers are 0.162 times less likely to take biased 
decisions. We believe a more focused experience towards IT investments allows 
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managers to evaluate the embedded risks in projects with growth options in a rational 
manner. Such experience leads them to take rational growth option exercise decisions.  
 For the large project with growth option (project 3), gender (z= -3.14, p<0.01), 
and work experience (z= -1.71, p= 0.08) were significant. Just like in the case of the 
small project with growth option, IT managers with greater work experience showed 
risk-averse behavior and made biased option exercise decisions as compared to the IT 
managers with lesser work experience. More specifically, with increased work 
experience, IT managers are 0.111 times more likely to take biased decisions. We 
believe this is due to the same reasons as described earlier. The results also indicate that 
gender becomes significant in large project with growth option, with male respondents 
exhibiting more risk-averse behavior and making more biased decisions, than female 
respondents. More specifically, females on average, after controlling for all other 
variables, are 0.202 times more likely to take rational decisions. This shows when 
stakes are higher in a project with growth potential, male IT managers are more 
conservative and take biased decisions. We did find that increasing project size 
increased the framing effects for the growth option significantly. As seen earlier in the 
case of single projects, we found that increasing project size increased the framing 
effects for growth option significantly. We found similar trend here, and the project size 
effect on growth option might be due to the gender difference.  
 For the small project with abandonment option (project 2), work experience (z= 
1.83, p= 0.067) and services sector (z= -1.66, p =0.097) were significant. For the small 
project with abandonment option, IT managers with more work experience showed less 
risk seeking behavior and took more rational option exercise decisions as compared to 
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the IT managers with lesser work experience. More specifically, with increased work 
experience, IT managers are 0.102 times less likely to take biased decisions. This result 
is intuitive and shows an opposite trend from the growth options scenario. It is not 
surprising, because the options in play are different in nature. This result confirms that, 
with more work experience, the problem of escalation of commitment can be reduced 
for small projects. For project 2, respondents belonging to the services sector took more 
biased decisions. Respondents from the service sector, on average after controlling for 
all other variables, are 0.079 times more likely to take rational decisions. We believe 
industry differences are due to the differences in the nature of IT projects managed in 
services and manufacturing sector. IT investments could be considered more important 
in the services sector than in the manufacturing sector since this sector is more IT -
intensive (Licht and Moch, 1999). 
 For large project with abandonment option (project 4), only experience with IT 
investments (z= 1.73, p=0.083) was significant. This result indicates that for large 
project with abandonment option, IT managers with more experience in IT investments 
took more rational decisions and terminated the project by exercising the option; instead 
of continue to invest in it. More specifically, with increased experience in IT 
investments, IT managers are 0.118 times less likely to take biased decisions. This 
result is intuitive. Greater experience led to more rational thinking for large projects. 
This result along with the  similar result for small projects can be used to make an 
argument that escalation of commitment in large projects can be controlled by letting IT 
managers with more experience with IT investments manage it.  
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 In a portfolio of small independent projects (portfolio 1) and small 
interdependent projects (portfolio 2), framing of decisions in single projects (small 
projects with growth and abandon options) did not contribute towards narrow framing 
in the portfolio significantly. Also, portfolio experience was not significant either, but 
for portfolio of large projects (portfolio 3), respective large project with abandonment 
option contributed towards narrow framing significantly (z= 1.72, p=0.086). With an 
increased number of biased decisions for the large project with abandonment option, IT 
managers’ biased decisions for portfolios of large projects increased by 2.93.  
 These results are supported by the repeated measures analysis, and indicate that 
framing of single project options did not contribute towards narrow framing in 
portfolios, except for the case of large projects with abandonment option. Based on all 
these results, hypothesis 5b is partially supported13. Trends in framing effects changed 
significantly in portfolios from single projects, as indicated by repeated measures 
analysis. Biased decisions for growth options (for both small and large projects) 
decreased significantly in portfolios whereas biased decisions for abandonment option 
for small project increased significantly, with no significant change in biased decisions 
for abandonment option for large project. In small portfolios, the narrow framing 
occurred due to framing of both growth and abandonment options, but significantly due 
to the increase in the biased decisions for abandonment options. In large portfolio, the 
narrow framing occurred due to framing of both growth and abandonment options, but 
significantly due to no change in the biased decisions for abandonment options. 
                                                 
13
 Hypothesis 5b states: Framing of real options in single IT projects will lead to narrow framing in IT 
portfolios. 
115 
 
 
 
 Hypothesis 6 was tested on suboptimal portfolio decisions14, by dividing them in 
two categories. From all the suboptimal portfolio decisions, the suboptimal portfolio 
responses due suboptimal abandonment option decisions were separated from the 
suboptimal portfolio responses due suboptimal growth option decisions. If the portfolio 
decision was suboptimal due to the both suboptimal growth and abandonment option, it 
was included in both categories. The results are given in Table 3.18.  
 
 
Table 3.18: Loss Aversion in Portfolio Scenarios 
 Total 
suboptimal 
decisions15 
Suboptimal 
decisions due to 
option to abandon 
Suboptimal 
decisions  
due to growth 
option 
Friedman’s 
rank test for 
k χ 
(p-value) 
Portfolio 1  
(small scale independent 
projects) 
117 
(52.5%) 
70 
(59.8%) 
70 
(59.8%) 
0.001 
(=0.999) 
Portfolio 2 
(small scale interdependent 
projects) 
114 
(51.1%) 
68 
(59.6%) 
70 
(59.8%) 
0.044 
(=0.833) 
Portfolio 3  
(large scale independent 
projects) 
167 
(74.9%) 
101 
(60.5%) 
115 
(68.8%) 
1.66 
(=0.197) 
 
 
 
The test results were not significant for all three portfolios, showing no 
significant loss aversion in portfolio suboptimal decisions. This means framing of real 
abandonment options did not play a significant role in narrow framing of portfolios. 
This result shows that, in a portfolio scenario, IT managers are not sensitive to losses 
as much. Based on these results hypothesis 6 is not supported. 
 
                                                 
14 Hypothesis 6 states: When IT managers exercise real options in an IT portfolio, framing effects will be 
greater for projects with an abandonment option than for projects with a growth option. 
15
 Total suboptimal decisions are the suboptimal portfolio decisions due to the sub optional project 
decision for either growth option, or abandonment option, or both options. 
116 
 
 
 
3.5.3 Reduction in Narrow Framing Effects 
Hypotheses 7, 8a,8b and 9 were tested by comparing the results of respective 
portfolio outcomes using a non-parametric k-related statistical test Friedman statistic 
and Cochran’s Q test. To test the effects of resource interdependency among projects in 
the IT portfolio on narrow framing (H7), portfolio results of the small independent 
project portfolio (portfolio 1) were compared with the small interdependent project 
portfolio (portfolio 2). The tests showed no significant difference between portfolio 1 
and 2 (χ(1) = χ = 0.158, p = 0.691). Hence, the interdependency among projects in a 
portfolio did not reduce the narrow framing effects in the IT portfolio, and therefore 
hypothesis 7 is not supported. This result is consistent with repeated measures analysis, 
where resource interdependencies among IT projects in a portfolio did not contribute 
towards its improved management, and as a result output of the portfolio was not 
maximized. 
To test the effects of project size in the IT portfolio on narrow framing (H8 a,b), 
portfolio results of the small independent project portfolio (portfolio 1) were compared 
with the large independent project portfolio (portfolio 3).  The tests showed significant 
difference between portfolio 1 and 3 (χ (1) = χ = 34.722, p < 0.001). Hence, the 
projects’ size did impact the narrow framing effects in an IT portfolio. From the 
comparative analysis of project portfolios in Table 3.15, we found a different trend than 
hypothesized. For portfolios 1(small independent projects) and 2 (small interdependent 
projects), the percentage of correct responses increased from 47.5% to 48.9% in 
portfolio 2, where the increase was not significant (paired sample t-value = -0.397, p 
=.692). Similarly for portfolios 1(small independent projects) and 3 (large independent 
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projects), the percentage of correct responses decreased from 47.5% to 25.1% in 
portfolio 3, where the decrease was significant (paired sample t-value = 6.399, p 
<0.001). Hence, the project size had an opposite impact on outcomes, where increase in 
project size increased framing effects in the case of growth as well as abandonment 
options, instead of reducing them, similar to the single projects case. This result is 
counter intuitive to the prospect theory, but consistent with escalation of commitment 
for the abandonment option case. Instead of reducing the narrow framing effects, the 
increase in project size intensified it. This showed that decision makers handling IT 
portfolio of larger IT projects are more likely to fall prey to narrow framing, as 
compared to the IT portfolio of smaller IT projects. We believe the same reasons hold 
for these results as explained for hypotheses 4a and 4d. Based on these results, 
hypothesis 8a is not supported, but hypothesis 8b is supported16. 
To test the effects of simplification of portfolio outcomes on narrow framing 
(H9), portfolio results of small independent project portfolio (portfolio 1) were 
compared with the results of the decision scenario of a follow up question. The tests 
showed significant difference between portfolio 1 and choices made in the simplified 
decision scenario (χ (1) = χ = 83.769, p <.001). Hence, hypothesis 9 is supported. 
This result implies two things. One, when portfolio scenarios with real options are 
simplified to make them less cognitively challenging, decision makers go for rational 
choices instead of risk sensitive choices due to framing. Secondly, these results showed 
preference reversal among decision makers, due to framing of real options at exercise 
time. Given that the decision scenario consisted of the same projects as in small 
                                                 
16
 Hypothesis 8a states: Increasing project sizes in an IT portfolio will reduce the narrow framing effects. 
Hypothesis 8b states: Increasing project sizes in an IT portfolio will increase the narrow framing effects. 
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independent project portfolio (portfolio 1), more respondents decided rather rationally 
in the simplified scenario when the portfolio value became obvious, as compared to the 
portfolio scenario.  
 We tested hypotheses H1-H9 using the data collected from international 
respondents. The results are given in Appendix-B. We found all the hypotheses were 
supported. However, we did not test H5b and H10, because it is out of the scope of this 
dissertation.  
3.5.4 Individual Risk Behavior 
Prior to running the analyses for hypothesis 10, all variables used to measure 
individual risk were examined for accuracy of data entry, outliers, and missing values. 
All the values for all variables were within acceptable ranges suggesting that there we 
no data entry errors. There were some univariate outliers detected (Table 3.19). We re-
ran the descriptive statistics with and without outliers and the statistics did not change to 
merit adjustment. Hence, the observations were retained in the data set. The descriptive 
statistics of the data is given in Table 3.20. 
We checked for multivariate outliers, normality of distribution, and 
multicollinearity. None of the Mahalanobis distance p-values (based on chi-square 
distribution) were found to be less than 0.001. Hence, there were no multivariate 
outliers. In terms of normality of the data distribution, some measures were slightly 
skewed (Table 3.19) like horse race, poker game, sports bet and gambling. For initial 
analysis, the data was not transformed to eliminate the skewness. None of the bivariate 
correlations were very high, i.e., they were less than 0.9 (Table 3.21), so there was not a 
problem of multicollinearity. 
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Table 3.19: Univariate Outliers (n=223) 
Variable Outliers 
Horse Race 26 (>=4) 
Mutual Fund 14 (= <1) 
Poker Game 29(>=4) 
Sports Bet  28 (>=4) 
Conservative Stock 12(=<1) 
Gambling 84 (>=2) 
 
 
Table 3.20: Descriptive Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness 
 Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error 
Horse Race 1 5 1.56 .932 1.718 .129 
Mutual Fund 1 5 3.81 1.024 -1.007 .129 
Poker Game 1 5 1.57 .987 1.715 .129 
Speculative Stock 1 5 2.67 1.153 .124 .129 
Sports Bet 1 5 1.63 .958 1.515 .129 
Conservative Stock 1 5 3.81 1.017 -.926 .129 
Government Bond 1 5 3.33 1.133 -.422 .129 
Gambling 1 5 1.41 .873 2.347 .129 
 
 
Table3.21: Bivariate Correlations 
 H.RACE M. FUND P. GAME S. STOCK S. BET C. STOCK G.BOND GAMBLE 
H.RACE 1        
M. FUND .095 1       
P.GAME .592** .101 1      
S.STOCK .251** .286** .256** 1     
S.BET .568** .106* .551** .322** 1    
C.STOCK -.064 .394** -.114* .103 -.077 1   
G.BOND .021 .269** -.045 .190** .048 .442** 1  
GAMBLE .473** .022 .571** .177** .503** -.078 .047 1 
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3.5.4.1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
 Before testing the hypothesis, we ran confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on the 
risk measures to compare the goodness-of-fit of the empirical data to the hypothesized 
conceptual model for financial domain specific risk measurement for US respondents. 
The CFA was run on US data (n=223). The conceptual model consists of 8 observed 
variables and two latent variables, investment risk and gambling risk, to determine the 
financial domain specific risk of the respondents. Each latent variable is measured by 
four items. 
We ran one factor model to examine unidimensionality. A one factor model was 
tested and found not to fit the covariance matrix (χ2 = 447.05, df =20, p<.0001; 
RMSEA [90%CI] = 0.286, 0.335; CFI= 0.55; GFI= 0.67). An examination of the 
standardized residuals indicated a misfit of the data, with standardized residuals as high 
as 15.9 (POKER_GA), 13.03 (MUTUAL_F), and 13.62 (SPORTS_B).These results 
suggest that the data is multidimensional (Figure 3.2). 
A two factor model, which was based on the original model specification, was 
tested. Some factor loadings were not statistically significant at the p <.01 level: 
including for government bonds (G.BOND) measuring investment risk (t=-0.39, p>.05) 
and item gambling (GAMBLE) measuring gambling risk (t=0.24, p>.05). The path 
diagram with standardized estimates is given in (Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3.2: One Factor Model 
Figure 3.3: Two Factor Model 
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The overall model fit indices suggested a slight improvement in the fit (χ2 
=335.49, df =19, p<.0001; RMSEA [90%CI] = 0.249, .30; CFI=.615; GFI=.726. There 
was still a significant chi-square and an examination of the residuals suggested a 
moderate misfit in the model, especially in the Investment risk factor (several 
standardized residuals were as high as 11.52). 
The initial conceptual model was modified by dropping the non-significant 
measures from the model, i.e., government bonds (GOV_BOND) from investment risk 
and gambling (GAMBLING) from gambling risk. Also, the conceptual model was 
modified (based on the modification indices) to allow three error covariance paths 
between the observed variables. The improvement in the model with all additional error 
covariance paths is given in the Table 3.22 below, along with the path diagram in 
Figure 3.4. This resulted in a reasonable fit, χ2 (5, N=223) = 13.43, p = 0.0197; RMSEA 
[90%CI] = 0.032, .145; CFI=.994; GFI=.980. 
 
 
Table 3.22: Model Improvements 
Correlation Allowed Chi-square RMSEA 
None χ2 (8, N=223) = 313.14, p < 0.001 0.415> 0.05 
Conservative stock, Sports bet χ2 (7, N=223) = 206.86, p < 0.001 0.359> 0.05 
Mutual fund, Horse race χ2 (6, N=223) = 26.75, p < 0.001 0.125> 0.05 
Speculative stock, Poker game χ2 (5, N=223) = 13.43, p = 0.0197 0.08> 0.05 
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3.5.4.2 Hypothesis Testing 
Based on the CFA results, regression weighted composite values were 
calculated for investment risk and gambling risk in SPSS v17. To test the hypothesis, 
the 3SLS model was used. The sequence of equations used for both data samples is as 
follows: 
Project 1 
(growth) 
 
= Gender + Work Exp + Firm Size + Industry + IT Exp + RO Exp 
+ Investment risk + Gambling risk         
 
(3.8) 
Project 2 
(abandon) 
 
= Gender + Work Exp + Firm Size + Industry + IT Exp + RO Exp 
+ Investment risk + Gambling risk              
 
(3.9) 
Project 3 
(growth) 
 
= Gender + Work Exp + Firm Size + Industry + IT Exp + RO Exp 
+ Investment risk + Gambling risk              
(3.10) 
Figure 3.4: Final CFA Model 
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Project 4 
(abandon) 
 
= Gender + Work Exp + Firm Size + Industry + IT Exp + RO Exp 
+ Investment risk + Gambling risk              
(3.11) 
Portfolio 1 = Project 1 + Project 2 + Portfolio Exp   (3.12) 
Portfolio 2 = Project 1 + Project 2 + Portfolio Exp   (3.13) 
Portfolio 3 = Project 3 + Project 4 + Portfolio Exp   (3.14) 
The results for 3SLS model with US data are presented in Table 3.23. 
 
 
Table 3.23: 3SLS Model Results – With Individual Risk  
Explanatory 
Variables 
(1) 
Project 1 
SSGO 
(2) 
Project 2 
SSAO 
(3) 
Project 3 
LSGO 
(4) 
Project 4 
LSAO 
(5) 
Portfolio 1 
SSIND 
(6) 
Portfolio 2 
SSINT 
(7) 
Portfolio 3 
LSIND 
Project 1 
- - - - 
0.646 
(1.15) 
1.276** 
(2.19) 
- 
Project 2 
- - - - 
-0.648 
(-.38) 
-0.488 
(-.28) 
- 
Project 3 
- - - - - - 
0.500 
(.90) 
Project 4 
- - - - - - 
2.239** 
(2.05) 
Gender -0.078 
(-1.06) 
0.024 
(.44) 
-.239*** 
(-3.13) 
0.032 
(.50) 
- - - 
Work 
Experience 
-.029 
(-0.89) 
.039 
(1.55) 
-.048 
(-1.41) 
0.031 
(1.18) 
- - - 
Services 
Sector 
0.049 
(.82) 
-.050 
(-1.11) 
0.030 
(.48) 
-0.050 
(-1.01) 
- - - 
Firm Size -0.020 
(-.77) 
0.006 
(.31) 
-0.010 
(-.37) 
0.015 
(.70) 
- - - 
IT 
Investments 
Experience 
.034* 
(1.11) 
0.024 
(1.01) 
-0.016 
(-.53) 
.053** 
(2.07) 
- - - 
Real 
Options 
Experience 
-0.035 
(-1.13) 
0.001 
(.07) 
-0.001 
(-.03) 
-0.042 
(-1.54) 
- - - 
Gambling 
Risk 
0.124*** 
(3.91) 
-0.009 
(-0.38) 
0.035 
(1.10) 
-0.010 
(-0.42) 
- - - 
Investment 
Risk 
0.053* 
(1.78) 
-0.023 
(-1.03) 
0.012 
(.69) 
0.046* 
(1.69) 
- - - 
Portfolio 
Experience 
- - - - 
0.060 
(.88) 
0.073 
(1.04) 
-0.000 
(-.00) 
Constant .716*** 
(4.04) 
.524*** 
(3.68) 
.875*** 
(4.89) 
.363** 
(2.22) 
3.074** 
(2.13) 
2.602* 
(1.76) 
0.990** 
(1.70) 
        
Model Fit        
R2 0.105 0.024 0.069 0.031 0.062 0.049 -0.441 
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χ statistics 26.58*** 7.15 18.65** 8.77 4.67 12.50*** 9.06** 
No. of obs. 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 
*** Significant at 1% significance level 
** Significant at 5% significance level 
*  Significant at 10% significance level 
SSGO = small scale project with growth option 
SSAO = small scale project with abandonment option 
LSGO= large scale project with growth option 
LSAO= large scale project with abandonment option 
SSIND= portfolio of small scale, independent project 
SSINT= portfolio of small scale, interdependent project 
LSIND= portfolio of large scale, independent project 
 
 
 
 Among the first stage equations, models for project 1 (χ= 26.58, p<0.01) and 
project 3 (χ= 18.65, p =0.02) are significant. Among the third stage equations, the 
models for portfolio 2 (χ= 12.50, p<0.01) and portfolio 3 (χ2= 9.06, p=0.03) are 
significant. For the small project with growth option (project 1), among all variables, 
gambling risk (z= 3.91, p< 0.01), and investment risk (z= 1.78, p= 0.076) were 
significant. These results indicate that for the small project with growth option, IT 
managers who were likely to take risk in their personal life in gambles or personal 
investments also took risk in project 1 scenario. More specifically, with increased 
likelihood of taking risk in gambles as well as personal investments, IT managers are 
0.249 and 0.106 times less likely to take biased decisions respectively. By preferring to 
take the risk and exercising the growth option embedded in the project, they took the 
economically optimal and rational decision for the project instead of going for small but 
certain gains. The same held true for the managers who were less likely to take risk in 
their personal lives in gambles or personal investments, which lead them to taking 
suboptimal decision. Hence, for these managers, their business decisions were 
influenced by their personal financial risk behaviors. These results are counter intuitive 
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to prospect theory that specifies risk behaviors relating to frames are independent of 
personal risk characteristics. This outcome is a strong indicator that real option exercise 
decisions are complex decisions, and these decisions are likely to be affected by the 
personal financial risk behavior of the decision maker. IT managers are shown to 
become personally vested in the project they are managing (Keil et al., 1995), which 
cause them to escalate their commitment to a failing project. We believe that IT 
managers have a tendency of getting personally vested in any project they are 
managing, due to which their personal risk behavior starts to influence their business 
decisions.     
 For the large project with growth option, only gender (z= -3.13, p<0.01) was 
significant, where male respondents showed risk-averse behavior and took more biased 
option exercise decisions than female respondents. More specifically, females on 
average, after controlling for all other variables, are 0.206 times more likely to take 
rational decisions. These results establish two main insights. First, for the growth option 
embedded in the large project, gender plays a significant role in decision making. 
Second, for growth options embedded in the large project, male IT managers are more 
prone to showing risk-averse behavior at option exercise time and taking biased 
decisions than female IT managers. 
 For the small project with abandonment option (project 2), none of the 
instrumental variables were significant. This showed that none of the individual level, 
firm level and country level characteristics impacted the decision in the small project 
with abandonment option. Hypothesis 3 results showed that most of the respondents 
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took a rational decision (80.3%) and terminated the project. 3SLS results indicate that 
the decision was not influenced by any exogenous variable. 
 For the large project with abandonment option, experience with IT investments 
(z= 2.07, p=0.039) and investment risk (z= 1.69, p=0.091) were significant. This result 
indicates that for the large project with abandonment option, IT managers with more 
experience in IT investments took more rational decision and terminated the project by 
exercising the option. More specifically, with increased experience in IT investments, 
IT managers are 0.139 times less likely to take biased decisions. This result is intuitive 
where more experience leads to more rational thinking, hence, facilitating options 
thinking in large projects (similar to 3SLS results for H5). Finding significant 
investment risk effects indicates that for the large project with abandonment option, IT 
managers who were likely to take risk in their personal investments took a rational 
decision for the project with an abandonment option and exercised the option optimally, 
instead of continuing to invest in the project. The same holds true for managers who are 
less likely to take risk in their personal investments, which lead them to taking 
suboptimal decision. More specifically, with increased likelihood of taking risk in 
personal investments, IT managers are 0.093 times less likely to take biased decisions. 
Hence, for these managers, their business decisions were influenced by their personal 
investment risk behavior. This result is counter intuitive to prospect theory that specifies 
risk behaviors relating to frames are independent of personal risk characteristics.  
 In a portfolio of small independent projects (portfolio 1), none of the decisions 
in the small project with growth option (project 1) and an abandonment option (project 
2) contributed towards narrow framing significantly. But for the portfolio of small scale 
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interdependent projects (portfolio 2), the small project with growth option (project 1) 
contributed towards narrow framing significantly (z= 2.19, p =0.028). With increased 
biased decisions for the small project with growth option, IT managers’ biased 
decisions for portfolio of small interdependent projects increased by 0.603. In the first 
stage equations, gambling and investment risks were significant for project 1. It is likely 
that the individual risks explained narrow framing via framing of project 1. Hence, 
these results indicate that framing of growth options in small single project is carried 
forwarded in project portfolios of interdependent projects, and personal risk behavior 
for investments and gambling affects these decisions.  
 In a portfolio of large independent projects (portfolio 3), the large project with 
abandonment option (project 4) contributed towards narrow framing significantly (z= 
2.05, p =0.041). With an increased number of biased decisions for the large project with 
abandonment option, IT managers’ biased decisions for portfolio of large projects 
increased by 2.54. In the first stage equations, investment risk was significant for 
project 4. It is likely that the individual risk explained narrow framing in portfolio 3 via 
framing of project 4. Hence, these results indicate that framing of abandonment options 
in large single project is carried forwarded in project portfolios, and personal risk 
behavior for investments affects these decisions. 
In summary, individual risk behavior did contribute significantly towards 
narrow framing in project portfolios via framing effects in single projects. It played a 
significant role in case of portfolio of small interdependent projects, via growth option 
and in case of portfolio of large projects via abandonment option. Based on these 
results, hypothesis 10 is not supported and personal risk preferences did impact IT 
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projects and portfolios decisions with real options. The summary of all the hypothesis 
results is given in Table 3.24.  
 
Table 3.24: Summary of Hypotheses Results and Support 
Hypothesis Test Test 
Parameters 
Supported by 
Results 
H1 Framing of growth options t-stat 
(p- value) 
Project 1, 
Project 3 
Yes 
H2 Framing of abandonment 
options 
t-stat 
(p- value) 
Project 2, 
Project 4 
Yes 
H3 Loss aversion in single 
projects 
Friedman’s rank 
test for k χ Project 1vs.2  Project 3 vs.4 No 
H4a Framing reduced by size – 
growth option  
Friedman’s rank 
test for k χ Project 1vs.3  No 
H4b Framing reduced by size – 
abandonment option 
Friedman’s rank 
test for k χ Project 2vs.4 No 
H4c Framing increased by size – 
growth option 
Friedman’s rank 
test for k χ Project 1vs.3 Yes 
H4d Framing increased by size – 
abandonment option 
Friedman’s rank 
test for k χ Project 2vs.4 Yes 
H5a Framing of options in a 
portfolio leads to narrow 
framing 
t-stat 
(p- value) 
Portfolio 1, 
Portfolio 2, 
Portfolio 3 
Yes 
H5b Framing of options in single 
projects leads to narrow 
framing in a portfolio 
Repeated 
Measures 
Portfolio 1, 
Portfolio 2, 
Portfolio 3 
Partially (for 
large 
abandonment 
options only) 3SLS All projects 
and portfolios 
H6 Loss aversion in a portfolio Friedman’s rank 
test for k χ Portfolio 1, Portfolio 2, 
Portfolio 3 
No 
H7 Interdependency reduces 
narrow framing 
Friedman’s rank 
test for k χ Portfolio 1 vs.  Portfolio 2 No 
H8a Project size reduces narrow 
framing 
Friedman’s rank 
test for k χ Portfolio 1 vs.  Portfolio 3 No 
H8b Project size increases 
narrow framing 
Friedman’s rank 
test for k χ Portfolio 1 vs.  Portfolio 3 Yes 
H9 Simplification reduced 
narrow framing 
Friedman’s rank 
test for k χ Portfolio 1 vs.  Simplified 
decision 
Yes 
H10 Individual risk does not 
impact narrow framing 
3SLS All projects 
and portfolios 
No 
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3.6 Discussion and Implications 
3.6.1 Framing Effects 
We found significant framing effects for growth option scenarios (both small 
and large projects), as well as for the abandonment option scenario (only for large 
project). IT managers displayed risk-averse behavior for growth option while exercising 
them, irrespective of project size, and risk seeking behavior for option to abandon only 
in large projects while exercising them. Framing of real options induces respective risk 
behaviors at option exercise time that may lead to suboptimal exercise decisions, hence, 
impacting its realized economic value. Projects with growth options are valued the most 
by IT managers because they seem to add more value than any operational option 
(Tiwana et al., 2006), and drive their commitment to it. Our results indicate that growth 
options have a potential to prevent IT managers from optimally exercising them by 
making them risk-averse, irrespective of the amount at stake. However, for options to 
abandon, only large project suffered significant framing effects. Although projects with 
option to abandon are valued the least by IT managers because they seem to add the 
least value due to difficulty in exercising them (Tiwana et al., 2006; Busby and Pitts, 
1997), yet, IT managers exercise them optimally. The preference for option exercise 
was significantly different for large projects, where IT managers took suboptimal 
exercise decisions. These findings for abandonment option are consistent with 
escalation of commitment behavior in IT projects, where inability to terminate a project 
midway is attributed to its size, along with other factors, like disruption in ongoing 
project operations, negative impact on the team’s morale and credibility, and the ability 
of the option to give no accomplishment as compared to other real options, except 
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curtailing losses (Tiwana et al., 2006). We also found the size of the project intensifying 
framing effects in growth options. For growth options, IT managers became even more 
conservative for large projects. We believe there could be several reasons for this. 
Several risk factors has been identified affecting large projects like ERP systems, 
including, organizational fit, skill mix, management structure and strategy, system 
design, user involvement and training and technology planning and integration 
(Sumner, 2000). Most of these risk factors are unsystematic, where managers have no 
control in mitigating them. Our project scenarios did not specify the strategic 
importance of projects to the organizations, nor any other information that could relate 
to the kind of risk involved, i.e., either systematic or unsystematic. Hence, due to the 
sheer size of the project and stakes involved in it, respondents might have decided for 
the safest choice. Also, economic recession effects might have come into play by 
impacting the IT investment decision makers, where departmental cost cuts (Botello, 
2009) and a shrinking technology market (Ante, 2008) made them more conscious on 
savings than maximizing returns.  
We, however, did not find significant loss aversion effects in single projects. 
These results held for both small and large projects. In the case of IT investments, IT 
managers are more risk-averse than loss averse. Same held true in portfolios. Hence, the 
option type does influence biased decisions, where growth options are more susceptible 
to being exercised suboptimally than options to abandon.  
3.6.2 Narrow Framing Effects 
Narrow framing effects were significant in all the portfolios. Narrow framing in 
all the portfolios was caused by suboptimal decisions for growth options as well as 
132 
 
 
 
abandonment options. Even though most respondents took rational decisions for small 
scale single project with abandonment option, their preferences for option exercise 
decision changed in the portfolio setting where some of them took biased decisions and 
showed risk seeking behavior. This change was indicated by the repeated measures 
result, where biased decisions increased for abandonment option in small scale 
portfolios. Similarly, most respondents took biased decisions for large scale single 
project with abandonment option. But their preferences for option exercise decision did 
not change significantly in the portfolio setting (as indicated by repeated measures 
analysis). In both small and large portfolios’ case, increase in the number of biased 
decisions for abandonment option was not significant enough to indicate loss aversion. 
For small and large single projects with growth options, managers showed significant 
risk-averse behavior. The number of biased decisions for growth option was decreased 
in portfolio scenarios, but they were still greater than the number of biased decisions for 
abandonment option. Therefore, narrow framing in small portfolios was caused by 
increased biased decisions for small abandonment options, in the presence of significant 
number of biased decisions small growth option. In large portfolio, narrow framing was 
caused by the presence of biased decisions for large abandonment option, and large 
growth option.   
Similar to the results found in the case of single projects, narrow framing effects 
were significantly higher in the case of large project portfolio compared to the small 
project portfolios. This outcome was possibly due to significant suboptimal decisions in 
both growth and abandonment option exercise, and due to no change in biased decisions 
for abandonment option decisions as compared to single project scenarios. Hence, the 
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combined impact of risk-averse behavior in the large project with growth option, risk 
seeking behavior in the large project with abandonment option, and with reference 
point impact in portfolios resulted in intensifying narrow framing effects in large project 
portfolios. The option to abandon a project seems to be unlikely to be exercised, and 
hence, not very valuable, when the project involves higher stakes (in terms of size) and 
the project is a part of a portfolio where other projects have a potential for positive 
returns. 
Interdependency among project resources in a portfolio had no significant 
impact on the narrow framing outcome. Although awareness of alternative uses of the 
funds supporting a project has been shown to force the decision makers out of decision 
making in isolation (Keil and Robey, 1999; McCain, 1986; Northcraft and Neale, 1986), 
it did not hold in our case. In the presence of framing effects on real options, resource 
interdependencies did not initiate competition for scarce resources (Throp, 1999), nor 
did they act as constraints on the portfolio, specified as a key in portfolio alignment 
(Goldman, 1999). Hence, it is likely that framing effects dominated the resource 
interdependencies among IT projects in a portfolio, and in turn negatively affected the 
efficient management of the IT project portfolio. 
When portfolio scenarios were simplified, narrow framing effects were 
eliminated. This result confirmed that uncertainty at option exercise time in a portfolio 
causes biased decision making. When the portfolio choice(s) are simplified and 
reframed such that economic dominance of the combined choice is obvious, most of the 
IT managers’ preferences for portfolio decision changed from risk-driven to 
economically optimal rational decisions.  
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Framing of single project options did not contribute towards narrow framing in 
portfolios, except for the case of large projects with abandonment option. Portfolio 
scenarios decreased biased decisions in small and large growth options, and increased 
biased decisions in small abandonment option significantly, with significant biased 
decisions in large abandonment option. This outcome indicates that in portfolios, 
decision makers were willing to take risk for both growth and abandonment options, 
where taking risk for growth option was necessary to realize its optimal value but taking 
risk for abandonment option was not. Combining the projects with growth and 
abandonment options in a portfolio facilitated risk taking among managers. The overall 
goal of portfolio management is to maximize the portfolio returns. Also, high returns 
are attributed to taking high risks. The risk behavior change in portfolios can be 
attributed to the general conception of taking higher risk to maximize returns.  
Reference point shift among IT managers in the portfolios may also be a cause of this 
outcome. With a growth option in the same portfolio as an abandonment option, and 
with certain and probable gains possible, the reference point for the managers to 
evaluate the real options’ outcomes was not neutral anymore. The narrow framing 
effects in portfolio decisions indicate that IT managers evaluated each project in 
isolation, relative to the status quo of the project with positive outcome, i.e., growth 
option, as a reference point, instead of a neutral reference point of zero NPV. We 
believe this reference point shift lead to the decreasing risk aversion for growth options. 
Managers valued the project with growth option more as compared to the one with 
abandonment option, which facilitated their willingness to invest in it further. Managers 
value growth option more than abandonment option (Tiwana et al., 2006).  
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The change in reference point also made risk seeking behavior significant in 
portfolio decisions. Managers’ focus in this case changed from loss minimization for 
projects with abandonment option, to taking a chance to breakeven the project. We 
believe managers did not value abandonment options with growth option in the same 
portfolio, which lead them to decide not to terminate the project and incur loss. 
Reference point shifts happen due to the availability of multiple candidate reference 
points where the new reference point is a function of past information, also known as 
adaption (Baucells et al., 2011). Also, recently experienced gains and losses can impact 
managers’ risky behavior by making them risk takers after a gain (Sullivan and Kida, 
1995). In our case, both effects came into play in a portfolio scenario, where adaption 
consisted of information from the growth option scenario, with possible higher gains 
realized for growth option scenarios possibly leading to risk taking behavior for the 
option to abandon in the same portfolio. This result indicates that risky decision making 
in a portfolio setting is more complex than explained by prospect theory (Sullivan and 
Kida, 1995).  
When the decision makers’ individual risk preferences were taken into account in 
equations (3.8) to (3.11), decisions in the small project with growth option also 
significantly contributed towards narrow framing in small interdependent project 
portfolio (portfolio 2). Also, decisions in the large project with abandonment option 
contributed significantly towards narrow framing in the portfolio of large projects. This 
set of results illustrate a significant role played by individual risk behavior towards 
framing of option decisions in single projects and in turn narrow framing of option 
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exercise decisions in portfolios. Based on these results, framing of decisions in single 
projects did lead to narrow framing in portfolios. 
3.6.3 Predicting Framing and Narrow Framing Effects 
Growth option decisions were explained by control variables but option to 
abandon decisions were not. This result indicates that growth option decisions can be 
predicted via individual or firm level characteristics, but option to abandon decisions 
hold irrespective of them. Growth option decisions for the small project were explained 
by work experience and real options experience. This indicates that respondents with 
more work experience as well as experience with real options took biased decisions. We 
suspect that with more experience, IT managers tend to get risk-averse. Hence, they see 
a project with high uncertainty in terms of downside risk instead of upside potential. 
They tend to minimize risk to make sure positive returns are ensured. There can be 
several reasons behind this behavior including budget cuts in organizations, difficulty in 
generating positive returns in IT support projects like infrastructure projects. However, 
for the large project with a growth option, gender, portfolio experience, and work 
experience became significant in explaining the growth option decisions. The work 
experience relationship is similar here to that observed in the case of the small project 
with growth option, and we believe the same reasons hold here as well. Portfolio 
experience on the other hand decreased the tendency of framing in large projects. We 
believe that with greater portfolio management experience, IT managers take more 
objective decisions. Our results indicate that managers work experience is significant 
only for large projects. This could be due to the fact that managers evaluate portfolios 
with large projects more carefully due to the higher stakes involved 
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Our results also indicate that for large project with a growth option, women are 
0.174 times less likely to take biased decisions than men. This result is contrary to 
findings of gender differences in investment risk behaviors, where men are found to be 
greater risk seekers than women (Fellner and Maciejovsky, 2007). We believe that in 
the case of growth options, gender differences are based on preferences for final 
outcomes, and women focused on maximizing returns whereas men focused on 
ensuring positive returns, hence, the risk-averse behavior.  
When control variables were run in a 3SLS model, along with the portfolio 
decisions, some similarities and differences were noticed (Table 3.25).  
 
Table 3.25: Significant Variables-Single Projects 
Explanatory 
Variables 
(1) 
Project 1 
SSGO 
(2) 
Project 2 
SSAO 
(3) 
Project 3 
LSGO 
(4) 
Project 4 
LSAO 
Gender 
- - 
-.235*** 
(-3.14) 
- 
Work 
Experience 
-.0641* 
(-1.85) 
.0422* 
(1.83) 
-.056* 
(-1.71) 
- 
Services 
Sector 
- 
-.063* 
(-1.66) 
- - 
IT 
Investments 
Experience 
.0635* 
(1.93) 
- - 
.0461* 
(1.73) 
*** Significant at 1% significance level 
** Significant at 5% significance level 
*  Significant at 10% significance level 
SSGO = small scale project with growth option 
SSAO = small scale project with abandonment option 
LSGO= large scale project with growth option 
LSAO= large scale project with abandonment option 
 
 
Gender was still significant for the large project with growth option. Work 
experience was significant for all projects except for the large project with 
abandonment option. Work experience became significant for small project with 
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abandonment option, and the direction of the impact was positive. IT managers with 
greater work experience showed less risk-seeking behavior and made rational option 
exercise decisions when compared to the IT managers with lesser work experience. This 
result is intuitive because with increasing work experience, IT managers are able to see 
the value of loss minimization provided by abandonment option. Also, experienced IT 
managers have a strong managerial reputation which allows them to look beyond 
making bad performing projects successful by taking high risks. This result also shows 
an opposite trend from the growth option scenarios, where with increasing work 
experience, IT managers became more conservative in their investments. It is not 
surprising, because the options in play are different in nature. This result confirms that, 
with more work experience, the problem of escalation of commitment can be controlled 
for small projects only. However, with greater work experience, risk-averse behavior 
for growth opportunities intensifies. 
 Industry sector was significant for the small project with abandonment option. 
Respondents belonging to the services sector made more biased decisions. This may be 
due to the differences in the nature of IT projects managed in the services and 
manufacturing sectors. IT investments may be considered more important in the 
services sector than in manufacturing sector, since the service sector is more IT 
intensive (Licht and Moch, 1999).  IT investment experience was also significant for 
the small project with growth option and the large project with abandonment option. 
These results indicate that for small project with growth option as well as for large 
project with abandonment option, IT managers with greater experience in IT 
investments made more rational decisions and exercised the respective options, instead 
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of showing respective risk behaviors based on frames. Greater experience with IT 
investments enabled IT managers to see the potential for value maximization due to 
growth option, and potential for loss minimization due to abandonment option. Hence, 
greater experience lead to more rational thinking for small project with growth option as 
well as for large project with abandonment option, and facilitated options thinking in 
these projects. IT Investment experience affected large portfolio decisions through 
large project with abandonment option. The relationship was positive implying that 
greater experience with IT investments lead respondents to make rational decisions, 
which in turn affected the portfolio decisions through more rational decisions. 
When individual risk factors were introduced, only Gambling and Investment 
risks were significant for the small project with growth option (Table 3.26).  
 
 
Table 3.26: Significant Variables – Single Projects and Individual Risk  
Control 
Variables 
(1) 
Project 1 
SSGO 
(2) 
Project 2 
SSAO 
(3) 
Project 3 
LSGO 
(4) 
Project 4 
LSAO 
Gender -0.078 
(-1.06) 
0.024 
(.44) 
-.239*** 
(-3.13) 
0.032 
(.50) 
IT 
Investments 
Experience 
.034* 
(1.11) 
0.024 
(1.01) 
-0.016 
(-.53) 
.053** 
(2.07) 
Gambling 
Risk 
0.124*** 
(3.91) 
-0.009 
(-0.38) 
0.035 
(1.10) 
-0.010 
(-0.42) 
Investment 
Risk 
0.053* 
(1.78) 
-0.023 
(-1.03) 
0.012 
(.69) 
0.046* 
(1.69) 
*** Significant at 1% significance level 
** Significant at 5% significance level 
*  Significant at 10% significance level 
SSGO = small scale project with growth option 
SSAO = small scale project with abandonment option 
LSGO= large scale project with growth option 
LSAO= large scale project with abandonment option 
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Work experience, IT investment experience and real options experience were 
not significant anymore. These results indicate that personal risk behavior explained the 
growth option exercise decision better than any other individual and firm level 
characteristic in this project scenario. For the small project with growth option, IT 
managers who were likely to take risk in their personal life in gambles or personal 
investments also took risk for the small project with growth option. By preferring to 
take the risk and by exercising the growth option embedded in the project, they took the 
economically optimal and rational decision for the project instead of going for small but 
certain gains. Similarly managers who were less likely to take risk in their personal 
lives in gambles or personal investments made suboptimal (risk-averse) decisions. 
Hence, for these managers, their business decisions were influenced by their personal 
risk behaviors. These results are counter to prospect theory which specifies risk 
behaviors relating to frames to be independent of personal risk characteristics. 
Along with IT investment experience, investment risk became significant for 
the large project with abandonment option. The relationship was positive showing IT 
managers with greater experience in IT investments made more rational decisions and 
exercised the respective options, instead of showing respective risk seeking behavior 
based on frames. These results are intuitive and greater experience leads to more 
rational thinking for large projects (optimal option exercise), with possible negative 
outcomes. Significant investment risk indicates that personal investment risk behavior 
explained the abandonment option exercise decision. For large project with 
abandonment option, IT managers who were likely to take risk in their personal life in 
personal investments exercised the abandon option embedded in the project. They made 
141 
 
 
 
the economically optimal and rational decision for the project instead of going for 
probable large uncertain losses. This result is counter to prospect theory, which 
specifies that risk behaviors relating to frames are independent of personal risk 
characteristics. 
Framing effects in small project with growth option significantly contributed 
towards narrow framing in small interdependent projects portfolio (portfolio 2) (Table 
3.27). This result was not true for the 3SLS model without risk preferences. The 
relationship was positive, implying that personal risk preferences (both gambling and 
investment risk) contributed positively towards the framing of growth option in small 
project, which in turn affected the portfolio decision through more irrational decisions.  
 
 
Table 3.27: Significant Variables - Portfolio Outcomes 
Dependent 
Variables 
Project 1 
SSGO 
Project 4 
LSAO 
IT 
Investments 
Experience 
Gambling 
Risk 
Investment 
Risk 
Project 1 
SSGO 
n/a n/a 
.034* 
(1.11) 
0.124*** 
(3.91) 
0.053* 
(1.78) 
Project 4 
LSAO 
n/a n/a 
.053** 
(2.07) 
- 
0.046* 
(1.69) 
Portfolio 2 
SSINT 
1.276** 
(2.19) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Portfolio 3 
LSIND 
n/a 
2.239** 
(2.05) 
n/a n/a n/a 
*** Significant at 1% significance level 
** Significant at 5% significance level 
*  Significant at 10% significance level 
SSGO = small scale project with growth option 
LSAO= large scale project with abandonment option 
SSINT= portfolio of small scale, interdependent project 
LSIND= portfolio of large scale, independent project 
 
 
 
IT investment experience and investment risk affected project portfolio 
decisions of large projects by affecting the large project with an abandonment option. 
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Both relationships were positive, implying that a) greater experience with IT 
investments lead respondents to take rational decisions, which in turn affected the 
portfolio decision through more rational decisions, and b) increased likelihood in taking 
risk in personal investments lead respondents to make rational decisions. 
3.6.3 Theoretical Implications 
 We contribute to the understanding of IS literature on real options as well as IT 
portfolio management. Earlier literature has recognized the differences among real 
option values in general (Busby and Pitts, 1996; Miller and Shapira, 2004), as well as at 
the project selection stage based on the real option type embedded in the project 
(Tiwana et al., 2006). By using the framing and narrow framing literature as a 
theoretical lens, we provide a nuanced understanding of IT real option exercise 
decisions associated with project and portfolio characteristics. We illustrate different 
behaviors based on type of the option embedded in the project and size, which impacts 
the realized value from the real option. The framing of real options is carried forwarded 
from the project selection stage to the decision making stage (exercising of real option) 
which leads to different risk behaviors among the decision makers because growth 
options and abandonment options are subject to different types of risk behaviors. The 
difference in risk behaviors associated with real option types deviate IT managers from 
making a rational real option exercise decision.  
Our findings about the existence of framing and narrow framing effects in IT 
project and portfolios provide insights for the consequences of the intuitive framing of 
the real options and their effects on real option exercise decisions. They also challenge 
the general perception of real options as adding to the portfolio value due to decision 
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making flexibility. The selection of portfolios based on embedded real options is not 
productive if the real options embedded in them are not exercised optimally.  
Factors that can help reduce the framing and narrow framing effects, such as 
project size, and simplification of portfolio decisions extend the understanding of 
decision theory in the context of IT. Narrow framing theory suggests that decision 
makers tend to make concurrent decisions in isolation, but the literature on IT portfolio 
management suggests that recognizing resource interdependency among IT projects 
improves its performance by enabling better management of resources (Keil and Robey, 
1999; McCain, 1986; Northcraft and Neale, 1986). Our results indicate that the framing 
effects dominate concurrent evaluation of projects in portfolios, leading to the decision 
making in isolation. 
Our findings about the increased framing effects in large projects and project 
portfolios enrich the IT project management literature. They illustrate the differences 
due to biases between the management of projects and portfolios of different sizes. 
Contrary to the Prospect Theory, we found intensified risk behaviors for larger projects 
and portfolios, where framing effects are milder closer to reference point (i.e. in small 
project and portfolio case) of decision making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1981).   
The results on the role played by individual risk preferences of the decision 
maker in framing of projects and portfolios add to the understanding of decision theory. 
These results highlight the correlation of individual risk behavior of decision makers 
and their decisions for long term investments in IT. It also adds to the Prospect Theory 
by identifying an exception to the underlying assumption of independence between 
framing of decisions and individual risk behavior. Organizational behavior studies have 
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established that Prospect Theory does not hold in completely in organizational decision 
making under uncertainty (Sullivan and Kida, 1995). Our results indicate the same, but 
in the context of investment decisions for IT.  
3.6.4 Practical Implications  
Real options are advocated as an effective way of exploiting the embedded 
flexibility in IT projects during their life cycle. Their value is realized only when they 
are exercised optimally (Kumar, 2002). Findings reflecting the reasons with the 
potential to hinder the realization of their value are important in order to exploit the 
benefits of this methodology. Our results improve the understanding of the biases that 
can affect the real options’ realized value. The IT managers valuing the real options 
subjectively at the project selection stage pose a risk at the options’ realized value, 
because subjective valuation may induce certain risk behaviors at the option exercise 
time, with the direct impact on option exercise decisions. 
Our results add to the explanation for the determinants of over valuation of 
projects with growth options. Framing of growth options as gains, as well as the 
consequence of framing in the form of risk-averse behavior can cause the decision 
maker to take minimal risk by playing it safe, instead of valuing the option rationally in 
its face value. Similarly, for the option to abandon in large projects, framing of an 
option to abandon as a loss, as well as the consequence of framing in the form of risk 
seeking behavior causes the decision maker to take extreme risk by playing the odds, 
instead of valuing the option in its face value, rationally. Further, framing of real 
options in IT portfolios affects the IT portfolio management, by impacting portfolio 
outcomes directly due to isolation effect.  
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To overcome the framing and narrow framing effects, changes in organizational 
culture and procedures can help. Real options should be explicitly recognized and 
valued for projects from the start, their value should be tracked during the project life 
cycle, and commitment to exercising them when appropriate should be understood. 
Training in real option recognition and effects of framing is warned. Implementation of 
quantitative measures to track the implications of decision flexibilities is a must for 
large projects with real options and project portfolios. Understanding of the factors that 
can reduce narrow framing effects in IT portfolios like, project size and simplification 
of real options exercise decisions accounting for cumulative risk and return of the 
portfolio, instead on individual projects in the portfolio, can play a role in controlling 
these effects. Explicitly accounting for the interdependency among IT projects in a 
portfolio have shown to improve portfolio outcome (Keil and Robey, 1999; McCain, 
1986; Northcraft and Neale, 1986). However, our results indicate that this trait does not 
reduce narrow framing effects in portfolios. Also, if the simplification of portfolio 
decisions does impact the narrow framing, then IT portfolio management practices 
aimed at implementing procedures to facilitate these decisions will be of great help.  
Last, but not the least, finding a connection between risky decisions and individual risk 
behavior of the decision makers highlights the importance of practitioners using caution 
while using the real options method for IT investment management. Managers’ 
awareness about their risk behavior, the impact of individual risk behaviors on real 
options exercising decisions, and their experience with IT investments, may also help in 
controlling for the framing and narrow framing effect biases. However, there is a need 
for additional research to explore this relationship 
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3.6.5 Limitations to the Study and Next Steps 
In this study, we studied only two types of real options that exist in IT 
investment scenarios, i.e., the real growth and real abandonment options. Several other 
real options exist in IT projects, including options to defer, switch use, scale and lease 
(Benaroch et al., 2002). Studying the framing and narrow framing effects for these real 
options is a valid extension to this study.  
The outcomes for each real option used in our experiment were presented as 
either a pure gain (for growth option scenarios) or a pure loss (for abandonment option). 
The abandonment option scenarios we used are closer to the reality. However, IT 
growth options may not always represent a pure gain scenario. If the projects embed a 
growth option, there is always an uncertain cost element along with the uncertain 
benefits in these investments at the onset of the project commitment that cannot be 
ignored. Examples include infrastructure investments, ERP systems implementation, 
etc.  Also, we created simple project portfolios to test for narrow framing. More 
complex portfolios exist in reality with varying degrees of interdependency among 
them. Studying the impact of varying interdependencies among projects on narrow 
faming is another reasonable extension to this study. 
IT projects are usually sequential in nature and completion of one project is 
necessary to start new projects. We did find reference point shifts in portfolio scenarios, 
where project with growth option was presented before the project with abandonment 
option. It can be argued that one factor contributing to the reference point shifts was the 
order of project presentations. As we did not check for the effects of sequential 
interdependencies among projects in a portfolio, but this argument qualifies for another 
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extension to this study. Finally, we did not take into account the dynamics of loss 
aversion explicitly. This evidence suggests that the degree of loss aversion depends on 
prior gains and losses: A loss that comes after prior gains is less painful than usual, 
because it is cushioned by those earlier gains. On the other hand, a loss that comes after 
other losses is more painful than usual. After being burned by the first loss, people 
become more sensitive to additional setbacks. This can explain the extent of risk 
seeking behavior in IT managers responsible for IT projects with embedded 
abandonment 
 
CHAPTER 4: STUDY 2 – EFFECTS OF TIME-INCONSISTENT PREFERENCES 
ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS WITH 
GROWTH OPTIONS 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Information technology (IT) investments are a collection of technological 
components and human skills that serve the needs of an organization. It provides a 
platform to facilitate large-scale connectivity, effective interoperation of an 
organization's IT applications and strategic alignment of IT (Colin and Dhaliwal, 2011; 
Kumar, 2004). They are complex endeavors which include decisions about large scale 
enterprise systems, networks, and databases (Gal et al., 2008). IT infrastructure 
investments have been under a spotlight due to their increasing importance. According 
to CIO magazine (2010), IT infrastructure spending was expected to grow 9.2% in 
2010, which is above the 6.6% average of other IT products and services.  
Investment in IT infrastructure may enable other projects and their completion 
along with the infrastructure itself may yield significant value (Dos Santos, 1991; 
Bardhan et al., 2004). For example, investment in software platforms such as operating 
systems, database systems, workflow/workgroup systems and application packages such 
as SAP R/3 or ORACLE, enable firms to realize value from their application systems 
(Taudes et al., 2000). Investment in a data architecture or telecommunications network 
may provide a firm with an opportunity to implement a new product differentiation 
strategy that employs these infrastructures (Kambil et al., 1993). Investment in web 
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technologies provides the firm with numerous e-business opportunities and process 
automation (Bardhan et al., 2004). Investment in electronic banking services allows 
firms to deploy point-of-sale debit services (Benaroch and Kauffman, 1999, 2000). 
These examples illustrate how IT infrastructure projects have embedded “growth” 
options, where firms have a “right” but not an obligation to initiate future projects 
(Kambil et al., 1993; Taudes et al., 2000).  
IT infrastructure investments contain options whose exercise brings forth further 
opportunities for investment as well as generating cash flows (Panayi and Trigeogis, 
1998). Hence growth options enabled by IT infrastructure projects play a significant 
role in their economic justification. These investments are categorized as high risk due 
to their capital intensive nature, irreversibility and valuation difficulty17 (Dos Santos, 
1991; Kambil et al., 1993). Traditional financial metrics (Discounted Cash Flows, Net 
Present Value, Internal Rate of Return, and Return on Investment) have been shown to 
undervalue IT infrastructure projects because they ignore the value of the opportunity 
for managers to intervene during the project’s course (Taudes et al., 2000). Hence real 
options analysis is advocated because it takes into account the uncertainty involved in 
IT investments while considering managerial flexibility in decision making (Benaroch 
and Kauffman, 1999; Benaroch, 2002; Kumar, 2002; Tiwana et al. 2006). 
The value of real options depends on the time of their exercise (Dos Santos, 
1991; Kumar, 1999). IT literature assumes managers as rational economic agents who 
would exercise these options on time. This rationality assumption has several 
                                                 
17 These characteristics are more prominent for IT infrastructures that are built and maintained in-house 
by the organizations than IT infrastructures that are outsourced, like IT-as-a-service for applications 
management and cloud computing for data management. In-house IT infrastructures provide firms with 
an opportunity to expand the use of these platforms via investing in new IT assets. In this study, our focus 
is the in-house IT infrastructures because they provide the firm with growth options. 
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implications. Economic agents maximize utility by eliminating any state of the world 
that yields the same outcome regardless of one's choice (cancellation), adhering to 
transitivity of preferences (transitivity), selecting the dominant option when one option 
is better than another in one state and at least as good in all other states (dominance), by 
showing same preferences in the face of different representations of the same choice 
problem (invariance), and  by showing same preferences about the future plan at 
different points in time (time-consistent preferences) (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). 
However, some IS literature provides evidence that managers may not possess all the 
above characteristics (Tiwana et al., 2006), and so does the literature on time-
inconsistent preferences (Frederick et al., 2002). We therefore examine the implications 
of IT managers being bounded rational agents with time-inconsistent preferences, 
applying real options thinking in managing growth options. 
This paper examines the relationship between managerial bias and time of 
option exercise. We focus on a growth option whose value depends on the option 
exercise time (Dos Santos, 1991; Kumar, 1996, 2002) and realization of option value 
depends on its optimal exercise. The economic literature suggests that people could 
have a bias for the present (Thaler, 1981; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992), which in turn, 
could affect real options thinking. We explore the effects of time-inconsistent 
preferences on IT growth option exercise time and its realized value. Using a two time 
periods binomial model for option valuation, and utility model for inter-temporal 
preferences, we derive a closed-form expression for the critical value of the present-bias 
self-control parameter below which a manager will exercise the option too early. We 
provide insights on how present-bias interacts with option parameters and extend the 
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analysis to more than two periods’ option in a numerical experiment. The results 
indicate that present-bias impacts growth option value via sub optimal exercise timing. 
A manager with time-inconsistent preferences may fail to foresee that he will evaluate 
the payoffs differently in the future than today leading to suboptimal exercise time. 
Furthermore, a present-biased manager is more likely to exercise a growth option early 
when the project is performing well.  Organizations aware of the present bias 
preferences of the managers can develop incentives geared towards minimizing the 
risks from early growth option exercise. Findings of this study may apply to other 
investments embedding real growth options such as manufacturing infrastructure and 
R&D.  
The following section summarizes the relevant literature on real options in IT 
investments along with the literature on time-inconsistent preferences. Subsequently, a 
model of time-inconsistent preferences for growth options with two exercise periods is 
presented along with a numerical example and sensitivity analysis. A numerical 
experiment examining the problem with more than two exercise periods is then 
conducted. Finally, discussion and implications are presented.  
4.2 Incentivizing  IT Growth Options  
There is extensive IS literature on IT infrastructure investments embedding 
growth options. Dos Santos (1991) justified investment in IT infrastructure projects by 
conceptualizing them as having embedded growth options. He used Margrabe’s 
financial options framework (Margrabe, 1978) to justify the value of initial investment 
with optional future projects. Panayi and Trigeorgis (1998) valued IT investment 
projects in telecommunication infrastructure utilizing a growth options framework. 
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Taudes (1998) developed a general valuation model for IT software growth options in 
the context of embedded information systems (IS) functions in an IT platform. 
Benaroch and Kauffman (1999, 2000) used a traditional call option to evaluate the 
deployment of IT point-of-sale debit services as a growth opportunity. Hillhorst et al., 
(2008) proposed a method to select a preferred IT infrastructure from competing 
alternatives using Dempster-Shafer theory along with real options theory.  
Although real options use is justified and advocated in IS literature, formal real 
options models are rarely used by managers in practice due to the complexity and 
difficulty in calculating the value of real options (Tiwana et al., 2007). Research has 
shown that even if managers are not aware of the method, or are not formally using it, 
their intuitions and decisions agree with the qualitative prescriptions of the framework 
most of the times. This phenomenon is referred to as real options thinking (Busby and 
Pitts, 1997) and is considered as an alternative to formal real options analysis (Fichman 
et al., 2005). Some studies have claimed that in the absence of explicit real options 
methods or training, managerial intuition typically responds in the correct direction to 
the factors that determine normative real options values (McDonald, 2000; McGrath, 
1997; 1999; Miller and Shapira, 2004). According to this view, formal or heuristic real 
options analysis adds logical support and quantitative precision to managerial intuition 
but does not differ qualitatively from it. In case of IT investments, studies indicate that 
managerial intuition may not always conform to real options theories, due to managerial 
bias (Lankton and Luft, 2008; Tiwana et al., 2007). Incentives may be appropriate in 
order to foster real options thinking. 
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4.2.1 Real Options and Managerial Biases 
While several models have been introduced for real options analysis of IT 
projects (Dos Santos, 1991; Kumar, 1999, 2002; Benaroch, 2002; Swartz and Zozaya-
Gorostiza, 2003), firms continue to use intuition instead of the formal analyses to 
manage flexibility in the projects (Fichman et al., 2005; Lankton and Luft, 2008). 
Hence, investment decision making in IT projects remains a mix of formal real options 
analysis, and qualitative real options thinking, with conventional financial methods.  
A stream of MIS literature exploring causes of managerial risk in investment 
decisions from a behavioral perspective has been growing. Table 4.1 highlights the 
major findings of some of these studies that view the divergence between real options 
thinking and real options analysis as a major cause of risk in IT project management.  
Effective options thinking requires managers to recognize and enhance 
opportunities to create options within IT projects, value these options, and manage 
projects to fully extract this value (Fichman et al., 2005). The largest value of an option 
is realized when it is exercised at the optimal time (Kumar, 2002). Hence, exercising 
real options sub optimally (when it is worth waiting or when the optimal exercise time 
has passed) reduces their value. This behavior is most likely to occur when managers 
apply real options thinking. Prior research has examined factors consisting of personal 
characteristics of managers including preferences based on their attitude towards risk 
(Tiwana et al., 2006, 2007; Lankton and Luft, 2008) that result in real options thinking 
being different from real options analysis. For example, an option to abandon is less 
preferred by managers compared to an option to grow, switch and/ or scale (Tiwana et 
al., 2007). External factors such as market competition also affect managers’ risk 
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preferences (Lankton and Luft, 2008). Adding to this list, we build a case for present-
biased managers, who may fail to realize the optimal value of the growth option by 
exercising it too early.  
 
 
Table 4.1: Research Identifying Various Managerial Biases Affecting Real Options 
Thinking 
Study Findings Explanation 
Lankton 
and Luft 
(2008) 
• As uncertainty increases, individuals judge 
deferral options as more valuable than 
growth options.  
• Competitor’s presence decreases deferral 
option value while increasing growth 
option value.  
Option-specific decisions 
are based on expected 
utility payoffs and 
anticipated regret, 
consistent with 
behavioral economic 
theories. 
Tiwana et 
al., (2007) 
• IT managers show bounded rationality bias 
in real option valuation for growth, scaling, 
switching and abandonment options.  
• For option to scale, managers value the 
flexibility to change scale irrespective of 
project NPV, unlike in the case of staging 
and deferral options. 
Managers only search for 
more information to 
support the project when 
project’s NPV is low. 
With high NPV they do 
not assess real options. 
Tiwana et 
al., (2006) 
• Managers correctly recognize and value 
real options in troubled IT projects. 
• Managers intuitively value growth options 
more than operational options (stage, scale, 
switch, defer and abandon).   
Possible reasons for 
differences across option 
types include signaling 
effects, exercise 
difficulty, framing 
effects, and anti-failure 
bias. 
Benaroch 
et al., 
(2006a) 
• Managers follow options-based risk 
management mostly based on intuition. 
• Intuitive decisions lead to suboptimal or 
counterproductive practices. 
Managers intuitively 
think of forms of 
flexibility (options 
thinking) as the level of 
risk rises.  
 
 
 
4.3 Time-Inconsistent Preferences 
Time-inconsistent preference refers to the preference for immediate utility over 
delayed utility (Fredrick et al., 2002). Experimental studies suggest that people have 
time-inconsistent preferences (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; Thaler, 1981). It means 
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when two rewards are far away in time, people act relatively patiently (e.g., they prefer 
two apples in 101 days, rather than one apple in 100 days). However, when both 
rewards are brought forward in time, they act more impatiently (e.g., they prefer one 
apple today, rather than two apples tomorrow). Hence these individuals give greater 
weight to earlier reward as it gets closer. These time-inconsistent preferences are also 
known as “present-biased" preferences (O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999a). We will use 
this term from here on. 
From a theoretical perspective, Phelps and Pollak’s (1968) study is the first to 
analyze the dynamically inconsistent time-preferences. Later O’Donoghue and Rabin 
(1999a) proposed a utility model for a person’s inter-temporal preferences at time t, 
which captures the salience of the present over the future. These “present-biased” 
preferences are represented by a simple model referred to as “quasi-hyperbolic” or 
(b, {- preferences.  
	|}	l, l
, … , l- ≡ {		l " 	b  {	l
-


 
With l as the instantaneous utility an individual receives at period t, the utility 
function U} represents his intertemporal preferences at time t. In this model, parameter 
{	is a simple discount rate for future utilities, and b= (0,1] is a self control parameter, 
that represents a time-inconsistent preference for immediate gratification. For b=1, 
these preferences are time-consistent; but for b< 1 the individual has a bias for now 
over the future. In other words, as b decreases, people are more present-biased.  
To better understand how these preferences address self-control problems, 
consider the following example similar to the one given by O’ Donoghue and Rabin 
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(2001). Suppose an IT manager can choose to invest in two technologies, ipad2 in 
period 2 or Samsung galaxy 10.1 in period 3, but can’t invest in both, due to scarcity of 
resources. If Samsung galaxy 10.1gives higher utility as a productivity tool (in terms of 
connectivity, backward integration with existing systems, etc.) than ipad2, these options 
yield the following instantaneous utilities (ut): 
ipad2 in period 2:     u1 = 0, u2 = 4, and u3 = 0. 
Samsung galaxy 10.1 in period 3:   u1 = 0, u2 = 0, and u3 = 6. 
The instantiations future utilities (u2 and u3) are lump-sum utilities for the respective 
time period (t=2,3) adjusted for time value of money that takes into account utilities 
from all future periods as well. An IT manager’s utility, with self-control parameter 
β=1/2 (assuming {=1) in period-1, will be U1 =quX	[l, lk]. Hence, the manager 
prefers to invest in Samsung galaxy 10.1, because it yields intertemporal utility of 
(1/2)6 = 3 whereas investing in ipad2 would yield intertemporal utility of (1/2)4=2. 
When period 2 arrives, the manager’s preferences change to U2=quX	[l, lk] and he 
now prefers to invest in ipad2, because doing so yields intertemporal utility of 4 
whereas waiting to Samsung galaxy 10.1 would yield intertemporal utility of 3. Such 
impatience towards technological investments has been observed in organizations (CIO, 
2011). 
Several studies have utilized time-inconsistent preferences to study problems in 
different areas (Fredrick and Loewenstein 2002). Also, the use of quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting to conceptualize “present-biased” preferences of managers is seen in 
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different fields as shown in Table 4.2. We integrated this basic model with real option 
model to evaluate the effect(s) of present-bias on growth option exercise decision. 
The key to understanding present-bias preferences is to consider a person at each 
decision time period as a separate agent who maximizes utility with regards to his 
current preferences while his “future selves” will determine future behavior according 
to the preferences that prevail at that time (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999a). Therefore, 
a person’s belief about his future selves’ preferences becomes important, because 
evaluating future preferences differently does not mean that person has a bias for 
present. It is the self-awareness of the time-inconsistent preferences that plays a role, 
since an individual who is aware of his time inconsistency will anticipate their future 
choices and choose consequently (Caillaud and Jullien, 2000), as compared to the 
individuals who lack such awareness. There are four types of assumptions about 
individuals’ self-awareness, based on their actual self-control parameter β, and their 
perceptions about future self-control parameter 	b  (O’Donahugh and Rabin, 2001). If 
the person believes that in the future he will encounter self-control problem, i.e. b	< 1	, 
he will choose his current behavior to maximize his current preferences (determined by 
his true self-control parameter β). With this formulation, people with standard time-
consistent (TC) preferences (do not have a bias for present and are fully aware of it) 
have b= β = 1, sophisticates (have a bias for present and are aware of it) have b= β < 
1, naïves (have a bias for present but believe otherwise) have β < b= 1, and partial 
naïves (have a bias for present and are partially aware of it) have β < b  < 1.  
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We consider two cases of self-awareness of managers in making IT 
infrastructure investments, i.e. TC and naïve. We examine the effects of the actual self-
control parameter β of the manager on the growth option exercise decision. TC with 
their actual self-control parameter β and their perceptions about future self-control 
parameter 	b  both equal to 1 will provide one extreme case with no bias for present and 
as a benchmark for comparison. Naïves with their actual self-control parameter β less 
than 1 (showing bias for present) but their perceptions about future self-control 
parameter 	b  equal to 1 showing their complete unawareness about their actual biased 
preferences will provide the other extreme case to capture the effects of present bias on 
growth option exercise decision. We do not consider sophisticates and partial naïves to 
keep the analysis simple, but they are a valid extension to this study. If the sophisticates 
and partial naïves are considered, then for those types, b  is less than 1 and the analysis 
should reflect it. Also, TC and naïve cases are the most discussed ones in the literature 
(Fredrick and Loewenstein 2002).  
As discussed before, in the IT real options framework, it is assumed that 
managers exercise real options on time. However, this may not be true in practice. 
Suppose a manger initially plans to exercise a growth option at a specific future time 
based on pre-determined criteria. Theoretically, the option exercise decision will be 
made at the pre-determined time if the criteria are met. However, there could be several 
cases where such options are exercised either too early or are allowed to expire (Coff 
and Laverty, 2007), resulting in compromised payoffs. Evidence of early commitment 
to premature technologies (Koghut and Kulatilaka, 1994) and early market entry with 
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new technology (Kalish and Lilien, 1986) has been reported. Such actions of IT 
managers can possibly be attributed to present-bias.  
It can be argued that incentives may dominate biases like effects of time-
inconsistent preferences on growth option exercise decisions. This argument is situation 
specific. Situations can be found where incentives might not dominate time-preferences 
of IT managers. Time-inconsistent preferences have shown to affect entrepreneurial 
decisions (Brocas and Carrillo, 2001), contract designs (Gilpatric, 2008), and long term 
projects (O’Donohugh and Rabin, 1999b).  
4.4 Time-Inconsistent Preference And Real Options On IT Assets 
A standard option has two stages, commitment stage and option exercise stage 
(Hull, 2008). At the commitment stage, value of the asset underlying the option is 
evaluated based on future payoffs from the exercise decision, and costs involved in 
exercising the option. For example, investment in ERP systems or DSS systems has an 
option for competitive expansion by utilizing it to integrate the supply chain (Collins et 
al., 2010). In this scenario, the growth option is the opportunity for competitive 
expansion. Similarly, investment in secure network infrastructure has an option for 
office automation by mobilizing employees via cloud computing and equipping them 
with mobile devices, or for flexible decision support in dynamic inter-organizational 
networks (Collins et al., 2010). Hence to value these options, cost of implementing the 
ERP/ DSS system or communication network are the commitment costs for the projects 
and the growth options they provide, and costs involved in competitive expansion, 
office automation or strategic flexibility are the exercise prices of these options. The 
benefits from competitive expansion, office automation or strategic flexibility are the 
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payoffs from exercising these options. To realize the value of these growth options, 
managers must decide whether to go for competitive expansion/office 
automation/strategic flexibility or not, when the necessary infrastructure is in place. 
This is known as exercise stage. The growth option exercise decision is made based on 
the current project progress and potential future payoffs (e.g. if ERP/DSS system 
implementation was successful, and supply chain members have the compatible 
technology enabling integration), and before the expiration of the option. Hence the 
option exercise stage is contingent to commitment stage (Dos Santos, 1991; Kumar, 
1996, 2002), and realized option value depends on the exercise time.  
In IS literature, real option analysis assumes managers are rational when making 
decisions. However, the economics literature argues that people could have a bias for 
the present (Thaler, 1981; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992), and their lack of awareness 
about this bias leads to suboptimal choices. This, in our case, translates into the 
potential for IT managers exercising a growth option pre-maturely.  
4.4.1 The Utility Function for Real Options 
We assume an IT infrastructure project with significant startup cost, where 
benefits can only be realized once all the costs are incurred. Typically the project 
without growth options will be valued using the discounted cash flow (DCF) method as 
Project value 
DCF
 = π – c  with  π = PV(πi) = ∑ 
-  (4.1) 
 
Where  
i = a period index, 
π= all the certain payoffs from the project,  
c = all the costs incurred to execute the project, 
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r= risk free discount rate, and 
T= life of project.  
 
If π > c, the project is profitable. For IT infrastructure projects, most of the future 
payoffs/ benefits are uncertain, which makes it difficult to determine the true economic 
value of the project upfront, hence leading to difficulty in their economic justification. 
For such cases, if a project embeds a growth option, it will have additional value from 
the flexibility of future decision making (Benaroch, 2002, Trigeogris, 1993).  
Project value 
RO
= π – c + real growth option value 
Where Project value RO is the net strategic value of the project, which is equal to the 
difference between certain payoffs from the project and costs involved to execute the 
project (π – c), and the value of decision making flexibility.  
To value growth options, we use a binomial option valuation method (Cox et al., 
1979) due to its simplicity, its requirements for estimating fewer parameters, easy 
application to a single real option case, and its previous successful implementation in IT 
investments (Kambil et al., 1993; Benaroch, 2002; Dai et al., 2007). This method 
assumes that the underlying asset value (present value of future payoffs) follows a 
binomial multiplicative diffusion process. Starting at time t1 = 1, the future payoffs 
value from the project may rise by factor u with probability p or fall by factor d with 
probability 1-p, by the exercise decision time t2 = t1 + ∆. Hence, at the option exercise 
decision time in t2, the expected value of the option payoffs will have only two possible 
variations. The IT manager will take into account these movements of the future payoffs 
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from the growth option to evaluate the project’s full value. The value of  the real option, 
V,  is calculated via backward induction by18: 
F = [)		,]
		[),]   for   n=1    (4.2) 
where 
u=√∆(expected upward movement in future benefits), 
d=1/u (expected downward movement in future benefits), d < r < u 
r= risk free rate, 
T = project life (option expiration time), 
 = uncertainty around future payoffs, 
p=

	; subjective probability of the event, 
f= one time follow-up investment (to exercise the growth option), and 
b= benefits realized after exercising the real option. 
For a growth option with n periods until maturity, option value depends on the 
same parameters and becomes complex. As long as option value is greater than zero, 
Project value
RO will be greater than Project valueDCF. Also, since real option value is 
proportional to the underlying uncertainty around future benefits, value of a project with 
uncertainty will be higher once the embedded real option is taken into account. Hence, 
Project value 
RO
 > Project valueDCF, when  > 0, which is in-line with findings in IS 
literature (Dos Santos, 1991, Kumar, 1996, Benaroch, 2002).  We also assume ∆ =
./d = 1 which is commonly done in the literature. 
 
 
                                                 
18 The Max function of payoffs in option value function has minimum value of zero, because the initial 
investment c is a part of the “Project Value” function consisting of certain benefits b, initial investment c 
and the real option value. 
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4.4.2 Time-inconsistent preferences and utility  
The IT manager commits to the project and obtains the embedded growth option 
with it at time t=1 with the expansion of the project in mind, i.e. by exercising the 
growth option if the condition ub - f > 0 holds at time t = 2. At time t=2, he will choose 
to exercise the option if ub - f >0. At the commitment stage (t=1), b will be equal to 1 
for TC managers19 as well as for naïve managers20 (naïves). Although naïves have a 
tendency of choosing present utility over future utility (with b < 1), they are unaware of 
their bias and think they will act in a time-consistent manner. Present-bias comes into 
play only when the rewards come near in the future (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999a, 
Caillaud and Jullien, 2000, Della Vinga and Malmendier, 2004). Hence both types of 
managers will evaluate and value the project equally. This correct evaluation for the 
project at the commitment stage by naïves also holds if the growth option has more than 
one exercise time period. 
Proposition 1: An IT manager with time-consistent (TC) preferences and an IT 
manager with time-inconsistent preferences (naïve) will value an IT project with 
embedded growth option more than an IT project without a growth option. 
 
Once committed to the project, the manager will decide about option exercise in 
the next period based on the evaluation of future payoffs at that time against the 
exercise price of the option. For a growth option with one time period to expire i.e. n=1 
at t=T=2, the manager has to decide at t=2 whether to exercise the option or let it 
expire. He will exercise the option if βub > f else the option will not be exercised. At 
                                                 
19 These managers awareness about their self-control (b) and their actual self control (b	is equal to 1. 
Hence they do not have a bias for present. 
20 These managers awareness about their self-control (b) mismatches their actual self control (b such 
that b  b  =1. Hence they have a bias for present but they believe that they don’t. 
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t=2, b will still be equal to 1 for TC managers as well as the naïves because the payoff 
is immediate.  
Proposition 2: IT managers (both TC and naïve) will exercise a growth option with one 
time period to expiration optimally.  
 
Typically there is more than one opportunity to exercise an option. We depict 
this real option exercise decision for two points in time in Figure 4.1, where IT manager 
decides after evaluating his/her utility at each stage. Figure 4.1 describes the necessary 
parameters that determine the utility from exercising a growth option. 
 
 
     
1 
Real option commitment decision 
where utility is a function of real 
option value Ut (V), which is a 
function of initial costs, future 
payoffs, follow-up investments, 
uncertainty around payoffs, risk free 
rate and optimal time to option 
expiration. 
 V = g (c, b, f, t*, , K) 
2 
Real option exercise decision at 
t=2, where utility is equal to the 
intrinsic value of the option, and is 
a function of future payoffs, follow-
up investments, uncertainty around 
payoffs, risk free rate and time to 
option expiration. 
U2 = g( b, f, t1, , K) 
     3 
Real option exercise decision at t=3, 
where utility is equal to the optimal 
value of the option, and is a function 
of future payoffs, follow-up 
investments, uncertainty around 
payoffs, risk free rate and time to 
option expiration. 
U3 = g( b, f, t2, , K) 
 
Figure 4.1: Timeline for real growth option with two time periods until expiration 
 
 
 
Let F, be the value of the option determined in period i if it is exercised in 
period	. For example, F, is the value a manager has for the option in period 1 if the 
option is exercised in period 2. At the commitment stage, t=1, both TC and naïve will 
commit to the project as per Proposition 1 as long as project value is positive. Once 
committed to the project with growth option, the exercise decision will be based on how 
the project performs overtime.  For a growth option with expiration time of two periods 
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(T=3), the manager has to decide at t=2 whether to exercise the option today or wait 
until maturity t=T=3.  
4.4.3 Two periods Growth Option 
Real growth options are typically modeled as European options, especially in the 
IT context (Kumar, 1996, 2002; Benaroch et al., 2006a), which can only be exercised at 
expiration. However, real options often do not have a fixed exercise time (Benaroch, 
2002) and can be exercised any time before expiration. For example, decisions such as 
an infrastructure investment in a software platform can usually be made any time until a 
cutoff date. Therefore, viewing a growth option as an American call option helps in 
capturing the option exercise flexibility.  
A key property of an American call option on a non-dividend paying asset21 is 
that it is never optimal to exercise it before expiration (Cox et al., 1979, Hull, 2008). 
We utilize this property and assume that a growth option is an American style call 
option on a non-dividend paying asset. This makes it optimal to exercise the option at 
the expiration date i.e. t*=3 for a two period growth option. The real option value at the 
project commitment stage to be exercised at t=3 is 
V1,3= 
),
[),]),(,
       (4.3) 
As long as r is positive, F, will always be greater than zero. Practically there is no 
situation in IT investments where the discount rate is non-positive, hence we will not 
consider that case. We further make the following assumptions: 
                                                 
21 A growth option in an IT infrastructure investment can be viewed as a call option on a non-dividend 
paying stock, because benefits from such investments are realized later in the future, over the period of 
time. This is consistent with the current IS literature (Benaroch, 2002; 2006b) 
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• Benefits from exercising the option (b) exceed the exercise cost (f), i.e. b>f. 
• u is greater than risk free rate r and d is less than risk free rate r,  i.e. d<r<u.  
• Risk free rate, future payoffs, option exercise cost, and uncertainty around future 
payoffs are constant.  
Bias for present comes into play when the rewards come near in the future 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999a, Caillaud and Jullien, 2000, Della Vinga and 
Malmendier, 2004) and per Proposition 1 both types of managers will value this project 
and growth option equally.  
Proposition 3: IT managers (both TC and naïve) will place the same value on an IT 
project with growth option with two time periods to expiration. 
 
At the first decision point t=2 the manager can exercise the option and realize 
immediate payoffs or wait until t=3.  At t=2, a naïve manager will exhibit present-bias 
for immediate payoffs and may exercise the option. This will give the real option value 
evaluated in period 2 and to be exercised in period 3 as: 
V2,3= 
),
[),]),(,
      (4.4) 
Since the benefits are immediate if the option is exercised at period 2, b	 in Equation 
(4.4) is less than 1 for naïve managers since those benefits are realized in t=3. For some 
value of		b, the Max function(s) in Equation (4.4) will result in zero. As b will impact 
only the payoffs in next period, a naïve manager may see V2,3 < V2,2 and will choose to 
exercise the option early, i.e. t=2. The utility from such decision at t=2 is 
U2 = Max(V2,2, V2,3)       (4.5) 
168 
 
 
 
Hence the utility is the maximum value from exercising the growth option today or in 
the next period. If V2,3< V2,2 , a naïve manager will choose to exercise the option early 
at t=2. Proposition 4 establishes the value of b for which a naïve manager will exercise 
the option suboptimally in period 2 instead of period 3. We refer to this value as the 
critical self-control parameter level and denote it by b̅. 
Proposition 4: There is a b̅ = 
 , such that for IT projects with a growth 
option with two exercise periods: 
• If b  b̅ the manager will exercise the options suboptimally in period 2 instead 
of period 3. 
• If b  	 b̅ the manager will exercise the option optimally in period 3. 
 
As the expression in Proposition 4 shows,  b̅ is a function of b, f, r, and σ. A 
naïve IT manager with a self-control parameter less than or equal to b̅ will exercise the 
growth option at t=2 and realize the payoffs sooner than waiting until t=3 to exercise 
the option and realize its optimal value. 
Proof.  See Appendix-C 
4.5 Numerical Example and Sensitivity Analysis 
To illustrate the effect of present-bias we use an example with the parameters 
shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: Parameter values for growth option, Kambil et al., (1993) 
Parameters Values  , , (for  = ) 
b $375,000 
0.94 $ 90,174 $ 110,003 f $320,000 
σ 0.3 
r 1.05 
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Without present-bias, F,k is greater than	F,, and the optimal value for this growth 
option will be realized when it is exercised at maturity, i.e. t=3. For naïve IT manager, 
with β  less than or equal to 0.94, he will exercise the option at t=2 instead of at 
maturity as shown in Figure 4.2. The lost value due to early exercise is $ 19,829. We 
conducted some numerical sensitivity analysis using the example to explore the 
relationship between b̅ and the option parameters. 
 
 
 
 
 
For growth options, the overall risk is determined by the volatility of the 
investment σ. As shown in Figure 4.3, increase in volatility first has little effect on the 
option value until  reaches 0.1.  Above  of 0.1, increase in volatility tends to increase 
option value, also known as the volatility smile (Hull, 2008). Figure 3 also shows b̅	as a 
function of . As the figure shows, in the range of  where volatility has little effect on 
option value, i.e. 0 <  < 0.1,  b̅ is small. For values of  above 0.1, b̅ is increasing in 
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Figure 4.2: Sensitivity of Growth Option Value to β 
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. This relationship between b̅ and  is similar to the volatility smile.  For 0 <  < 0.1, 
option value is relatively certain, and b̅ is smaller. When IT managers know that the 
additional value they can realize by waiting is certain, they are more likely to wait. 
Hence under low volatility, a present-biased IT manager is less likely to exercise the 
option early. For  > 0.1, the option value starts increasing at a fast rate but it is more 
uncertain, and, hence, present-biased IT managers are less likely to wait because of the 
uncertainty. This result is different than some of findings of empirical studies on growth 
options (Howell and Jagle, 1997; Lankton and Luft, 2008).  
 
Figure 4.3: Sensitivity of Critical β and Option Value to the Volatility 
 
 
We explore the sensitivity of b̅	to the risk free rate in Figure 4.4 which shows 
that b̅ is decreasing in the risk free rate r. Increase in the risk free rate increases the 
probability of an increase in the option value (i.e. due to the increase in  p=

). This 
provides a higher incentive to wait to exercise the option. Therefore, IT managers will 
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not exercise the option today and realize a lower value than they could realize if they 
wait until maturity. Hence, b̅ decreases as the risk free rate increases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Real option value has an inverse relationship with the follow-up costs f. The 
sensitivity of b̅	to f is shown in Figure 4.5. The figure shows that b̅ increases with f 
which implies that for higher values of growth option exercise price, present-bias is 
more likely to cause early exercise. As follow-up cost increases, growth option value 
will decrease, which makes it more attractive to exercise early since waiting is of little 
additional value which is offset by present biasness.  
Higher future payoffs increase the option value. We explore the sensitivity of 
b̅	to values of future payoffs b in Figure 4.6 which shows that b̅ is decreasing in b.  For 
higher values of payoffs from exercising a growth option, it is less likely that managers 
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Figure 4.4: Sensitivity of Critical β to the risk-free discount rate 
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will exercise it early. As future payoffs increase, the growth option value will increase 
and it is more attractive to wait for the high payoffs.  
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The results of the sensitivity analysis above can be confirmed for zero risk free 
rate, i.e. r = 1, for which the following expressions can be obtained: 

 = 
Q
Q
 ;   

 = 

Q
 ;   

 = # Q
 
These expressions support our numerical sensitivity analysis. The directions and 
the forms of the relationships hold for each case. b̅ increases with increases in volatility 
and future payoffs and decreases with an increase in follow-up costs. Also, b̅ has a non-
linear relationship with volatility and future payoffs whereas it has a linear relationship 
with follow-up costs.  
We further analyze the effects of present-bias on growth options with more than 
two exercise periods. We kept all the parameters same except for f = $345,000, and five 
time periods, n=5, to exercise the option and obtained the values of	b̅. At each option 
exercise time t=2,3,4,5 (t=1 is the project commitment stage), the manager evaluates 
his utility from exercising the option at t, or waiting until the optimal exercise time t= 6. 
Using the binomial option valuation method, we solved Vt, t = Vt,6 , t=2,3,4,5 for β. This 
allowed us to obtain b̅ for t=2,3,4,5 which is the value of present-bias parameter below 
which a manager will exercise the option in period t<6 instead of 6. Table 4.4 gives the 
b̅ values, along with cost of early exercise for each period. For a manager with β  
0.816, he will opt for exercising at t=2, given the project perform well over this period 
(an upward movement in payoffs). If the project did not perform well, he will not 
exercise the option since the realized value is negative. For a manager with 0.816 
b 0.885, he will wait for one period and exercise the option at t=3, given the project 
keeps performing well (i.e. two upward movements). In case the project does not 
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perform well in t=3 (a downward movement in payoffs), he will wait to exercise. This 
is shown by a value of β = 0.517 which is smaller than β = 0.816 and the manager 
would have exercised the option at t=2 already. Similar results hold for t=4. For a 
manager with 0.885 b 0.909, he will exercise the option at t=4, given the project 
keeps performing well (i.e. three upward movements). Figure 4.7 shows the relationship 
between b̅ for t=2,3,4 and cost of early exercise when project is performing well 
throughout (only upward movements). In case the project does not perform well in t=4, 
the manager will wait to exercise. At t=5, a naïve manager will not exercise the growth 
option at this point and will wait until maturity.  
 
 
Table 4.4: Critical β for each time period on the growth option horizon of n=5, along 
with cost of early exercise 
Exercise time Project Progress
22
   Exercise Decision 
Cost of 
early 
exercise 
t=2 upward 0.816 If b 0.816 $71,453.50 
t=3 (upward)2 0.885 If 0.816 b 0.885 $56,717.50 
 (upward)(downward) 0.517 At maturity None 
t=4 (upward)3 0.909 If 0.885 b 0.909 $31,076 
 (upward)2(downward) 0.504 At maturity None 
 (upward)(downward)2 0.504 At maturity None 
t=5 All >1 At maturity None 
                                                 
22 “upward” means single upward movement in the value of asset i.e. potential payoffs from the project, 
and “downward” means single downward movement in the value of asset i.e. potential payoffs from the 
project. 
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We further analyzed the effects of σ, r and b, on	b. A 3x3x3 experiment was 
run with σ = {0.3, 0.6, 0.9}, r = {5%, 10%, 15%} and b= {165,000, 180,000, 195,000} 
for an option with five time periods to exercise, n=5. We kept f = $150,000 since it is 
realistic to assume the option will not be exercised if the project did not perform well in 
t=2 (the first movement is downward). The range of b values was selected to ensure 
equal chance of negative feedback during the course of the project along with positive 
feedback. We then averaged the b̅ values across each parameter as shown in Table 4.5. 
As shown, the direction of the relationship between b̅	and σ (decreasing then 
increasing), b̅	and r (decreasing), b̅	and b (increasing) observed for the two-period 
option also hold here. The values of b̅ for any period with a down movement (not 
shown) were smaller than values of b̅ in prior periods where the project performed 
well. Therefore, there is small likelihood that the option will be exercised in periods 
with down movement (when project did not perform well). This can be explained by the 
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fact that a downward movement decreases the present value of the option and makes 
even present-biased managers less likely to exercise it in that period. Also, Table 4.5 
shows that the threshold for b̅ is largest (i.e. strong present-bias is needed for early 
exercise) for options in which payoff is high, volatility is high, and the discount rate is 
low. For these options, a present-biased manager is encouraged to be patient due to the 
large reward. Potential reward may even get larger because of the high volatility, and 
the low eroding power small discount rate has on future payoffs. 
 
 
Table 4.5: Average critical β needed to exercise the option in the first three periods with 
three upward movements 
σ 
	needed to exercise in 
t=2 
 needed to exercise in  
t=3 
¡ needed to exercise in 
t=4 
0.3 0.810 0.914 0.925 
0.6 0.805 0.903 0.871 
0.9 0.817 0.898 0.852 
       r 
0.05 0.815 0.850 0.704 
0.10 0.809 0.899 0.944 
0.15 0.808 0.966 1.000 
     b - f 
$15,000 0.789 0.911 0.922 
$30,000 0.818 0.901 0.884 
$45,000 0.825 0.904 0.842 
 
 
 
4.6 Discussion  
  Growth options help in IT infrastructure investments’ economic justification. 
They also facilitate the realization of IT infrastructure investments’ strategic value by 
providing a platform to manage IT tools that impact firms’ productivity. For the best 
utilization of these investments, it is important to make optimal exercise decisions for 
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growth options embedded in them. There is a chance of suboptimal exercise decisions 
motivated by a manager’s desire to realize the benefits sooner. This suboptimal exercise 
time may even lead to the whole project having a negative value. Such occurrences are 
related to some previous findings in the literature. For example, it has been shown that 
the existence of complementarity among projects aggravates the tendency to rush 
(Brocas and Carrilo, 2001). Growth options can be considered complimentary projects 
to infrastructure investments. This complementarity could accentuate present-bias of IT 
managers in exercising growth options. 
  We examined two distinct cases of self-awareness among IT managers about 
their time-preferences, TC and naïve. Our results indicate that at the commitment stage, 
IT project with growth option is valued equally irrespective of time-preferences of the 
manager. This result is consistent with the real options analysis literature (Tiwana et al., 
2006).  
Present-bias preferences affect the growth option exercise decisions when the 
real option allows the IT manager multiple exercise decision time periods during 
project’s life. Having multiple exercise decision time periods is likely in IT 
infrastructure projects (Kumar, 2004). Also, infrastructure components are sequentially 
dependent on each other and need to be carefully coordinated. For example, 
implementation of new system integrators, upgrading software platforms, expanding 
network platforms etc., are the decisions that can be taken within a specific time period. 
IT managers with present-bias preferences may exercise these growth options early due 
to preferring immediate payoffs and their unawareness of such preferences. Business 
environment may impact the IT manager’s time-preferences as well. In situations like 
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economic recession or market competition, where preference for immediate utility from 
IT utilization may lead IT managers to make decisions and waiting to invest does not 
seem feasible (even if it is so). Also if the strategic importance of a technology is high 
to the firm, it might impact IT managers’ decisions about investment by affecting their 
time-preferences due to stake holder’s pressure and to keep the firm competitive.  
We found that higher values of payoffs from exercising growth option decrease 
the likelihood that the manager will exercise the option early. Also, for higher values of 
growth option exercise price, present-bias was found to more likely cause early exercise 
of the option. These findings are counter-intuitive. Naïves are supposed to delay 
immediate cost activities and rush into immediate reward, where for immediate cost 
activities; a small present-bias can severely affect naïve decision makers (O'Donoghue 
and Rabin, 1999b). Higher payoffs increase option value and higher exercise costs 
decrease the option value. Accordingly, IT managers should be tempted to realize the 
value sooner than later when payoffs are high and should not rush the exercise decisions 
when costs involved are high. Our results point in the opposite direction. Large net 
payoffs (high payoffs and low follow-up costs) decrease b̅ and require the manager to 
have more present-bias to exercise the option early. One may view this as higher net 
payoffs tempt the manager to wait while lower net payoffs provide the manager with 
little incremental value from waiting which are easily discounted by his/her present-
bias. This is particularly true when the discount rate is high. 
Our experiment demonstrates the importance of project’s progress on its 
vulnerability to early exercise. Projects progressing well overtime are most vulnerable 
to early exercise by naïve managers.  Such projects could have large immediate payoffs 
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and therefore be vulnerable to present-biasness which penalizes future payoffs. This, in 
turn, results in unrealized project value due to premature exercise. 
4.6.1 Managerial Implications  
  Managers with present-bias may exercise growth options early. Hence, it is not 
enough for managers to recognize growth options in a project and intuitively evaluate 
their value (options thinking). They need to conduct formal option analysis; to be aware 
of their time-preferences over time; to reevaluate payoffs, costs, and parameters 
compared with previous period’s estimates. Furthermore, the organization should have 
incentives in place to mitigate the effects of present-bias. Understanding the effects of 
time inconsistent preferences may help in designing better incentives. For example, 
consider two scenarios. One with no managerial incentives and the other with incentives 
for periods t=2,3. The incentive amount depends on when the growth option is 
exercised i.e. either at t=2 or at maturity. Let Ut be the instantaneous utility a manager 
gets in period t from incentives given in that period. For the scenario with no incentives, 
the manager will have zero utility from incentives. For the incentives scenario, the 
utility of the manager from incentives in period 2 is  
|	l, lk ≡ 	¢uX	[l, blk] 
Suppose the incentive amount is a certain fraction “v” of the payoff from exercising the 
growth option “bt” at time t. Hence the utility from an incentive at time ,  l will be 
l= vbt; whereas future incentives are discounted by b.  
  With the above equation, for a two time period option, the incentives evaluated 
in period 2 are	l= vb2;  lk=b £¤
. This incentive will motivate the manager to wait 
180 
 
 
 
until t=3 to exercise the growth option if vb2  b £¤
 or b3 ¥ 
 . If this condition 
does not hold, then offering an incentive scheme in which the manager receives a 
fraction of s from payoffs if the option is exercised in period 2 or a fraction of sk from 
payoffs if the option is exercised in period 3 can be used. As long as  
£¤
£  
	¤ , it is 
utility maximizing for the manager to wait until period 3. This result is in agreement 
with the convexity of managerial incentives to overcome risk-averse behavior of 
decision makers (Coles et al., 2006).  
Changes to IT governance may help mitigate the effects of present-bias. IT 
governance procedures will benefit from requiring formal analytical methods to valuate 
investment decisions.  This analysis must rely on inputs from multiple managers and 
must have a post-project evaluation of performance to identify any existing biases. 
Incorporating healthy competition with IT governance can hence help control the 
effects of these biases as well (Brocas and Carrilo, 2001).  
Another important implication for IT governance and for managing IT projects 
is the choice of methods and procedures for controlling risks, especially in IT 
infrastructure investments.  Since there is a risk that a present-biased manager will 
exercise an option early, especially if the project is performing well, using a systematic 
and objective method to update estimates needed for option evaluation is important to 
reduce risk.  A possible way for achieving that is to conduct a “net change” evaluation 
at each option exercise period.  This implies that the evaluation begins with the 
estimates of option parameters, costs, and payoffs used in the previous period and 
181 
 
 
 
changes are only made when justifications are provided based on new information.  
Following such approach would limit the creep of present biasness.   
4.6.2 Limitations and Future Steps 
We have focused on growth options. Growth options are call-like options that 
are strategic in nature. Our analysis might apply to other operational call-like options 
such as options to defer investment, scale and switch use, but understanding the exact 
effects of present bias warrants further investigation. Time-inconsistent preferences may 
also impact put-like real options such as abandonment option. For abandonment 
options, the effects of present bias on exercise timing might be different from growth 
options because abandonment options are geared towards loss minimization in the 
project instead of profit maximization. Also, the effects may vary depending on the 
salvage value of the project, ability to put the project to another use and timing of 
payoffs from this switch in use. 
Analyzing the effects of present-bias on these options will give useful insights. It also 
might explain problems like escalation of commitment in IT projects. Also, we used a 
discrete time valuation model. Comparison among different real option valuation 
methods can provide better understanding of the effects of present-bias on option 
exercise time and realized value.  
We have focused on one project with one embedded growth option. Real options 
may appear in compound form in IT infrastructure projects (Bradhan et al., 2004; 
Benaroch et al., 2006b), where exercise decision of one real option may lead to enabling 
further real options in the project. For example, exercising a growth option on an 
internet platform by a utility firm may enable electronic application and billing for 
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customers. Analytical exploration of the impact of present-bias in such compound 
options where sequential interdependency exists will give insights into the long term 
impacts of such decisions, in terms of timing and realized value. Also, we focused on 
in-house IT infrastructures. Future studies can analytically explore the impact of 
present-bias effects on options underlying outsourced IT infrastructures with embedded 
real option. 
CHAPTER 5: STUDY 3 – EFFECTS OF TIME-INCONSISTENT PREFERENCES 
ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS WITH ABANDONMENT 
OPTIONS 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Escalation of commitment to a failing course of action is studied in great detail 
in IS literature (Keil et al., 1995; Keil and Monte, 2000). In this stream of research, IS 
managers are shown to get vested in the bad performing projects while keeping on 
investing resources into them instead of terminating them. Several factors have been 
identified that lead to escalation of commitment such as, sunk cost effect, project 
completion effect, presence and absence of alternate courses of action etc. (Keil et al., 
1995). If we look at the phenomenon of escalation of commitment in failing projects 
from the real option’s perspective, it may be failing to exercise the option to abandon in 
an IS project that may or may not have been identified before committing to the project. 
Along with escalation of commitment, real option to abandon has also been studied as a 
management practice in IS project management, with the factors leading up to 
abandonment (Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnuski, 1991), and the perceived repercussions 
of this practice. 
One school of thought explains that the presence of flexibility in abandonment 
option exercise time in projects leads to delay in their exercise (Adner and Levinthal, 
2004), hence leading to escalation of commitment. Another school of thought argues 
that the flexibility in exercise time increases the abandonment option value.  In the 
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presence of option to abandon in a project with less flexibility in exercising time, 
managers may use it as an excuse to decide on terminating a project earlier than it 
should be, and using the real option in justifying their action (Zardkoohi, 2004). The 
value of a real option is time sensitive, where it’s realized value depends on the time of 
its exercise (Dos Santos, 1991; Kumar, 1999). These schools of thought are implying 
that the realized value of an option to abandon is affected by its exercise time. Also, 
these findings cannot be generalized as IT projects are heterogeneous in terms of scale, 
size, strategic importance etc., and the impact of flexibility might vary among these 
factors. We focus on the abandonment options with flexibility in exercise time and see 
how time inconsistent preferences impact their exercise time and realized value. 
As described in Chapter 4, we find evidence in IS literature that managers may 
not be rational in their decision making (Tiwana et al., 2006).We examine the 
implications of IT managers being bounded rational agents with time-inconsistent 
preferences, who apply real options thinking in managing options to abandon. We 
examine the relationship between managerial bias and time of abandoning IT projects. 
We focus on option to abandon whose value depends on the option exercise time (Dos 
Santos, 1991; Kumar, 1996, 2002) and the realization of option value depends on its 
optimal exercise. Based on the economic literature which suggests that people could 
have a bias for the present (Thaler, 1981; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992), we argue that 
this, in turn, could affect IT projects’ abandonment decisions. We explore the effects of 
time-inconsistent preferences on IT option to abandon exercise time and its realized 
value. 
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The following section motivates this study. Subsequently, a model of time-
inconsistent preferences for option to abandon projects with two exercise periods is 
presented along with a numerical example and sensitivity analysis. We also present a 
model of time-inconsistent preferences for option to abandon projects with decreasing 
salvage value over time. Finally, we discuss the similarities and differences between the 
impacts of time-inconsistent preferences on real options of different type. 
5.2 Incentivizing  Real Abandonment Option in IT 
An IS project can have an embedded option to abandon, where it can be 
terminated before its completion. For example, IT application that have lost its value for 
the organization (Weil and Vitale, 1999), lease contracts that have lost value, 
technological changes making the current project outdated etc. Abandonment option 
value comes from its ability to minimize losses by preventing further investment in a 
nonproductive project, once exercised. Option to abandon is like a financial put 
option23, where the goal is to minimize losses instead of maximizing payoffs. It works 
like insurance on the project for downside protection. An option to abandon a project is 
like an American put option that can be exercised anytime during the life of the project 
before its completion in exchange for the salvage value of the project or value in its best 
alternative use. Also, it may be optimal to exercise an option to abandon early, if the 
option is sufficiently deep in the money and continuing the project would incur further 
losses or alternate use of resources would generate profits etc.  
Technically every project has an option to abandon. Based on project reviews, if 
conditions are unfavorable, the project can be terminated before completion. In practice, 
                                                 
23 A put option gives its buyer a right to sell the underlying asset at a pre-determined price. Hence it 
covers the underlying asset position against unfavorable fluctuations in its value (Benaroch, 2002).  
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it is not feasible to abandon every project, due to several reasons. For example, 
contractual agreements not allowing terminating projects, political implications, 
temporary economic conditions, strategic importance of the project, maximum upfront 
resource allocation, etc. Under these circumstances, it is hard to argue a case for 
abandoning a project mid-way, solely based on performance. 
In IS literature, abandonment option is sometimes associated with a switch-use 
option (Benaroch, 2002; Tiwana et al., 2006, 2007), where abandonment options 
become more valuable if the resources from the abandoned project can be salvaged by 
putting to another use e.g., using website for internal organizational communication 
when it was originally intended for e-commerce.  Such an action is also known as 
substantial abandonment (Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnyski, 1991), where a project is 
made radically different from the original specification before its implementation and 
the value is generated by minimizing losses on the overall investment through reducing 
resource waste and redirecting resources to generate some benefit. This is possible for 
projects when, most of the costs are not incurred upfront, project is not bound by 
contracts (and can be terminated before completion), the resources are usable 
somewhere else (also known as high interaction effects), and when competitors’ 
reactions are strong to the project (Kim and Sandars 2002). In either complete 
abandonment or switch use case, the objective is to control the damages, by exercising 
the option on time. 
Similar to a standard option, an option to abandon has two stages, i.e. 
commitment stage and option exercise stage (Hull, 2008). At the commitment stage, 
value of the asset underlying the option is evaluated based on the payoffs from the 
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exercise decision, and costs involved in exercising the option. For example, investment 
in a new and risky software project has an option of terminating it if the project loses its 
value before completion. In this case, the option to abandon is the opportunity for 
minimizing losses by not investing in the project further, and putting the project to 
another use to generate alternate stream of income or selling the partially complete 
project for some amount. In valuing an option to abandon, the costs at the commitment 
stage include the cost of starting up the project, adjusted for the hedge option to 
abandon the project provides.  At the option exercise stage, the costs involved in 
terminating the project before completion is the exercise price, e.g., given up payoffs 
from continuing the project. The benefits from terminating the project prematurely 
resulting into savings, alternate stream of income via putting project resources to 
another use or selling the partially complete project for some amount, are the payoffs 
from exercising the option. We refer to them as the project’s salvage value.  
For real assets like a manufacturing plant, it is relatively easy to exercise the 
option to abandon if the project is deep in the money because the salvage value of the 
asset is deterministic. In case of IS, exercising option to abandon is not as simple. One 
of the reasons is that IS projects seldom have substantial positive salvage value (Ewusi-
Mensah and Przasnuski, 1991), especially when project has not progressed much. Under 
these circumstances, the value of the option to abandon increases if there is a possibility 
of switching use of the resources (Keil et al., 1995).  
To realize the value of an option to abandon, managers must decide whether to 
go for terminating the project prematurely or not, given the project’s progress. This is 
known as exercising decision. The exercise decision of an option to abandon a project is 
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made based on the current project progress, potential future payoffs if project is not 
terminated, salvage value of the project if the project is terminated before the expiration 
of the option. Hence the option exercise stage is contingent to the commitment stage 
(Dos Santos, 1991; Kumar, 1996, 2002), and realized option value depends on the 
exercise decision and time of exercise. 
Empirical evidence shows that option to abandon is least valued by the 
managers in terms of valuation as well as exercising (Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnuski, 
1991; Tiwana et al., 2006), hence leading them either not to commit to projects with 
such options or not exercising the option even when it is appropriate to do so (Busby 
and Pitts, 1997; Miller and Shapira, 2004; Tiwana et al., 2006). Several reasons for this 
behavior have been identified, including political implications of cancellation of the 
project, personal reputation of managers, negative impact on staff morale, etc. (Ewusi-
Mensah and Przasnuski, 1991; Keil et al., 2000). 
As discussed before, in the IT real options framework, it is assumed that 
managers exercise real options on time. However, this may not be true in practice. 
Suppose a manger initially plans to exercise an option to abandon project at a specific 
future time based on pre-determined criteria. Theoretically, the option exercise decision 
will be made at the pre-determined time if the criteria are met. However, cases of IS 
projects where exercising the option to abandon was difficult have been reported in the 
literature. It included Denver’s International Airport baggage system (Keil and 
Montealegre, 2000) and London’s Taurus stock exchange project (Drummond, 1996). 
In these cases, the size and scale of the project have been shown to play a major role in 
the difficulty in exercising option to abandon along with other factors like managers’ 
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reputation, the political ramifications of abandoning, and the possible effect of 
abandonment on staff morale (Keil, Mann, and Rai, 2000). We argue that such actions 
of IT managers can possibly be attributed to their time inconsistent preferences. 
5.3 Valuing Option to Abandon 
For this study, we assume a simple IT project scenario, with some startup cost, 
and periodic operational costs over time. The benefits from the project can only be 
realized once all the initial estimated costs are incurred. To value option to abandon, we 
use a binomial option valuation method (Cox et al., 1979) due to its simplicity, its 
requirements for estimating fewer parameters, easy application to a single real option 
case, and its previous successful implementation in IT investments (Kambil et al., 1993; 
Benaroch, 2002; Dai et al., 2007). Although MIS literature focuses more on call options 
with its successful implementation in IT investments (Kambil et al., 1993; Benaroch, 
2002; Dai et al., 2007), we extend the same reasoning for the use of this approach for 
valuing option to abandon, while making some necessary modifications. 
The binomial option valuation method assumes that the underlying asset value 
follows a binomial multiplicative diffusion process. For a project with one period to 
exercise the option, starting at time t1 = 1, the future payoffs value from the project may 
rise by factor u with probability p or fall by factor d with probability 1-p, by the 
exercise decision time t2 = t1+ ∆. Hence, at the option exercise decision time in t2, the 
expected value of the option payoffs will have only two possible variations. The IT 
manager will take into account these movements of the future payoffs from the project 
to evaluate the project’s full value. The value of the real option, V, is calculated via 
backward induction by: 
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F = [)	,¦]
		[),¦]   for   n=1    (5.1) 
where 
u=√∆(expected upward movement in future benefits), 
d=1/u (expected downward movement in future benefits), d < r < u 
r= risk free rate, 
T = project life (option expiration time), 
 = uncertainty around future payoffs, 
p=

; subjective probability of the event, 
b= present value of the future benefits from the ongoing project, and 
s= salvage value of the project (may include present value of the implementation/ operating  
costs of the project, benefits from switching use of the invested resources, benefits from the 
partial implementation of the project, and selling price of the project equipment).  
 
For an abandonment option with n periods until maturity, option value depends 
on the same parameters and is more complex. As long as option value is greater than 
zero, the project value with an option to abandon will be greater than the project value 
without an option to abandon. Also, since real option value is proportional to the 
underlying uncertainty around future benefits, value of a project with uncertainty will 
be higher once the embedded real option is taken into account. Hence, the project value 
with an option to abandon will be greater than the project value without an option to 
abandon, when > 0, which is in-line with the findings in IS literature (Dos Santos, 
1991, Kumar, 1996, Benaroch, 2002).  We also assume∆ = ./d = 1.  
5.3.1 Salvage Value 
In IT projects, salvage value varies in terms of amount, certainty and time of 
realization. Some projects have tangible salvage value like network infrastructure 
projects, where salvage value can be realized after they are sold. But some projects do 
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not have substantial and certain salvage value e.g. customized online billing system. 
Salvage value may also be a function of time, where it may increase (for example 
projects for which additional features can added in the future, hence increasing its 
value), decrease (for example hardware value depreciates over time due to rapid 
technological changes), or stay constant as a project progresses. In any case, the salvage 
value of the project as well as the uncertainty around the salvage value play an 
important role in determining the value at the option exercise time. The source of 
salvage value in an IT project may be from value generated by switching the use of 
resources, partial implementation of the project, savings on future operating costs, or 
present value of selling price of resources. Hence, salvage value from these sources can 
either be stochastic or deterministic. Some examples are given in Table 5.1. For each 
case, in Table 5.1, the salvage value or “exercise price” of option to abandon, will differ 
which will affect the abandonment option value at the exercise time. Under these 
circumstances, the option exercise decision for a naïve manager will be different, due to 
the value certainty of the salvage value of the project. To account for the dependency of 
salvage value on time, we assume salvage value “s” as a function of time and certainty: 
m = 	§ " 	¨ # 1 " ©      (5.2) 
where 
m = salvage value of the project in period . 
§ = base/initial salvage value of the project. 
¨ = rate of change in salvage value. For ¨=0, salvage value of the project is constant 
over time. For ¨< 0, salvage value of the project decreases over time. For ¨> 0, salvage 
value of the project increases over time.  
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t = time period at which salvage value is calculated. We consider t=1 as the 
commitment stage, and option cannot be exercised at the commitment stage. Hence 
salvage value at t=1 is not applicable and first salvage value is calculated at t=2. 
© = a random variable with expected value of zero and known distribution, to account 
for salvage value certainty. 
 
 
Table 5.1: Value Orientation of Salvage Value sources in an IT Project 
 Value Certainty Example Salvage Value Source 
1 Deterministic Savings on future operating costs, selling price of 
project/resources, Payoffs from partial implementation of 
project, switch use of resources 
2 Stochastic Selling price of project/ resources, , Payoffs from partial 
implementation of project, Switch use of resources 
 
 
 
For simplicity and we consider an IT project with deterministic salvage value, 
i.e., © = 0. Further we first analyze constant salvage value case (¨ = 0), and then 
analyze decreasing salvage value case over time (¨  0. We consider these two cases 
because they are more common in IT projects. It is unlikely that an IT project’s salvage 
value will be increasing over time. We further make the following assumptions: 
• Salvage value (s) from exercising the option exceed the exercise cost (db), i.e. 
m  N« at t=2.  This assumption will ensure that the option is deep in the money 
at t=2, and lN«  m  N« at t=3. 
• u is greater than the risk free rate r and d is less than risk free rate r,  i.e. d<r<u.  
• Risk free rate, future payoffs, option exercise cost, and uncertainty around future 
payoffs are given and constant. 
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5.3.2 Example of Option to Abandon 
As a high risk24 project progresses and the uncertainty does not resolves in favor 
of its continuation, IT managers may have an option to abandon the project before its 
completion for downside protection. If the future payoffs seem to suffer a sustainable 
decline, management can forego the future payoffs “b” in exchange for the project’s 
salvage value “s” in the form of selling off the hardware, putting the resources’ in best 
alternative use (utilizing capital and human resources for other productive purpose), or 
saving costs by not investing in the project any further. For the option with maturity 
T=3, the decision problem of the IT manager at t=1 is shown in Figure 5.1.  
Let F, be the value of the option determined in period i if it is exercised in 
period	. For example, F, is the value a manager has for the option in period 1 if the 
option is exercised in period 2. At t=1, with parameters s= $320,000, b= $375,000, 
r=5%,  = 30%, and n = 2, the abandonment option is valued at25 
F,k = [),¦]
[),¦]
[),
¦]  = $25,108. Hence the 
option to abandon has a positive value. If at t=2, the project progresses well with 
ub=$506,197, there is no reason to abandon the project as its prospects look promising 
(Max (0, s-ub) = 0). However, if at t=2, the project does not progress well with db= 
$277,807, the project performance is lower than what can be salvaged s=$320,000 (Max 
(0,s-db) = Max (0,$320,000-$277,807)= $42,193). At t=2, the IT managers’ decision 
problem is to decide between savings of $42,193, or waiting to abandon the project at 
                                                 
24
 We refer to the uncertain outcomes from the project as high risk 
25F,k = [),¦]
[),¦]
[),
¦] =
	).p¬[),k)))))+­)p]
).p¬).+[),k))))kx+)))]
).+[),k))))t­k)))].)+  = $25,108 
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t= 3 with26 F,k = [),¦]
[),¦] = $13,271.2, if the project does 
not recover. Therefore, with the poor performance of project at t=2, and s-db>0, it is 
better to terminate the project now than later to minimize the losses. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Abandonment Option Decision Problem 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Time Preferences and Option to Abandon Project 
Literature on time-preferences makes a distinction of cases studied for time 
preferences, based on the time orientation of costs (c) and benefits (¯) involved, while 
conceptualizing intertemporal utility of the decision makers (O'Donoghue and Rabin, 
1999b, Brocas and Carrillo, 2001). The two main cases studied the most are: 
                                                 
26F,k = [),¦]
[),¦] = 	 ).p¬
[),k)))))+­)p]
).p¬).+[),k))))kx+)))]
.)+  
= $13,271.20 
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 (V) 
Max(0, s-db) 
 
Max(0, s-ub) 
Max(0, s-u2b) 
Max(0, s-d2b) 
Max(0, s-dub) 
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a) Immediate cost, future rewards case, with intertemporal utility of	b¯ # j.  
b) Immediate rewards, future cost case, with intertemporal utility of	¯ # bj.  
The case of option to abandon can be classified as both, based on the characteristics of 
the salvage value. At a given exercise decision time t, an IT manager has to evaluate the 
decision based on the benefits from exercising the option i.e. the salvage value of the 
project “s”, and the cost involved in realizing the benefits i.e. given up future benefits 
from continuing the project “b”. We assume the constant salvage value case with ¨=0 
is an immediate reward and future cost case, whereas decreasing salvage value case 
with ¨<0 is an immediate cost and future reward case. In the constant salvage value 
case, we assume the salvage value is realized immediately by selling the project or its 
resources, in return for giving up the project and its future payoffs. Hence the salvage 
value of the project is the immediate reward and the project’s future payoffs are the 
future costs. In the decreasing salvage value case, the source of the salvage value of the 
project is assumed to be the payoffs from switching the project’s use, in return for 
giving up the current project and its future payoffs. Switching the project’s use involves 
time and costs before it starts to payoff. Therefore, the salvage value of the project is the 
future reward and the project’s future payoffs are the immediate costs. We will use this 
decision to build our decision problems and solving them.  
Irrespective of the nature of salvage value of the project. An IT manager 
commits to a risky project and obtains the embedded option to abandon at time t=1 with 
the possible termination of the project in mind, i.e. by exercising the option to abandon 
if the condition s-db>0 holds at time t = 2 (as demonstrated in the example above). At 
time t=2, he will choose to exercise the option if s-db>0. At the commitment stage 
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(t=1), b will be equal to 1 for TC managers27 as well as for naïve managers28 (naïves). 
Although naïves have a tendency of choosing present utility over future utility (with b< 
1), they are unaware of their bias and think they will act in a time-consistent manner. 
Present-bias comes into play only when the rewards come near in the future 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999a, Caillaud and Jullien, 2000, Della Vinga and 
Malmendier, 2004). Hence both types of managers will value the project equally. This 
correct evaluation for the project at the commitment stage by naïves also holds if the 
option to abandon has more than one exercise time period. 
Proposition 1: An IT manager with time-consistent (TC) preferences and an IT 
manager with time-inconsistent preferences (naïve) will value an IT project with 
embedded option to abandon equally and more than an IT project without an option to 
abandon. 
 
Once committed to the project, the manager will decide about option exercise in 
the next period based on the evaluation of future payoffs at that time against the 
exercise price of the option. For an option to abandon with one time period to expire i.e. 
n=1 at t=T=2, the manager has to decide at t=2 whether to exercise the option or let it 
expire. At t=2, b will be equal to 1 for TC managers as well as the naïfs because the 
payoff is immediate.  
Proposition 2: IT managers (both TC and naïf) will exercise the option to abandon with 
one time period to expiration optimally. 
 
                                                 
27 These managers awareness about their self-control (b) and their actual self control (b	is equal to 1. 
Hence they do not have a bias for present. 
28 These managers awareness about their self-control (b) mismatches their actual self-control (b such 
that b  b  =1. Hence they have a bias for present but they believe that they don’t. 
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5.4.1 Two Time Period Model 
Typically there is more than one opportunity to exercise an option. We depict 
this real option exercise decision for two points in time in Figure 5.2, where IT manager 
decides after evaluating his/her utility at each stage. Figure 5.2 describes the necessary 
parameters that determine the utility from exercising an option to abandon. 
 
 
     
1 
Real option commitment decision 
where utility is a function of real 
option value Ut (V), which is a 
function of initial costs, future 
payoffs, salvage value of the project, 
uncertainty around payoffs, risk free 
rate and optimal time to option 
expiration. 
U1 = V = g (c, b, m, t*, , K) 
2 
Real option exercise decision at 
t=2, where utility is equal to the 
intrinsic value of the option, and is 
a function of future payoffs, 
salvage value of the project, 
uncertainty around payoffs, risk 
free rate and time to option 
expiration. 
U2 = g( b, m, t1, , K) 
     3 
Real option exercise decision at t=3, 
where utility is equal to the optimal 
value of the option, and is a function 
of future payoffs, salvage value of 
the project, uncertainty around 
payoffs, risk free rate and time to 
option expiration. 
U3 = g( b, m, t2, , K) 
Figure 5.2: Timeline for real abandonment option with two time periods until expiration 
 
 
 
At the commitment stage, t=1, both TC and naïve will commit to the project as 
per Proposition 1 as long as project value is positive. Once committed to the project 
with option to abandon, the exercise decision will be based on how the project performs 
overtime.  For an option to abandon project with expiration time of two periods (T=3), 
the manager has to decide at t=2 whether to exercise the option today or wait until 
maturity t=T=3.  
Real abandonment options often do not have a fixed exercise time, and can be 
exercised any time before expiration. For example, decisions such as terminating a 
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poorly performing project can and must be made any time until a cutoff date. Therefore, 
viewing an option to abandon as an American put option helps in capturing the option 
exercise flexibility.  A key property of an American put option is that, for an option 
with n periods, it might be optimal to exercise it any time before expiration, as long as 
the option is sufficiently deep in the money (Cox et al., 1979, Hull, 2008). For example, 
for a project performing poorer than the targeted performance at t=2, it might be better 
to terminate it and realize the salvage value. We utilize this property and assume that an 
option to abandon is an American style put option, that is sufficiently deep in the money 
at t=2, with salvage value greater than future payoffs if the project performed bad. This 
makes it optimal to exercise the option before the expiration date i.e. t*=2 for a two 
period growth option (i.e. n=2).The real option value at the project commitment stage to 
be exercised at t=2 is: 
V1,2=
[),¦]
[),¦]
       (5.3) 
And the real option value at the project commitment stage to be exercised at t=3 is: 
V1,3= 
),¦
[),¦]),(¦,
   (5.4) 
As long as r is positive, F,will always be positive for any t, if s > d2b. Practically there 
is no situation in IT investments where the discount rate is non-positive, hence we will 
not consider that case. 
Bias for present comes into play when the rewards come near in the future 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999a, Caillaud and Jullien, 2000, Della Vinga and 
Malmendier, 2004) and per Proposition 1, both types of managers will value this risky 
project and abandonment option equally.  
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Proposition 3: IT managers (both TC and naïve) will place the same value on an IT 
project with option to abandon with two time periods to expiration. 
 
Proposition 3 will hold if the option to abandon has more than one exercise time period. 
5.4.2 Case 1: Deterministic Constant Salvage Value in Time 
With ¨ = 0, salvage value “m” of the project at any time would be a constant 
“§” according to equation (5.2). This assumption implies that the salvage value of the 
project will not change overtime, and it can be realized as soon as the project is 
terminated. As m = §, we dropped the subscript from m. At the first decision point t=2, 
when the project does not perform well, the manager can exercise the option and realize 
salvage value by giving up future benefits from the project, or wait until t=3.  The 
decision problem at t=2 for a manager will be: 
Max(V2,2, V2,3)  (5.5) 
where: 
V2,2 = (1 # Ym # N«,   (5.6) 
and  
V2,3= 
),¦
[),¦]
   (5.7) 
 
In equation (5.7), the term bm # lN« will be negative, because lN« = «  and m  «. 
This condition implies that if the project recovers in t=3, it is worth continuing it. With 
the salvage value of the project at t=2 less than or equal to its average performance i.e., 
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m  lN«, the term ¢uX[0, bm # lN«] will be zero for all values of b. This will 
reduce equation (5.7) to: 
V2,3= 
),¦
    (5.8) 
An IT manager’s decision problem at t=2 is based on the output of the decision function 
¢uX[F,, F,k	]. If the project is deep in the money at t=2, this will render F,k to 
equation (5.8). We can show that: 
(1 # Ym # N«,  °±R),¦ 	;	or  
(m # N«,  ),¦                          (5.9) 
Thus, F, 	F,k	 will hold for any value of b. This outcome indicates that if the IT 
project is deep in the money at t=2, managers will always exercise the abandonment 
option immediately to realize the salvage value. In this case, the present biased 
preferences of the managers do not impact their decision.  
Proposition 4: If the salvage value of a project is immediate and non-increasing, the IT 
manager will exercise the abandonment option at t=2, irrespective of their time 
preferences. 
 
With immediate salvage value, the manager will only wait until t=3 to exercise 
the option to abandon if the salvage value is increasing overtime, or if ¨  0. This will 
result in m,  m,k. Some value of ¨ will result in F, 	F,k indicating that higher 
option value can be realized if the abandonment option is exercised in t=3.The 
increasing salvage value which will cause the IT manager to wait until t=3: 
(m # N«,  ),¦¤  ; or 
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§ " 	¨ # N«  ),³
	´   (5.10) 
Given the condition in equation (5.10), a TC manager with b = 1, will always wait to 
terminate the project. Interestingly, in this case, the naïve manager might terminate the 
project prematurely, because on one hand, increase in ¨ will result in F, 	F,k. And 
at the same time, a lower b of a naïve manager would discount the net salvage value for 
t=3. Under these circumstances, there will be a critical beta (b̅), which will discount the 
net salvage value enough such that F, =	F,k. However, in the case of IT projects, the 
salvage value seldom increases overtime. Therefore we did not solve for b̅ in this case. 
5.4.3 Case 2: Deterministic and Decreasing Salvage Value in Time 
As an IT project progresses, it becomes more customized. With increasing 
customization, the project’s ability to be put to another use decreases and switching 
costs increase as well. We account for this property in equation (3) with φ < 0, which 
will result in m>m
. This will change our original assumption as follows: 
• Salvage value “m” is decreasing over time due to ¨ < 0 in m = 	§ " 	¨. This 
will result in m  mk. 
• Salvage value (s) from exercising the option at t=2 exceed the exercise cost 
(db), i.e. m>db.  This assumption will ensure that the option at t=2 is deep in 
the money, and at t=3, mk  N«.  
• Salvage value	mk  Nl«.  This implies that if the project performed on average 
at t=3, after recovering for a bad performance in t=2, it is better to continue it 
instead of terminating it. We use this assumption because due to high 
uncertainty and qualitative goals in terms of project payoffs for most IT projects, 
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it is more realistic to continue an average performing project after investing in it 
than terminating it. 
At the first decision point t=2, when the project does not perform well, the 
manager can exercise the option and realize salvage value m by giving up future 
benefits from the project, or wait until t=3 to realize mk by abandoning the project. As 
described before, switch-use case is an immediate cost and future payoff case. With 
switching use of project as a source of a salvage value, it usually takes at least one 
period to materialize it, hence making the orientation of the salvage value towards 
future and making m subject to discounting. The decision problem at t=2 for a naïve 
manager will be similar to equation (5.5) : Max(V2,2, V2,3)  
where: 
V2,2 = (1 # Ybm # N«, = (1 # Yb§ " 	¨ # N«,  (5.11) 
and  
V2,3=
°±R[),¦¤]
°±R),¦¤
   
=  
°±R[),³
	´]
),³
	´
   (5.12) 
In equation (5.11), the value from switching the project’s use, if exercised at 
t=2, will be discounted due to its future orientation. In equation (5.12), the value from 
switching the project’s use, if exercised at t=3, will be discounted for the same reason, 
along with payoffs from continuing the project.  
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In equation (5.11), with the assumption m>db, the term bm # N« will be 
either positive or negative, depending on the value of b. For b µ 1, the condition 
bm  N« will hold on the discounted salvage value. For	b µ 0, the term bm # N« 
will become negative. So for some value of b, the term bm # N« will become 
negative, hence making V2,2 negative. 
In equation (5.12), with the assumption Nl« ¥ mk  N«, the term 
¢uX[0, bmk # Nl«] will be zero for 0 b  1. So we take it out of the equation 
(5.12), making it look like as follows: 
V2,3=
°±R),¦¤
  =  
),³
	´
   (5.13) 
In equation (5.13), the term ¢uX[0, bmk # N«] will be positive for any value of b. 
This will make V2,3 positive for any value of b.  
A TC manager with b = 1, will evaluate the decision function Max (V2,2, V2,3), 
and will decide based on the output. The assumptions discussed above will result in: 
• Positive V2,2, because the condition bm  N« will hold on the discounted 
salvage value in equation (5.11). 
• Positive V2,3 , because the term  ¢uX[0, bmk # N«] in will be positive for 
any value of b in equation (5.12) 
• V2,2 > V2,3, because of m>db, φ< 0, and d<r<u.  
The difference between V2,2 and  V2,3 will be the cost of waiting and will be: 
V2,3 -V2,2 = # QQQ¦
´
Q¦
´
Q
¦

´
Q  (5.14) 
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Based on equation (5.14), the decision of a TC manager would be to terminate the 
project at t=2.  
A naïve manager with b< 1, will exhibit present-bias for project future payoffs, 
and salvage values at different time periods. As for some value of b  1, the term 
bm # N« in equation (5.11) will become negative, it will make V2,2  negative as a 
result. A negative V2,2  implies that it will seem less attractive to IT manager to 
terminate the project at t=2. As V2,3 is positive for  any value of β, a naïve manager will 
see V2,2=V2,3 for a specific value of b leading him to delay the termination decision. We 
call this value of		b, critical	b	b̅).  
Proposition 5: There is a  b̅ = 
Q
Q¦
´
Q¤
¦

´
Q¦
´, such 
that for IT projects with  abandonment option with two exercise periods and decreasing 
salvage value: 
• If b  b̅ the manager will not exercise the option optimally in period 2. 
• If b  b̅ the manager will exercise the option optimally in period 2. 
 
As Proposition 5 shows,  b̅ is a function of b, s, r,	¨, and σ. A naïve IT manager 
with a self-control parameter less than or equal to b̅ will delay exercising the 
abandonment option at t=3 and realize the salvage value later than not waiting until t=3 
to exercise the option and realize its optimal value. 
To illustrate the effect of present-bias we use an example with the parameters 
shown in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2: Parameter values for option to abandon 
Parameters Values b̅ F, F,k (for b = 1 
b $375,000 
0.91 $ 72,277 $ 60,537.90 
m $350,000 
σ 0.7 
r 1.05 
¨ - $50,000 
 
 
 
In this case, V2,2 is greater than V2,3, at the first decision point t=2. For naïve IT 
manager, with  b̅ less than or equal to 0.91, he will not exercise the option at t=2, and 
instead will wait. The lost value due to waiting to exercise is $ 11,739.10. We 
conducted some numerical sensitivity analysis using the example to explore the 
relationship between b̅ and the option parameters. 
The sensitivity of V2,2 and V2,3 to volatility  is given in Figure 5.3. For a given 
set of parameter values, increase in volatility first has little effect on the option value 
until  reaches 0.1.  Above  of 0.1, increase in volatility tends to increase option value, 
also known as the volatility smile (Hull, 2008). This holds for both values of option to 
abandon i.e. V2,2 as well as V2,3. For very low values of volatility, V2,2 is positive, but 
V2,3 is negative. This means if the project is deep in the money and its future is certain, 
then it is better to terminate it immediately. As volatility increases both the option 
values increase, and for high values of volatility V2,2 is greater than V2,3. This trend 
implies that as uncertainty increases about the project, abandonment option’s value 
increases, and if the option is deep in the money at the beginning of the project, it is 
better to terminate it instead of waiting for one more period. 
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Figure 5.3: Sensitivity of Option Values to the Volatility 
 
 
 
The sensitivity trend of option value and critical beta to volatility  is given in 
Figure 5.4. b in this case is impacting V2,2  along with V2,3, hence in this case, multiple 
parameters are impacted by time preferences. Figure 5.4 shows b̅ as a function of	, 
where b̅ is a decreasing function of	. For very low volatility, b̅ is very high, and as the 
volatility increases, b̅ decreases. The rate of decline in b̅ is higher for low values of 
volatility, as compared to the higher values of volatility. There exists a range of 
volatility	0    0.28, where b̅ is greater than 1. In the same volatility range, V2,2  and 
V2,3  are negative, indicating that option does not have a positive value at t=2. As value 
for b̅ cannot exceed 1, we believe the reason for this outcome is the negative option 
value for very low uncertainty for our selection of parameters. When there is no 
abandonment option to exercise, IT managers will not take any action. 
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Figure 5.4: Sensitivity of Critical β and Option Values to the Volatility 
 
 
For > 0.28, V2,2  becomes greater than V2,3 indicating the project being deep in 
the money at t=2. With increasing volatility, difference between V2,2  and V2,3  also 
increases. For the same volatility values, b̅ is decreasing, indicating that managers are 
less likely to delay exercising the option because of the uncertainty. With increasing 
volatility, option value increases, and managers will likely to exercise it at t=2, to 
realize the option value. Higher uncertainty also decreases their confidence in project 
recovering in the future, leading them not delaying the termination of the project. The 
first derivative of b̅ with respect to volatility (by setting r=1 for simplified form) shows 
the same trend: 

 = Q
¦
Q´
·¸¹º[]

Q¦
´Q´ ; indicating the inverse relationship, and 
similar to case 1. The numerator in this case is negative due to high negative value of ¨, 
resulting into the declining trend.  
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The sensitivity trend was similar for risk free rate r is shown in Figure 5.5. We 
believe the same explanation hold true here as in the first case. Again, for a given set of 
parameter values, the b̅ in salvage value through switch-use case is lower than constant 
salvage value case. It is due to the impact of b on multiple parameters thus impacting 
V2,2 along with V2,3. The derivative of b̅ with respect to risk free rate is  =
	# Q
Q
Q¦
´
Q¦
´
Q¤
¦

´
Q¦
´, showing the relationships 
similar to case 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
We explore the sensitivity of b̅ to values of future payoffs b in Figure 5.6 which 
shows that b̅ is increasing in b.  For higher values of payoffs from not exercising the 
abandonment option, IT managers are less likely to exercise it early. As future payoffs 
Figure 5.5: Sensitivity of Critical β to the Risk free discount 
rate 
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increase, the option to abandon value will decrease and it is more attractive to wait for 
the high payoffs. Hence for extremely high payoffs, option to abandon loses its value 
significantly and therefore b̅ keeps increasing for those values. The derivative of b̅ with 
respect to « (by setting r=1 for simplified form) is  = Q

Q¦
´Q´

Q¦
´Q´ , showing a 
non-linear positive relationship for «. 
 
 
 
 
Increase in salvage value of the project increases the option to abandon value, 
ceteris paribus. The relationship of real abandonment option value, in this case, is no 
different. The sensitivity of b̅	to base salvage value “s” is shown in Figure 5.7. The 
figure shows that b̅ decreases with increasing value of m. Relationship of b̅ with m 
implies that for higher values of base salvage value through switching use of project, 
present-bias is less likely to cause early exercise. As salvage value increases, option to 
abandon value will increase, which makes it more attractive to terminate the project 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
$0 $100,000 $200,000 $300,000 $400,000
C
ri
ti
ca
l 
B
et
a
Future payoffs
Wait till t=3 
Terminate at t=2 
Figure 5.6: Sensitivity of Critical β to the Payoffs 
210 
 
 
 
early once it has performed badly, since waiting is of little additional value. The 
derivative of b̅ with respect to m (by setting r=1 for simplified form) is ¦ =
# Q
Q
Q¦
»Q», showing a non-linear positive relationship for m. 
 
 
 
 
The difference in this relationship comes from the varying value of “¨”. As 
shown in Figure 5.8, b̅ increases with the decrease in ¨, indicating as the difference 
between the payoffs from switching use of the project resources increases, the 
likelihood of delaying the decision of switching use decreases. This is indicated by 
increasing value of b̅ with decreasing	¨. Hence, IT managers are less likely to delay the 
decision of switching use of project, if the payoffs from switching use decline at an 
increasing rate over the period of time. The derivative of b̅ with respect to ¨ (by setting 
r=1 for simplified form) is 

´ =	 Q

Q

Q¦
´Q´, showing a non-liner positive 
relationship for ¨.  
Figure 5.7: Sensitivity of Critical β to the Base Salvage Value s 
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Figure 5.8: Sensitivity of Critical β to the Decrease in Salvage Value φ 
 
 
 
We changed the 	mk  Nl« assumption on salvage value to 	mk  Nl«, 
indicating the chances of salvage value t=3  be greater than the average performance of 
the project. In this case, the solutions held for b µ 1 and b µ 0 cases. However, the 
critical beta with same set of parameters was lower for this case:  b̅ = 0.75. This is 
because with the assumption 	mk  Nl«, the term ¢uX[0, bmk # Nl«] in equation 
(5.9), will not be zero for b µ 1 as well as b µ 0. So the term stayed in the equation 
(5.9). Due to this change, closed form solution for critical beta changed to b̅ =


Q
¦

´. We had a higher threshold beta for the case with 	mk  Nl«, i.e. 
b̅ = 0.91. Comparing the two cases for critical beta, the case of higher threshold beta 
will hold because higher threshold beta means more sensitivity of exercise decision to 
the time inconsistent preferences.  
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5.5 Discussion 
Option to abandon facilitates the justification and management of risky projects 
because they provide downside protection in case the project does not perform well. To 
better manage such projects, it is important to make optimal exercise decisions for 
option to abandon embedded in them. By optimally exercising the option to abandon, 
the project value can be salvaged in the form of savings on the project or by putting the 
resources to another use. There is a chance of suboptimal exercise decisions motivated 
by a manager’s desire to delay realizing the costs associated with project abandonment. 
This suboptimal exercise may even lead to the whole project being unsuccessful, over 
time and over budget. We find these occurrences in the literature. For example, 
Denver’s International Airport baggage system (Keil and Montealegre, 2000) and 
London’s Taurus stock exchange project (Drummond, 1996). In these cases, the size 
and scale of the project, managers’ reputation, the political ramifications of abandoning, 
and the possible effect of abandonment on staff morale (Keil, Mann, &Rai, 2000), could 
accentuate present-bias of IT managers in terminating these projects. 
We examined two distinct cases of self-awareness among IT managers about 
their time-preferences, TC and naïve. Our results indicate that at the commitment stage, 
IT project with option to abandon is valued equally irrespective of time-preferences of 
the manager. Present-bias preferences affect the option to abandon exercise decisions 
when the real option allows the IT manager multiple exercise decision time periods 
during project’s life. Having multiple exercise decision time periods is likely in IT 
projects, especially in large scale projects, with considerable risk involved. Also, high 
risk projects are typically managed in stages, especially when switch use option is 
213 
 
 
 
present. For example, while developing a new system, it might be put to another use in 
the organization, after initial stage, if it does not work for its initially intended use. 
IT managers with present-bias preferences may exercise these options to 
abandon late due to avoiding immediate costs or realizing immediate salvage value, and 
their unawareness of such preferences. Business environment may impact the IT 
manager’s time-preferences as well. In situations like when managers’ reputation is at 
stake, the political ramifications of abandoning, and the possible effect of abandonment 
on staff morale (Keil, Mann, &Rai, 2000), it may prevent IT managers from terminating 
the project, with a hope of project recovery. Unfortunately, the projects seldom recover 
and end up as a failed endeavor.  
We found that when the salvage value of the project is immediate and constant 
over time, managers’ time preferences will have no impact on their decision to 
terminate the deep in the money project. In case if the salvage value of the project is 
decreasing overtime, time preferences of the managers will come into play. For higher 
values of salvage value of the project, present-bias was found to less likely to cause 
delay in the exercise of the option. With increasing rate of decline in salvage value of 
the project, present-bias was found to less likely to cause delay in the exercise of the 
option. We also found that higher values of payoffs from not exercising the option to 
abandon project in this case decrease the likelihood that the manager will exercise the 
option early. These findings are partially consistent with the literature. Naïves are 
supposed to delay immediate cost activities and rush into immediate reward, where for 
immediate cost activities; a small present-bias can severely affect naïve decision makers 
(O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999b). Higher payoffs from continuing the project decrease 
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option value and higher salvage value increase the option value. Accordingly, IT 
managers should be tempted to realize the value when either project payoffs are high, or 
salvage value is high. Also, they should not delay the exercise decisions when salvage 
value decreases at increasing rate overtime. Our results point in the same direction, 
when the salvage value is decreasing overtime. Large salvage value, payoffs from 
continuing the project and rate of decrease in salvage value decrease b̅and require the 
manager to have more present-bias to delay exercising the option. But in the case of 
immediate and constant salvage value, managers will instead take the rational decision 
and terminate the project, if it is performing below expectation.  
5.5.1 Managerial Implications  
Managers with present-bias may delay exercising option to abandon. Hence, it is 
not enough for managers to recognize option to abandon in a project and intuitively 
evaluate their value (options thinking). They need to conduct formal option analysis; to 
be aware of their time-preferences over time; to reevaluate payoffs, costs, and 
parameters compared with previous period’s estimates. Furthermore, the organization 
should have incentives in place to mitigate the effects of present-bias.  
Changes to IT governance may help mitigate the effects of present-bias. IT 
governance procedures will benefit from requiring formal analytical methods to valuate 
investment decisions.  This analysis must rely on inputs from multiple managers and 
must have a post-project evaluation of performance to identify any existing biases. 
Incorporating healthy competition with IT governance can hence help control the 
effects of these biases as well (Brocas and Carrilo, 2001).  
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Another important implication for IT governance and for managing IT projects 
is the choice of methods and procedures for controlling risks, especially in IT 
infrastructure investments.  Since there is a risk that a present-biased manager will delay 
exercising an option, especially if the project has political ramifications, using a 
systematic and objective method to update estimates needed for option evaluation is 
important to reduce risk.  A possible way for achieving that is to conduct a “net change” 
evaluation at each option exercise period.  This implies that the evaluation begins with 
the estimates of option parameters, costs, and payoffs used in the previous period and 
changes are only made when justifications are provided based on new information.  
Following such approach would limit the creep of present biasness.   
Present-bias preferences can impact option exercise decisions for growth options 
as well as option to abandon project. But their impact is significantly different in each 
case. For naïve IT managers, present bias preferences may rush them to exercise the 
growth option. However, the same preferences may prevent them from terminating a 
poorly performing project. Both options are impacted by these preferences when there 
are multiple decision instances for the manager. 
5.5.2 Limitations and Future Research 
 In this study, we concentrate on two simple cases of abandonment option i.e. 
constant salvage value overtime and decreasing salvage value overtime. In both cases 
we assumed salvage value to be deterministic. A valid extension would be to explore 
the effects of time inconsistent preferences on IT projects with stochastic salvage value. 
We also studied only a two-time period model. Another extension to this research 
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would be to expand the model for multiple time periods and analyses the sensitivity and 
impact of time inconsistent preferences with respect to project performance.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Prior studies have found inconsistencies between managerial intuition and real 
option values across different real option types and settings (Benaroch et al., 2006; Busby 
& Pitts, 1997; Lankton & Luft, 2008; Tiwana et al., 2006; Tiwana et al. 2007). Recent IS 
literature is inclined towards the idea due to the increasing popularity and advocacy of the 
real option theory in justifying and managing IT investments. In this dissertation we 
approached the problem by studying it from more realistic angle i.e. vulnerabilities of 
real options exercise decisions to managerial intuition.  
The first part of the dissertation focuses on testing the effects of framing on real 
options exercise decisions in individual IT projects, narrow framing in IT portfolios and 
role of individual risk behavior of the decision maker. By concentrating on two types of 
real options commonly found in IT investments i.e. growth and abandonment, we tried to 
study if the perceptual framing associated with growth and abandonment option values 
result in different risk behaviors at exercise decision time, leading to sub optimal exercise 
decisions respectively. We found that real option exercise decisions are vulnerable to 
framing and narrow framing effects and individual risk behavior play a significant role in 
managing IT investments by influencing these decisions.  
We also tried to test for factors that can potentially decrease these effects hence 
improving the decision making under flexibility. We found that simplification of decision 
scenarios and reducing the scale of the projects can limit these effects.  
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 The second and third studies theoretically explain the impact of time-inconsistent 
preferences on real option exercise decisions. We conducted numerical tests to get a 
deeper understanding of how time inconsistent preferences impact the decision of IT 
managers under uncertainty, for growth option and abandonment option scenarios. We 
found that present-bias preferences may play a role in biased decision making for option 
exercise decisions for growth options as well as option to abandon project. The impact of 
present bias preferences of IT managers is significantly different, depending on the type 
of the real option. For naïve IT managers, present bias preferences may rush them to 
exercise the growth option. However, the same preferences may or may not prevent them 
from terminating a poorly performing project.  
Findings of this thesis will hopefully change the way real options are perceived in 
IS. Although managerial instincts have been shown to be in alignment with the real 
options logic, they are vulnerable to the managerial biases. We add knowledge to the use 
of real options in IT investment decisions by exploring three of the biases found to be 
primitive to human cognition: framing, narrow framing and time-inconsistent 
preferences. We are confident that our findings may apply to other areas where ROT is 
used as a risk management methodology. Further investigation is required though to 
confirm their generalizability. 
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY 
 
 
General Instructions 
1. You will be evaluating four individual IT projects and three IT portfolios in order to determine 
their future direction. 
2. Each IT portfolio consists of two IT projects that may or may not be related. 
3. Each project (individual and in portfolios) that you will be evaluating in this survey, will have either 
an option to invest further in it for its future expansion (Option to Grow) or an option to kill it 
before it is completed (Option to Abandon). 
4. You will be given information regarding expected future payoffs from the project and the uncertainty 
around these payoffs. 
 
Evaluation of Individual Projects 
• All the projects are approximately mid-way in their life cycle i.e. they have spent 50% of their 
allocated budget and are only 50% complete. 
• The estimated net present value (NPV) for each project depends on your decision. NPV of a project 
is the net future cash inflows of the project, adjusted for the time value of money. 
• Based on the information given, please make a decision in terms of exercising the option 
(described below). 
 
IT Project Profile 1 of 4   
 
 
 
What would you choose to do for Project 1? 
Invest (Exercise the option) 
Do not Invest (Do not exercise the option) 
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IT Project Profile 2 of 4 
 
 
 What would you choose to do for Project 2? 
Abandon (Exercise the option) 
Do not Abandon (Do not exercise the option) 
 
IT Project Profile 3 of 4 
 
 
 
What would you choose to do for Project 3? 
Invest (Exercise the option) 
Do not Invest (Do not exercise the option) 
 
 
IT Project Profile 4 of 4 
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What would you choose to do for Project 4? 
Abandon (Exercise the option) 
Do not Abandon (Do not exercise the option) 
 
 
IT Portfolios Evaluation 
Evaluation of IT Project Portfolios 
• Next you will be evaluating three IT project portfolios. Each project portfolio consists of two IT projects, 
and some information on resources allocated to them. 
• Each project within these project portfolios gives you a decision flexibility of either investing in it further 
for its growth (Option to Grow) or killing the project (Option to Abandon). 
• All the projects in the portfolios are approximately mid-way in their life cycle, i.e. they have 
spent 50% of their allocated budget and are only 50% complete. 
• Based on the information given, please make a decision in terms of exercising the option (described 
below) for each project within the portfolio. 
 
 
IT Project Portfolio Profile 1 of 3 
Both projects in this portfolio are independent of each other in terms of resources. This 
means each project in the portfolio has its own pool of financial and human resources. 
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What would you choose to do for each project in Portfolio 1? 
  Exercise the Option 
Do Not 
Exercise the 
Option 
Project 1 (Growth Option) 
  
Project 2(Abandonment Option) 
  
 
IT Project Portfolio Profile 2 of 3 
Both projects in this portfolio have resource dependency. This means each project in the 
portfolio share the same pool of financial and human resources. This sharing of resources 
among the projects within this portfolio means that resources from one project can be 
utilized in another project. 
 
What would you choose to do for each project in Portfolio 2? 
  Exercise the Option 
Do Not Exercise the 
Option 
Project 1 (Growth Option) 
  
Project 2(Abandonment Option) 
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IT Project Portfolio Profile 3 of 3 
Both projects in this portfolio are independent of each other in terms of resources. This 
means each project in the portfolio has its own pool of financial and human resources. 
 
What would you choose to do for each project in Portfolio 3? 
 
Exercise the Option 
Do Not 
Exercise the 
Option 
Project 1 (Growth Option) 
  
Project 2(Abandonment Option) 
  
 
Suppose you are managing a portfolio of two projects. Project 1 has the option to grow 
and project 2 has the option to abandon. Which of the following choices will be your 
decision for this portfolio? 
Realize Net Present Value of $450,000 for project 1 and Net Present Value of $ -450,000 for project 2. 
Realize Net Present Value of $450,000 for project 1 and Net Present Value of $ -250,000 for project 2. 
Realize Net Present Value of $250,000 for project 1 and Net Present Value of $ -450,000 for project 2. 
Realize Net Present Value of $250,000 for project 1 and Net Present Value of $ -250,000 for project 2. 
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Individual Risk Preferences 
For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood of engaging in each 
activity or behavior. Please provide a rating from "Very Unlikely" to "Very Likely". 
1. Would you consider betting a day’s income at the horse races?  
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not Sure Likely Very Likely 
2. Would you consider investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual 
fund?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not Sure Likely Very Likely 
3. Would you consider betting a day’s income at a high stake poker game?  
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not Sure Likely Very Likely 
4. Would you consider investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock?  
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not Sure Likely Very Likely 
5. Would you consider betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event (e.g. 
baseball, soccer, or football)? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not Sure Likely Very Likely 
6. Would you consider investing 5% of your annual income in a conservative stock?  
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not Sure Likely Very Likely 
 
7. Would you consider investing 10% of your annual income in government bonds (treasury 
bills)?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not Sure Likely Very Likely 
8. Would you consider gambling a week’s income at a casino?  
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Unlikely Unlikely Not Sure Likely Very Likely 
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Please answer the following questions to the best of your knowledge. 
 
1. Your gender                        Choose an item. 
 
 
2. Your Age (in years) 
 
3. Your work experience (in years) 
 
4. Industry sector that your organization belongs to?         Choose an item. 
 
 
5. Size of your firm in terms of annual revenue?               Choose an item. 
 
6. On a scale of 1 to 11, please indicate your experience with IT investment decisions? 
I have no experience at all 2 3 4 I am highly experienced  
 
7. On a scale of 1 to 11, please indicate your experience with decisions involving real options? 
I have no experience at all 2 3 4 I am highly experienced  
 
8. On a scale of 1 to 11, please indicate your experience with IT project portfolio decisions, similar to 
this survey? 
I have no experience at all 2 3 4 I am highly experienced  
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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
 
 
Hypotheses results for international data with sample size n=132. 
  
                                                 
29 H5 on international sample was only tested for the presence of narrow framing in portfolios. Testing 
the impact of scenario change and control variables is not the scope of this dissertation. 
Hypothesis Test Test 
Parameters 
Values Hypothesis 
Support 
Consistent 
with US 
data 
H1 t-stat 
(p- value) 
Project 1 15.392, p<.001 Supported Yes 
Project 3 11.798, p<.001 
H2 t-stat 
(p- value) 
Project 2 22.571, p<.001 Supported Yes 
Project 4 11.978, p<.001 
H3 Friedman’s 
rank test for k χ2 
Project 1,2 χ (1) 8, p<.01 Not Supported Yes 
Project 3,4 χ (1) = 0.019, 
p=.891 
H4a-d Friedman’s 
rank test for k χ 
Project 1,3 χ (1) = 8.26, 
p=.004 
H4a,b not 
supported. 
H4c,d 
supported 
Yes 
Project 2,4 χ(1) = 29.45, 
p<.001 
29H5a t-stat 
(p- value) 
Portfolio 1 10.61, <.001 Supported Yes 
Portfolio 2 10.94, <.001 
Portfolio 3 7.41, <.001 
H6 Friedman’s 
rank test for k χ 
Portfolio 1 χ (1) = 2.97, 
p=.0.085 
Not Supported Yes 
Portfolio 2 χ (1) = 3.27, 
p=.071 
Portfolio 3 χ (1) = 4.63, 
p=.031 
H7 Friedman’s 
rank test for k χ 
Portfolio 1 and 
2 
χ(1) = 0.125, 
p =0.724 
Not Supported Yes 
H8a,b Friedman’s 
rank test for k χ 
Portfolio 1 and 
3 
χ (1) = 10.52, 
p=0.001 
H8a not 
supported. 
H8b supported 
Yes 
H9 Friedman’s 
rank test for k χ 
Portfolio 1 and 
Simple 
Decision 
χ (1) = 45.56, 
p <.001 
Supported Yes 
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APPENDIX C: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. 
 
 
An IT manager will exercise the option int=2 instead of t=3if V2,2 ≥ V2,3.Therefore 
to findb̅, we solve V2,2 = V2,3for b̅. As shown in Figure 4.8, at t=2, the manager may 
only exercise the option today if uncertainty has resolved in projects favor and payoffs 
looks relatively certain.  This will reduce equation (4.2) for V2,2to: 
V2,2= Yl« # z       (a-1) 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Decision problem of naïve IT manager at t=2 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In equation (a-1), Max terms are eliminated because by t=2, uncertainty is resolved and 
the option is only feasible to be exercised today if payoffs moved upward. Hence the 
t=1 t=2 t=3
u 
u2 
d 
d 
u 
d2 
U
t
 (V) 
Max(0, db-f) 
 
Max(0, ub-f) 
Max(0, u2b-f) 
Max(0, d2b-f) 
Max(0, dub-f) 
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downward lattice in Figure 4.8 will be eliminated. Also r=1 because of the present 
nature of the exercise decision.  
Similarly, at t=2, equation (4) for V2,3will be: 
V2,3 = 


     (a-2) 
Again, Max terms are eliminated because by t=2, some uncertainty is resolved if 
option is exercised in the next period. As the payoffs have already moved upward by u 
at this point, eliminating the downward lattice of the tree at t=2 indicates the adjusted 
option value for the decline in future payoffs at that time. For the value of option at t=3, 
the possible movement of future payoffs further by u and d will stay in the valuation 
because there is still uncertainty around payoffs value at t=3. The possibility of future 
payoffs recovering from downward movement in t=3 is kept in the V2,3. Future payoffs 
value moving down by d in t=3 after moving up by u in t=2 is equal to future payoffs 
value moving up by u in t=3 after moving down by d in t=2. As the Max function will 
possibly not give a zero outcome for Max (0, dub-f) due to our conditions d<r<u and ub 
- f  > b - f > 0>db - f, it was kept in the equation. Also discount rate r will apply for 
only one time period because when the IT manager at t=2, the payoffs in period t=3 are 
only one time period away.  
Solving (a-1) and (a-2) for b̅ gives b̅ = 
  
 
 
 
 
